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International Trade Under the Rule of Law
Organized and sponsored by the Dean Rusk Center and designated an 
American Society of International Law Centennial Regional Meeting, this 
conference focused on the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) with a view toward discussing the need for a su-
perstructure of international law governing trade and economic cooperation 
between states.
From the time the DSS was established pursuant to the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, questions concerning the reform of enforcement measures and 
the system as a whole, the role of Appellate Body decisions in global gover-
nance, and the issue of who benefi ts most from the system have continued to 
challenge practitioners and scholars alike. A distinguished group of interna-
tional panelists – compromised of diplomats, academics, legal practitioners, 
and government offi cials – assembled to address and explore these and other 
questions relating to international trade under the rule of law.
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The Dean Rusk Center
The Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law was estab-
lished in 1977 to expand the scope of research, teaching, and service at the 
University of Georgia School of Law into the evolving international dimen-
sions of law. In 2000, it became the Dean Rusk Center – International, 
Comparative, and Graduate Legal Studies as it merged with the law school’s 
International and Graduate Legal Studies program to capitalize on the com-
bined strength of the two units. Today, the Dean Rusk Center plays an active 
role in the international arena by hosting conferences and visiting scholars 
and by undertaking international research and outreach projects. Through 
these activities, the Center seeks to provide a sound basis for policy judg-
ments, to increase international understanding, and to contribute to the so-
lution of problems and issues of global signifi cance. The Center’s impact is 
evident on a multitude of levels. At the School of Law, it serves as a forum for 
the exchange of ideas and the development of international projects among 
students, faculty, staff practitioners, and alumni. For UGA, the Dean Rusk 
Center works to expand academic synergy between law and other disciplines.
To aid the State of Georgia, the Center seeks to be a complementary resource 
for collaboration on trade issues and their impact on the state and region as 
well as for promoting Georgia’s effective involvement in international trade 
and investment. At the national level, the Center collaborates with academic, 
professional, and governmental legal institutions to promote the integration 
of parallel efforts in international and comparative law. Globally, the Dean 
Rusk Center plays an active role in exchange and outreach; collaboration 
with universities, judiciaries, and governments around the world has bol-
stered institutional reform, capacity building, and legal scholarship.
Further information regarding the Dean Rusk Center – International, Com-
parative, and Graduate Legal Studies is available on the Center’s web page: 
www.uga.edu/ruskcenter
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Thursday, March 23, 2006
Welcome
Rebecca H. White, Dean, School of Law, University of Georgia*
C. Donald Johnson, Director, Dean Rusk Center, 
School of Law, University of Georgia**
Rebecca H. White:  Good afternoon. My name is Rebecca White. I am 
the dean of the School of Law, and it is my pleasure to welcome you to the 
University of Georgia, to the Dean Rusk Center and to our conference, In-
ternational Trade Under the Rule of Law. 
Here, at the University of Georgia, we understand the value and impor-
tance of having an international perspective of the law. This understanding 
is refl ected in our outstanding international curriculum and in our faculty 
and through events such as this conference. The Dean Rusk Center, through 
conferences such as this, provides an excellent way for our students and our 
faculty to learn about the practical aspects of international law and policy. 
The contributions of panelists, such as those we have with us today, help 
broaden the perspectives and increase dialogue related to international law 
between and among our law school community members. Thank you so 
much for taking the time to be with us today. 
As the world becomes more connected through technological advances 
and globalization, we continue to see increased activity in international trade 
and commerce. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an important in-
stitution, providing structure and direction related to this increased activity. 
The path toward progressive international trade liberalization continues to be 
fi lled with both challenges and opportunities, and it is our hope that this con-
ference will provide a valuable venue for discussion related to these issues.

* Dean and J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
** Director, Dean Rusk Center – International, Comparative, and Graduate Legal Studies, 
University of Georgia School of Law; Moderator (Panel 2: After a Decade of Dispute Settle-
ment Cases, Whom Does the System Benefi t?).
2As with past conferences, the dedicated staff of the Dean Rusk Center, 
under the direction of Ambassador Don Johnson, has worked very hard to 
put together an excellent group of international participants. I know you 
are looking forward, as we all are, to an exciting two days of discussion and 
presentation during this timely conference on international trade and the 
Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the WTO. Again, I thank you so much 
for taking the time to be with us here in Athens.  
C. Donald Johnson:  Thank you, Dean White. On behalf of the Dean 
Rusk Center, I would also like to welcome you to our conference, Interna-
tional Trade Under the Rule of Law, which I hasten to point out, is also an 
American Society of International Law Centennial Regional Meeting. This, 
for those of you who might not remember, is the 100th anniversary of the 
American Society of International Law, which has honored us in allowing us 
to hold a regional conference in celebration of that centennial. 
In recognition of the growing importance and evolving dimensions of 
international law, the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative 
Law was created in 1977 in honor of the late Dean Rusk, who served on 
this faculty for nearly a quarter of a century, and was a mentor and teacher 
to a generation of students who came through here, following his service in 
the Johnson and Kennedy administrations as secretary of state. In addition 
to holding conferences and lectures, other activities of the Center include 
research, graduate legal studies, international judicial training, and summer 
abroad programs – we have a new summer abroad program in China begin-
ning this summer – and Professor Gabriel Wilner has been running the Brus-
sels Program on the Law and Institutions of the European Union for over 
thirty years. But it is through conferences such as this one that we perhaps 
play our most active role in the international arena, as we seek to increase the 
understanding of international law and policy decisions, and contribute, we 
hope, to the solutions of issues of global signifi cance. In doing so, we think 
it is very important to bring not only academics to these conferences but 
also people who are actively engaged in the process, as well as those who are 
sometimes affected by the process. In other words, this is not a conference 
that is simply for academic discussion, although I am sure we will have a lot 
of interesting academic discussions because we have a number of eminent 
scholars with us here. 
Today, we have assembled, in addition to the distinguished scholars, a 
distinguished group of diplomats, government offi cials, and practitioners. 
3Therefore, we hope that this will be a comprehensive review of the fi rst ten 
years of the WTO DSS. It is a period that has enjoyed quite a bit of contro-
versy from time to time, particularly in the political world in which we all 
currently reside. It should be a very lively and interesting discussion, and we, 
of course, look forward to having the participation of the audience at the ap-
propriate times. As many of you who attended the Seattle ministerial meeting 
and other ministerial meetings know, some people like to speak out during 
inappropriate times. I do not see any of those people here at this time, but we 
are happy to have the discussion and look forward to that dialogue. 
I also want to give a word of thanks, as Dean White did, to the staff of 
the Dean Rusk Center. Assistant Director André Barbic has done a lot of 
great work in putting this together, as has Nelda Parker our general offi ce 
manager. Also, I want to thank Rebecca O’Grady, who is our administrative 
associate, and Maria Giménez, who is our associate director, for all the work 
they have done, as well as Professor Gabriel Wilner, who will be joining us. 
He is associate dean and head of the graduate legal studies program, as well 
as executive director of the Dean Rusk Center. He and visiting professor Kim 
Van der Borght, who will also be on one of the panels a little bit later, were 
instrumental in arranging for a number of our panelists to come, and helped 
in the organization of this conference. So, I would not want to neglect to 
thank them for their work.
Without further ado, I turn the fi rst panel, which is on reform of the 
WTO in general, over to our moderator Peter Spiro, who is the Dean & 
Virginia Rusk Professor of International Law here at the University. He also 
serves as associate dean for faculty development. He has had a great record in 
areas of his specialty, which of course are international law and constitutional 
aspects of foreign affairs, as well as immigration and nationality issues. He is a 
former clerk of the United States Justice of the Supreme Court David Souter. 
He also served as director for democracy on the National Security Council 
in the White House, has been an attorney advisor in the State Department’s 
legal advisor offi ce, and is a resident associate for the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. 
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5Should the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Be Modifi ed or Reformed?
Moderator: Peter J. Spiro, Associate Dean and Dean & Virginia Rusk 
Professor of International Law, School of Law, University of Georgia
Dencho Georgiev, Ambassador of Bulgaria to the WTO
Stephen Kho, Associate General Counsel, 
Offi ce of the United States Trade Representative
Amy S. Dwyer, Of Counsel, Stewart and Stewart
Peter Spiro:  I would like to echo Don and the Dean’s welcome. We are 
delighted to be hosting such a distinguished group and, as Don said, such a 
mixed group. There is great virtue in bringing together academics, govern-
ment offi cials, and practitioners by way of exchanging thoughts on important 
issues such as this one. And, on this panel, we have each sector represented. 
The way we will proceed is as follows: each of the speakers will open with 
twenty or twenty-fi ve minutes of introductory remarks; I will introduce all 
three before we get started. Then, I hope we will have some time for discus-
sion following their remarks. 
Today, we have on this panel Dencho Georgiev. He is ambassador of 
Bulgaria to the World Trade Organization (WTO), but I would offer him as 
our academic representative on this panel – if that is fair – or one who has 
crossed the divide, at least. He is a “sometime” professor of international 
law in Bulgaria and has published widely on issues related to both trade and 
international legal theory. 
We then have Stephen Kho, who is our government representative. He 
is Associate General Counsel in the Offi ce of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR). For purposes of our discussion today, he was, in effect, at 
the center of the action as the legal advisor at the U.S. Mission to the WTO 
in Geneva before assuming his current responsibilities as the principal attor-
ney at USTR on all China matters. 

6And then from the practice sector, we have Amy Dwyer, who is an inter-
national trade attorney and “of counsel” to one of the country’s leading trade 
law fi rms, Stewart and Stewart in Washington, D.C. She has had an extensive 
and varied practice in trade matters, both in the domestic institutions of inter-
national trade as well as in the WTO, since 1990. So, I would like to welcome 
all three of our panelists. We will proceed fi rst with Ambassador Georgiev.
Dencho Georgiev:  Thank you very much. I would fi rst like to start by 
thanking the Dean Rusk Center for inviting me. It is a pleasure and an honor 
to be here. I am delighted to hear that you want to have a mix of academic, 
governmental, and other expertise, because I think that that is exactly why I 
fi nd this conference a very useful and timely initiative. 
WTO matters affect a much broader range of people than just govern-
ment representatives, with whom I am communicating most of the time now. 
People are interested in WTO matters, and governments are infl uenced by 
what people think about WTO matters. In Seattle, during the WTO ministe-
rial conference in 1999, we heard the demonstrators’ argument that impor-
tant matters are decided by three offi cials somewhere in the dark in Geneva. 
As a result, we saw governments coming out with proposals for transparency, 
etc. Who speaks out is important, and I think that lawyers and academics and 
universities should also speak out. It is a subject matter which affects econo-
mies at large – not just businesses, but also employment and development. 
The question before this panel is: whether the WTO system should be modi-
fi ed or reformed, which seems a simple and straightforward question – and 
I guess there are simple and straightforward answers possible – but in fact, 
matters may not be that simple. There is an agreed answer to this question, 
and the answer in the Doha Declaration is that it is not to be fundamentally 
changed but only “clarifi ed and improved.”1  That is the mandate in the 
Doha Declaration, which seems quite simple. Nevertheless, the proposals 
which have been submitted in the course of the negotiations on the reform of 
the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) are contained in fi fty-four papers.  The 
compilation of proposals is at one hundred and something pages, whereas the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) itself is only about thirty pages.2 
The proposals cover all articles of the DSU except three of them. 
1 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
7So, on the one hand, governments did not want to change the system fun-
damentally (and they said so: it has to be clarifi ed, modifi ed and improved), but 
they have submitted a large number of proposals. These are not the only pos-
sible proposals; proposals continue to come in. We had last week, just before I 
came, a few other proposals, and there are other possible proposals. Kim Van 
der Borght and I have co-edited a collection of essays where there are a num-
ber of other proposals, which are not governmental – some of them probably 
never will be.3  But I think that a debate on whether and how the DSS of the 
WTO should be improved or modifi ed should not be limited just to discussion 
within the negotiations. As I said, it is a matter which affects wider circles.
The answer to the question – What should be changed in the system? – is 
contained in those proposals which have been submitted so far, or could be 
submitted, and many of the proposals contain their own motivation. But 
apart from this, it makes sense to put the question in a more general sense: 
What should be the aim of the changes and modifi cations; what should be their 
purpose? I will try to address some approaches to the more general question 
of whether it should be changed or not. 
One way of expressing an attitude about whether the WTO DSS should 
be changed or not changed, is by saying that we should only have the nec-
essary – the absolutely necessary – changes. It could be argued that even 
such problems, which have been generally acknowledged, like sequencing 
(the problem of whether you should go through a panel determination of 
whether a Member has complied with the recommendation of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) or not and then go to retaliation, or whether you 
can go directly to retaliation) should be solved through the present system. 
And, indeed, practice has tried to solve this problem in some way on a bilat-
eral ad hoc basis. So you could argue that nothing is necessary. The general 
approach of some was: If it ain’t broke, don’t fi x it; an approach that comes 
from an uncertainty – which was there in the Uruguay Round and after the 
Uruguay Round – and which is the effect of having created something abso-
lutely unique – never before seen – and people were not sure how it would 
work. 
But on the other hand – and this is what my own view is – dispute settle-
ment in the multilateral trading system has been the product of constant 
3 REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Dencho Georgiev and 
Kim Van der Borght eds., Cameron May Ltd., 2006).
8reform. It did not exist in the GATT ’47.4  Or, what existed there were a few 
texts which did not envisage the development of such a system. So the DSS 
is, in fact, the result of constant reform and improvements. At the same time, 
the possibilities, the opportunities which are there for reform of the system, 
are not there all the time. We do have, now, such an opportunity in the Doha 
Round; why not use it? And we should make not just the necessary changes, 
but all those changes which are reasonable and which can attract consensus.
 
My answer to the general question about the aim of improvement and 
clarifi cation (or, if you want, of change) is that it is reasonable to make the 
system more effective and more equitable. What is more effective, and what 
is more equitable? There is no easily available general standard which would 
allow you to go from this very general formulation to the specifi c, but I think 
that professionals – and that is the use of having such a conference as this one 
– can say, or, at least, can argue what is better and what is not better – from 
certain points of view, of course. Distinctions are being made by academics, 
and I think that academics have much to say about the improvement of the 
system. 
This transition from the more general motivation – the aim of the im-
provement of the system and the specifi c technical changes – has been, by 
the way, an issue in the negotiations themselves. The chairman (the pre-
vious chairman of the special session of the DSB, Ambassador Balás from 
Hungary) was complaining that there was no mandate; there were no aims 
– including those of having a more effective and more equitable system – in 
the mandate of the Doha Round, so there were some attempts to have a 
preliminary general discussion in the negotiations in order to specify some 
objectives. This has not worked, however, and the negotiations focused on 
the specifi cs rather than on the generalities. 
There has been an individual attempt by the Mexican delegation, which 
is very active in the dispute settlement reform (and we have with us here 
today Ambassador Perez Motta, who was personally very active) and has 
offered a diagnosis of the current state which could enable us to draw some 
conclusions and, on their basis, go into the specifi cs. But, this exercise did 
not multi-lateralize to become a mainstream endeavor to move from the gen-
eral to the specifi c, so, basically now what we have is just the specifi cs. 
4 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194.
9If we talk about generalities (and this will be the last generality about 
which I will be speaking) there is this major difference of attitude towards the 
WTO DSS, which existed before its creation and which still persists: whether 
we have a judicial system or some intergovernmental type of system. This has 
an infl uence on people’s attitudes and approaches, and it does play a role. 
I personally think that it is a judicial system in – probably – everything but 
name. 
So, for example, you could say that under the DSS, cases are decided just 
for themselves and that formally they have no precedential value like in a ju-
dicial system. In fact, however, it does not work like this, and Appellate Body 
decisions and panel reports do play the role of precedent. By the way, I come 
from the so-called continental system, which is different from the common 
law system and where the theory is that legislation is done by legislators, and, 
in the judicial system, the courts only apply the law, they do not create it and 
there is no precedent. In practice, however, precedent does play a role even 
in our system. It works the same way in the WTO.
The question of whether we have a judicial system or some sort of inter-
governmental form of decision making is important for the directions one 
could take in order to improve it: if it is judicial, then it is worth exploring 
the experiences of judicial systems; and if it is more intergovernmental, then 
methods for improvement of intergovernmental decision making could be 
explored. My view is that we should improve the DSS as a judicial system 
because the problems we are dealing with are problems of a judicial system. 
There is no single answer to the question of whether and how the DSS 
in the WTO should be improved. The answers are specifi c. What I could do 
is give examples of what I think could become part of a reasonable package 
of improvements, which would correspond to the wish of having a more ef-
fective and a more equitable DSS on the one hand, and on the other hand 
could, in my view, attract consensus. 
Some of the issues which could, I think, attract consensus are: sequenc-
ing, third-party rights, and remand. In spite of the different solutions offered, 
the question itself, whether to have improvements on these issues, did not 
seem controversial. And these issues were part of the Balás text,5 which was 
not adopted when it could have been adopted. Balás himself says that his 
5 Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Péter 
Balás, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/DS/9 (June 6, 2003).
10
proposal was not accepted because of reasons, which delegations themselves 
indicated. First, some delegations, whose proposals were not included, were 
against the text of his draft. Secondly, unfortunately, these are mercantilistic 
trade negotiations – including the dispute settlement negotiations; this is 
how things are. The third reason was the drafting, which, of course, could be 
improved. But ultimately, as he himself pointed out, the political conditions 
were not ripe for adoption of a package on dispute settlement.6 
The issue of timeframes is another interesting issue. I happen to have 
worked against the shortening of timeframes in this DSS when it was pro-
posed together with sequencing. It was about the shortening of timeframes 
before the adoption of the panel report, not after. And some Members – the 
smaller ones, those with limited administrative capacity and expertise – felt 
that they had too little time to prepare, especially when in a defensive posi-
tion, if they were respondents. Unfortunately, this has not been fi xed in any 
of the proposals so far. The time left to the respondents to prepare their fi rst 
submission is too little.
But, I have to say that, actually, two of the proposals now on the table 
are reasonable: [1] the establishment of panels at the fi rst DSB meeting, not 
at the second, as it is now, and [2] the shortening of the time for consulta-
tions. Instead of sixty days, it is proposed to have thirty days, but if the re-
spondent is a developing country, they will be allowed more time – which I 
do not think is fair because the division here is not between developed and 
developing countries, but between big and small, rich and poor. For instance, 
Albania, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia are considered to be developed countries. 
If they had a dispute, let us say, with Mexico (a country with considerable 
expertise in WTO dispute settlement), they would be disadvantaged. Devel-
oping countries have been insisting, and they have a point, on reducing the 
timeframes, especially for compliance after the recommendation of the DSB. 
They are not satisfi ed with having a long period in which a WTO inconsistent 
measure would stay in place, and they are right. Some shortening of some 
timeframes should be undertaken. 
I am being reminded of my “timeframes” (laughter), so I will just enu-
merate what else I think would be reasonable. A permanent roster of panel-
ists would serve a good purpose. It would make the system more effective. 
It would contribute to the improvement of the quality of panel decisions. It 
6 Id.
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would enhance the legitimacy of the system. It would not be some “three 
offi cials from somewhere,” but it would be three permanent judges – chosen 
in a legitimate process. Third party rights are important because we have a 
judicial system, and because legislation in an international legal system has 
certain impediments. The law – want it or not – is being, if not created, then 
at least refi ned and developed by the judicial system of the WTO – by panels 
and the Appellate Body. But, the participation of Members in that system is 
restrained just to those who are participating in specifi c disputes, so, from 
the point of view of the legitimacy of global governance, it is important to 
enhance third party rights. External transparency is also something that con-
tributes to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the DSS. Remand seems to be 
a technical matter which is undisputed. The strengthening of remedies also 
seems important. Thank you. 
Spiro:  Thanks very much. I did not mean to impose on you by pegging 
you as an academic, but maybe that refl ects my own institutional bias. Our 
next speaker is Stephen Kho.
Stephen Kho:  Thank you, and thank you for the opportunity to be a 
part of this conference. Before I begin, I would like to – I am obligated to 
– confi rm that my remarks are, for media purposes, off the record. That is 
probably not at issue here, but I have to say it anyway; no quotes or attribu-
tions. My views are my personal views and not necessarily the views of the 
U.S. government. 
Let me begin by saying that for those of us who have argued cases before 
the WTO, and for those of us who have been Geneva delegates for heavy dis-
pute settlement users (dealing with the minutia of these rules day in and day 
out), the topic of this panel is near and dear to our hearts. We argue about 
the rules among ourselves, among our colleagues; we think about them in 
the shower; they become punch lines to our jokes. It sounds pretty pathetic, 
but a conference like this just feeds our insatiable appetites for all things 
DSU. So thank you, Ambassador Johnson and the University of Georgia. 
I want to respond to the question of whether the WTO DSS should be 
modifi ed or reformed by fi rst asking a slightly different question, and that 
is: Does the WTO Dispute Settlement System need to be modifi ed? Is it so broken 
that it cannot be fi xed – that it must be fi xed? I think the resounding answer to 
that question is: No. Most WTO Members agree that the system is currently 
functioning quite well. More and more Members are using the system, and 
disputes are being resolved. This last point, by the way, is of utmost impor-
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tance because the main purpose of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
is, in fact, to resolve disputes. I will speak more on this later. 
So what does this mean – that the system is perfect? By no means. As with 
all dispute resolution systems, adjustments can be made to make the system 
better. And with that premise in mind, my answer to the question posed to 
this panel is: Yes, I think the WTO system could do with a bit of tinkering. 
So what kind of tinkering would be useful? It should come as no surprise 
that my personal views in this case pretty much parallel the views of my em-
ployer, my client, the U.S. government. At the WTO, Members have been 
engaged in an extended review of the DSU since 1998. Many amendments 
have been proposed, affecting, as I have said, almost every single provision 
of the DSU, and yet no consensus has been reached on which amendments 
should be adopted. Some would say that this supports the general notion 
that the system is actually working quite well as is. Others would simply say 
that this is just showing that it is diffi cult for 149 Members to reach consen-
sus. There is truth to both of those views. 
For its part, the U.S. has proposed two sets of amendments, and I want 
to focus on those. The fi rst involves transparency. I think greater transpar-
ency in the dispute settlement proceeding would benefi t the system. It would 
improve and strengthen the operation of the system. How so? Well, I think 
that experience has shown that WTO dispute decisions can affect a large sec-
tor of civil society. With the increased membership of the WTO, this only 
means that more people will become more interested in WTO decisions. 
And yet, currently, civil society and even WTO Members (those that are not 
parties or third parties to the dispute) have been unable to even observe the 
arguments or proceedings that lead to the decisions that affect them – save 
one exception, and I will get to that in a second. We have all heard criticisms 
about how the WTO is nontransparent; how the WTO process is in fact a 
“black box;” and how the public can not be confi dent about decisions being 
made by the Appellate Body. 
Frankly, being more transparent, in my mind, is a “no-brainer.” Letting 
the public observe the panel and the Appellate Body proceedings and hear 
the arguments that are being made can only improve confi dence in the fair-
ness of the system. Public confi dence translates into greater support for im-
plementing the decisions that are made. At the same time, non-party WTO 
Members would benefi t from being able to learn more about the process 
without having to become third parties, which, as some of you may know, 
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requires some active participation and additional burdens. Moreover, trans-
parency in international tribunals is not unique. The International Court of 
Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the European 
Court of Human Rights – just to name a few – all hold public hearings. 
The U.S. proposal is to allow the public to observe all substantive panel, 
Appellate Body, and arbitration meetings with parties; to make all submis-
sions and statements public; and to have fi nal panel reports made available 
to the parties, to other WTO Members, and to the public, all at the same 
time. The proposal also takes into account the need to safeguard confi dential 
information as it arises in disputes. 
Again, a “no-brainer,” right? But there have been concerns raised. The 
most common one being that greater transparency means that the “gov-
ernment-to-government” nature of WTO proceedings might somehow be 
compromised. To be frank, I do not get this argument. Allowing the public 
to watch the proceedings and read the submissions does not mean the public 
can then participate in the proceedings. The public has no rights under the 
WTO agreements to make submissions or to make statements, and being 
more transparent does not change any of that. 
Another concern raised is about the logistics of opening these hearings. 
This is a legitimate concern, and when the EU, the U.S., and Canada recent-
ly agreed to open up the panel proceedings in the Beef Hormones case,8 we 
all struggled with this question. What we ultimately decided to do was to set 
up a closed circuit television feed from the panel room to a larger, nearby au-
ditorium. The public could then sign up to watch the proceedings on a fi rst 
come, fi rst served basis. In the future, we might perhaps consider web-cast-
ing. It would be like watching CBS’s broadcast of March Madness, except, in-
stead of basketball, you would see guys (a bunch of men and women) in suits 
talking to each other. I know it is equally as exciting – it is; I assure you. 
As for making written submissions public, with the exceptions of those 
with confi dential information, it is already happening. When WTO fi nal re-
ports are made public at the end of proceedings, a party’s submissions and 
statements are essentially public at the same time. So, the only issue with re-
gard to the transparency of submissions, really, is when they become public. 
8 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, (Jan. 16 1998) (adopted Feb. 
13, 1998).
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Is it at the time when they are submitted to the WTO or at the end of the 
proceedings? I simply do not see a reason why they cannot be made public 
from the outset. 
Similarly, fi nal panel reports are currently made public at the end of the 
proceedings. So again, the only issue there, with regard to transparency, is 
when those reports should be made public. Should it only be after fi rst be-
ing issued on a confi dential basis to the parties, which is what the rules cur-
rently require? Or, should they be made public at the same time that reports 
are made to the parties? I would argue the latter. The current rules only 
encourage misunderstanding, since the public is often fed selective informa-
tion through speculation and leaks. To be fair though, the current rules are 
intended to ensure that the reports are offi cially available in all three offi cial 
WTO languages. But, I really do not see the goal of translating panel reports 
confl icting with the goal of enhanced transparency so long as there is suffi -
cient time for the disputing parties to analyze the report in any of the three 
WTO languages that they wish. 
The second main proposal of the United States involves providing fl ex-
ibility in dispute proceedings. As I noted earlier, the central aim of the WTO 
DSS is to resolve disputes. It is not to produce comprehensive reports or to 
create law, and I think that is where my view and Dencho Georgiev’s might 
diverge. In fact, the DSU is quite clear about this. Not only is prompt settle-
ment of the disputes the main objective, but the system, “cannot add to” 
– and I am quoting here from the DSU – “or diminish the rights and obliga-
tions” of Members that are already provided in the text of WTO agreements.9 
My personal opinion is that these stated goals have sometimes been brushed 
aside, intentionally or unintentionally, although I am sure not by anybody in 
this room that has been on a panel before. Therefore, it would be useful to 
introduce fl exibility into the system, which would assist in ensuring that all 
of the WTO stays true to the goal of the DSS as envisioned and agreed to by 
the parties, by the Members.
In that regard, the United States has proposed six procedural mechanisms 
for consideration. The fi rst is to provide an interim review stage at Appellate 
proceedings, similar to the stage currently provided for in panel proceedings. 
In other words, just like a panel, the Appellate Body would issue an interim 
report for the parties to comment on before fi nalizing their report. As with 
the panel, this would serve to ensure that the Appellate Body reports are of 
9 DSU, supra note 2, art 3.2.
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the highest quality, particularly given the goal of resolving disputes. Mistakes 
would be caught; unclear reasoning could be clarifi ed; unintentional incon-
sistencies could be rectifi ed. This is a win-win situation for the Appellate 
Body, for the parties to the dispute, and for the membership as a whole. Also, 
given that there is no appeal to Appellate Body decisions, such a mechanism 
would be particularly important. 
Some have argued that an interim review stage during the appellate pro-
ceedings is unnecessary, or would not be advisable because the Appellate 
Body deals with law and not with facts. In response, I would fi rst say that this 
is inaccurate. The Appellate Body often deals with facts, particularly as the 
law applies to those facts. Also, even legal analysis would benefi t from being 
reviewed. Another argument put forward is the suggestion that somehow 
the Appellate Body’s independence and authority would be compromised by 
such a review. I do not see the basis for this argument. In fact, to make that 
argument is to suggest that panels, with their interim reviews, are somehow 
“unobjective,” or their reports are less authoritative. And, if less authorita-
tive, does this mean that WTO Members must always appeal a report in 
order for that report to become authoritative? Frankly, having an interim 
review process can only further assure parties that the Appellate Body acted 
impartially and with authority by allowing the Appellate Body to respond to 
any questions the parties may have regarding its fi ndings, or to fi x any inad-
vertent mistakes (which is inevitable, given that the Appellate Body members 
are, themselves, human). 
The second procedural mechanism the United States proposes is to allow 
parties, after review of the interim report, to delete – by mutual agreement 
– fi ndings that are not necessary or helpful for resolving the dispute. Related 
to that, the United States also proposed a “partial adoption” procedure, 
whereby the WTO membership as a whole could decline to adopt certain 
parts of the report that are not helpful for resolving a dispute – while adopt-
ing those portions that allow the parties to secure the panel and Appellate 
Body rulings necessary to resolve the dispute. These two proposals are similar 
in that agreement is needed for the mechanisms to kick in. They are differ-
ent in that the deletion of fi ndings at the interim stage is contingent upon 
agreement just between the two disputing parties, whereas the deletion of 
portions of the report (be they fi ndings or reasonings) at the adopted stage 
requires the agreement of all 149 WTO Members. 
Regardless, these agreement requirements should alleviate any fear that 
any single WTO Member could misuse these procedures. In fact, I would 
16
expect that the mechanisms probably would not be used at all, maybe infre-
quently. The mere fact that they exist, however, could help to ensure that the 
panel and the Appellate Body reports are written with a single-minded focus 
towards resolving disputes. To the extent that the agreement is reached and 
that these mechanisms are used, they can only benefi t the system by – as I 
said before – obviating the need to appeal panel reports because unhelpful 
fi ndings can be deleted. 
Also requiring agreement by the disputing parties is a proposal to provide 
parties with the right to suspend panel and Appellate Body proceedings, in 
order to allow parties time to return to the settlement table should they want 
to. Currently, there is no provision for suspending Appellate Body proceed-
ings once they have begun. In the panel proceedings they can only be sus-
pended if the panel accepts the request of the complaining party.
The fi fth mechanism proposed by the United States is one that would 
ensure that individuals serving on panels have the appropriate expertise to 
appreciate the issues presented in the dispute. Experience to date shows that 
it is helpful for panelists to have the appropriate expertise concerning par-
ticular issues in a dispute, such as: intellectual property, services and trade 
remedies. I would note that that is different from the EC (European Com-
munity) proposal for a Standing Body.10  Currently, there is no provision in 
the DSU providing for this. 
Finally, the United States has proposed that Members provide guidance 
to WTO adjudicatory bodies regarding certain legal procedural issues that 
recur again and again in the disputes. To date, the United States has only 
identifi ed the issues for consideration, and it is consulting with other WTO 
Members to try to establish a shared view for purposes of providing this 
guidance. The issues identifi ed, by the way, have played important roles in 
the outcome of past disputes, and yet the Members have not yet expressed 
views collectively about them. Many of the issues are “inside baseball” stuff, 
like: what constitutes a measure under review; when should panels engage in 
judicial economy; the use of the so-called mandatory discretionary distinc-
tion. Two issues, however, might be of interest to some of you. The fi rst 
involves a relationship between the WTO and other public international law. 
This is the topic for tomorrow morning’s session, so I will not get into it 
10 Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European Communi-
ties and its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
(Mar. 13, 2002).
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here. The second involves the interpretive approach to be taken by WTO 
adjudicatory bodies. Generally speaking, the interpretive approach, in com-
mon law countries, tends to lean towards making law, towards fi lling in the 
gaps of existing laws; whereas the interpretive approach in civil law countries 
tends to focus more on clarifying the existing text, the existing statutes. So 
the question is: which interpretive approach should the WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body take? And, as has been mentioned, should they be modifi ed to be 
more judicial or much more of an intergovernmental process? I think we can 
see the difference in views there. 
Obviously, the WTO membership has not reached a consensus on this 
view, but as I mentioned before, the DSU is quite clear that the dispute pro-
cess cannot diminish and cannot add to a Member’s rights and obligations. 
The Appellate Body has confi rmed this itself by noting that the principles of 
the interpretation of the DSU – and I am going to quote from the Appellate 
Body here – “neither require[s] nor condone[s] the imputation into a treaty 
of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that 
were not intended.”11 
With that context in mind, here are some questions that the Members are 
currently asking themselves as they wrestle with this particular issue: 
1. What signifi cance should be attached to the fact that the WTO agree-
ments are a result of negotiations and compromises among sovereign 
nations and autonomous customs territories?
2. What signifi cance should be attached to the fact that the agreements 
are sometimes imprecise and susceptible to more than one interpretation 
as a result of those compromises?
3. What signifi cance should be attached to the fact that the agreements 
are not comprehensive and, oftentimes, silent on certain issues? 
I, for one, will be very interested in the membership’s collective answers 
to these questions.
In conclusion, these are what I think would be useful tweaks to the WTO 
DSS. It could do with a little tweaking and a little tinkering, but it has worked 
pretty well so far, for the most part. Indeed, at the end of the day, trade dis-
putes are and continue to be resolved using the system, and that is what is 
important. Thank you.
11 Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998).
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Spiro:  Thanks very much, Steve. Our fi nal speaker is Amy Dwyer.
Amy Dwyer:12  Thank you. My name is Amy Dwyer, and I have been 
with the law offi ces of Stewart and Stewart in Washington, D.C., for over 
fi fteen years. My boss, Terry Stewart, was unfortunately unable to make it 
this afternoon and asked me to fi ll in for him. Over the years, we have done a 
fair amount of thinking and writing on the question before this panel, which 
is: Should the WTO Dispute Settlement System Be Modifi ed or Reformed? In 
October 2004, we had the opportunity to prepare a short chapter for a com-
pilation of essays on the reform of the system. That chapter will be published 
by Cameron May in June of this year. I should mention that Ambassador 
Georgiev, on this panel, and Professor Van der Borght, on Panel 3 tomor-
row, were the co-editors of that compilation. Many of my remarks today are 
based on that chapter, so with the permission of the publisher, I have made 
available a limited number of copies of our chapter for you today, and I think 
they are by the door if you want to pick them up for perusal.13  
The question for the panel is: Should the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Be Modifi ed or Reformed? And the short answer is: Yes. While most Mem-
bers support and recognize the system as a signifi cant achievement, reform is 
necessary to maintain the proper role of disputes in the WTO. In 1995, the 
system was viewed as a great experiment. Members agreed that it should be 
reviewed within four years so that a decision could be made to “continue, 
modify, or terminate” its rules and procedures.14  Most WTO Members are 
generally pleased with the functioning of the system. A number of trends in 
decisions, however, raise questions that should be reviewed and addressed in 
the context of the DSU negotiations. 
On this slide, I have listed a series of questions concerning whether the 
system is functioning as intended. My comments will review some of these 
questions and then turn to a select group of proposals made in the context of 
the ongoing DSU negotiations. 
12 Remarks were complemented by a PowerPoint slide presentation. 
13 Terence P. Stewart, Amy S. Dwyer, & Elizabeth M. Hein, Proposals for DSU Reform 
that Address, Directly or Indirectly, the Limitations on Panels and the Appellate Body Not 
to Create Rights and Obligations, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 331 (Dencho Georgiev and Kim Van der Borght eds., Cameron May 
Ltd., 2006).
14 Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1259-1260. (Aug. 26, 2002).
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[Question 1: Why is there such a high WTO violation rate?]
The facts are that the complaining parties successfully establish at least 
one WTO violation in ninety percent of the cases that result in decisions, 
compared to a sixty percent win/loss rate in GATT days. The fairly high 
win/loss rate raises a number of questions. For example, does the trend re-
fl ect the novelty of the system, or does it refl ect the development of a plain-
tiffs’ court? Is it reasonable to think that only WTO panels and the Appel-
late Body know what the covered agreements mean? Does the success rate 
encourage litigation over negotiation, and, if so, how is that consistent with 
the WTO system? 
[Question 2: Can a complaining party increase the likelihood of success 
by soliciting others to join in the dispute?]
Another trend that is hard to ignore is the tendency of WTO Members 
to band together to pursue cases against the same measure to increase their 
odds of victory. Does it work? Well, they say there is power in numbers. In 
this case, it looks like that might be true. The success rate of cases with mul-
tiple complaining parties increases to 100 percent of cases brought, which 
raises the concern that individual WTO Members lacking a strong WTO case 
can, and do, enlist the help of others to challenge unpopular laws to improve 
their success rate. The “pile-on” effect of multiple complaining parties can 
give the appearance of broad Member concern with a trading partner’s mea-
sure. Note that, of the fi fteen disputes brought by multiple complaining par-
ties, the U.S. or the EC was a responding party in eight of those cases. 
[Question 3: Why are Members fi xated with challenging trade remedy 
measures?]
A third trend is the high number of trade remedy disputes compared to 
their effect on trade. As of September 2005, almost fi fty percent of WTO 
disputes involved trade remedies. Forty-eight percent of requests for con-
sultations involved the WTO Agreements on anti-dumping, subsidies and 
countervailing measures or safeguards. Forty-two percent of all decisions in-
volved trade remedy measures. The U.S. was the responding party in sixty 
percent of those trade remedy disputes resulting in decisions. 
The trend raises a number of questions when trade remedies typically 
affect a tiny percentage of total trade and WTO Members. For example, 
is it reasonable that trade remedy disputes should account for almost fi fty 
percent of disputes when they typically affect a tiny percentage of total trade 
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and WTO Members, generally less than one percent? Or, is it reasonable 
to expect that a single WTO Member – the United States – would be the 
responding party in sixty percent of trade remedy disputes resulting in deci-
sions but only account for fi fteen percent of all anti-dumping, countervailing 
duty, or safeguard initiations? Of course, the United States is a major im-
porter and user of trade remedies, but it also has one of the most transparent 
trade remedy systems in the world. Query whether the transparency that our 
country demands from the U.S. government is the same transparency that 
makes it easier to challenge? The trend has raised a red fl ag for Congress. In 
the Trade Act of 2002, Congress specifi cally expressed its concerns with the 
trend in trade remedy decisions and objected to the imposition of new obli-
gations and restrictions on the use of anti-dumping, countervailing duty, or 
safeguard measures.15
[Question 4: Is gap-fi lling and the construction of silence in covered 
agreements consistent with DSU limitations?]
The fourth trend, and one of the most serious problems facing the dis-
pute system, is the extent to which WTO Members consider that panels or 
the Appellate Body have overreached their authority by creating new obliga-
tions for Members – which raises the question: Is gap-fi lling and the construc-
tion of silence in covered agreements consistent with DSU limitations?
Prior to the DSU, as a general matter, GATT panels did not construe 
silence or fi ll gaps. The Uruguay Round negotiations to change the GATT 
dispute system were focused on expediting the process and providing conse-
quences for adverse decisions. There was no indication that the DSU would 
change the nature of the dispute system. Under the DSU, panel and Ap-
pellate Body decisions are automatically adopted unless Members decide 
by consensus not to adopt the reports. Likewise, modifi cations to covered 
agreements require consensus. As a result, it is virtually impossible to correct 
erroneous panel or Appellate Body decisions. 
Now, as a general matter, WTO panels and the Appellate Body do construe 
silence and fi ll gaps in covered agreements. Compared to GATT panel deci-
sions and early Appellate Body decisions,16 there has been a rather unexpected 
and fundamental shift in the operation of disputes. The Appellate Body has 
15 19 U.S.C. § 3801 (2002).
16 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 45 (Dec. 19, 1997).
21
become reluctant to accept the silence of an agreement text. Instead, it will 
try to determine whether the requirement was intended to be included by im-
plication.17  Nothing in the DSU, however, authorizes the Appellate Body to 
read the negotiators’ minds. If the agreement is silent, there is no obligation.
The Appellate Body has also indicated that panels should follow its deci-
sions.18  Although the system does settle trade disputes, it does not serve as 
a trade court. The system does not give panels or the Appellate Body the 
power to make law by issuing interpretations of covered agreements binding 
on all Members.19  For that reason, it is disturbing that the Appellate Body 
now expects panels to follow its decisions. Query how binding decisions will 
affect the rights of those WTO Members that are not participants in panel 
proceedings? Nothing in the DSU authorizes the approach taken by the Ap-
pellate Body. 
Yet, panels in the Appellate Body do have limits on their authority. First, 
they are not permitted to provide authoritative interpretations that are bind-
ing on all Members.20  That exclusive authority resides in the Members.  Sec-
ond, they are not permitted to “add to or diminish the rights and obliga-
tions” in covered agreements.21  Instead, the role of panels and the Appellate 
Body is to preserve the rights and obligations in the covered agreements, and 
to clarify existing provisions in those agreements.22
Existing limitations in the DSU, however, are proving to be insuffi cient. 
Roughly a third of all WTO Members have offi cially objected to instances of 
panel or Appellate Body “overreaching” in response to particular disputes 
or in the context of negotiating changes to the DSU. The fundamental shift 
in the operation of disputes has changed the way Members think about the 
role of disputes in negotiations. For instance, it is a widely recognized belief 
that Members are frequently choosing to litigate rather than negotiate is-
sues, despite the opportunities presented by the ongoing Doha Round of 
17 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corro-
sion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R, para. 65 (Nov. 
28, 2002).
18 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina,  WT/DS268/AB/R, para. 188 (Nov. 29, 
2004).
19 See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8, 10, 11/AB/R, 
Section E (Oct. 4, 1996).
20 See DSU, supra note 2, art. 3.9; Marrakesh Agreement Art. IX:2. 
21 DSU, supra note 2, arts. 3.2 & 19.2. 
22 DSU, supra note 2, art. 3.2.
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multilateral trade negotiations. Members are fi ling more panel requests than 
under the GATT system. Members are frequently alleging multiple WTO 
violations in a single challenge, perhaps to increase their odds of establishing 
a violation. Members are pursuing disputes in the absence of a clear violation 
of a covered agreement. Members’ behavior in daily negotiations has been 
affected by the operation of the dispute system.
[Question 5: Can the system survive without substantially increased 
transparency and public access?]
Another question that has been raised is whether the dispute system can 
survive without substantially increased transparency and public access. Al-
though the WTO website is updated with formal requests for consultations, 
establishment of panels, or fi nal reports, the public only has access to those 
written submissions voluntarily posted on Members’ websites. There is basi-
cally no access to oral hearings or transcripts. There is no public fi le room 
with copies of panel or Appellate Body working procedures or timetables in 
particular disputes. 
The current lack of transparency has the effect of denying actual, inter-
ested parties even the opportunity to observe the process and generate con-
fi dence in the system – which raises the serious question of whether society 
should accept the creation of new rights and obligations by an unelected en-
tity. Can the lack of transparency in the decision-making process encourage 
confi dence in the system when society is being directly affected by decisions 
of an unelected entity? 
Dr. Claude Barfi eld, with the American Enterprise Institute, recently tes-
tifi ed before Congress that the system is ultimately unsustainable as currently 
structured.23  The system now operates with an imbalance of power. On the 
one hand, you have a powerful dispute system run by the unelected, and 
[on the other,] a weaker and slower negotiating body unable to respond 
effectively to erroneous decisions. Dr. Barfi eld concluded that, eventually, 
the system would create major questions of democratic legitimacy when the 
judicial bodies “‘legislate’ new rights and obligations through judicial inter-
pretation.”24 
23 Senate Subcommittee Hearing on Securing American Sovereignty: A Review of the United 
States’ Relationship with the WTO, July 13, 2005, at p. 3. (Statement of Dr. Claude Barfi eld, 
Resident Scholar and Director of Science and Technology Policy Studies, American Enterprise 
Institute).
24 Id.
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[DSU Negotiations]
This leads us to the question of whether proposals made in the context of 
the DSU negotiations will reform the system to address some of these ques-
tions. Since 1997, WTO Members have made over fi fty individual submis-
sions, which suggest changes to almost every DSU provision. In the interest 
of time, my remarks will focus on only two groups: the proposals which ad-
dress, either directly or indirectly, the series of trends identifi ed earlier. 
The goal of any reform should be to restore balance to the WTO system 
as a whole. Like most treaty-based systems, the WTO is a Member-driven 
organization. No independent power is given to the DSS to create rights and 
obligations. A group of proposals in the DSU negotiations do attempt to 
restore some balance to the system by reinforcing limitations on panels and 
the Appellate Body and by improving transparency. 
[Proposals – Group 1]
In group one we have a series of proposals made in fi ve general areas to 
reinforce existing limitations on panels and the Appellate Body. First, a num-
ber of proposals have been directed at reforming the panel selection process 
to improve the quality of panel decisions. Indeed, the EC has argued that the 
most important systemic issue is the improvement of the panel composition 
process. Therefore, a number of proposals suggest establishing a roster of 
panel chairs or a roster of permanent panelists with demonstrated expertise. 
In addition to emphasizing that panelists should have the requisite expertise, 
there has also been a proposal to increase the pay rate for panelists. 
Although improving the panel selection process or the panelists’ exper-
tise would likely improve the system and the quality of reports issued, there is 
no guarantee that those panelists will not make fl awed decisions, especially if 
the system itself does not provide adequate guidance or allow for the correc-
tion of errors. It is not clear that the proposals would improve the quality of 
the Appellate Body’s decisions. Right now, almost fi fty percent of decisions 
are issued in the trade remedies area, yet not one Appellate Body member has 
a strong trade remedy background. The WTO’s consensus-based structure 
makes the correction of erroneous decisions diffi cult and, basically, possible 
only in larger negotiations.
Second, another set of proposals has been made to address the treatment 
of amicus or other unsolicited submissions. These proposals were prompted 
by the Appellate Body’s decision to develop working procedures to permit 
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the receipt and consideration of amicus submissions. Some WTO Members 
interpret the current DSU as not giving the Appellate Body the authority to 
accept such submissions. Proposals on amicus or unsolicited submissions, 
however, would only address the treatment of those submissions. As such, 
they would correct only one instance of prior overreaching instead of provid-
ing additional guidance for the development of other working procedures. 
Guidelines for the submission of amicus or other unsolicited submissions, 
however, could give affected private parties the ability to be heard. 
Third, a number of proposals would allow the parties or the dispute set-
tlement bodies to refer certain questions to the General Counsel or the In-
ternational Court of Justice. The downside of a referral procedure would be 
that it would only offer guidance in individual disputes, instead of providing 
guidance in the DSU to parties, panels, and the Appellate Body for each and 
every dispute. 
Fourth, some of the most creative proposals in the DSU negotiations are 
those aimed at strengthening Member control and fl exibility in the dispute 
settlement process. Through the use of procedural roadblocks, the proposals 
give the parties more control by requiring Appellate Body interim reports 
(on which the parties could comment and request a meeting), by allowing 
parties to agree to delete specifi c fi ndings or the basic rationale behind fi nd-
ings in particular cases, by allowing a report to be partially adopted by the 
DSB, and by permitting the parties to suspend panel and Appellate Body 
procedures. These proposals attempt to correct a systemic imbalance caused 
by a powerful dispute system without effective oversight. Practically, it is not 
clear that parties with opposing interests would be able to mutually agree to 
invoke the new procedures. Nor do the proposals, on their own, offer guid-
ance to panels or the Appellate Body to avoid overstepping DSU limitations 
in future cases. 
Finally, the proposals to provide additional guidance to dispute settle-
ment bodies have the greatest potential to affect future decisions. In addition 
to establishing a negotiating history of DSU revisions, DSU proposals iden-
tify the following areas for providing additional guidance: judicial economy, 
use of public international law, the interpretive approach, and measures un-
der review. 
Specifi cally, the United States has submitted a paper which articulates 
a number of guiding principals. With respect to the use of public interna-
tional law, the paper explains that “it is not the function of the WTO dispute 
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[settlement] system to adjudicate rights and obligations beyond those in the 
covered agreements” and that consideration of how other bodies approach 
procedural issues “is not a question of interpreting a covered agreement in 
accordance with public international law.”25  
The paper also offers some guiding principles as to what might or might 
not be a proper interpretive approach.  In doing so, the paper addresses the 
Appellate Body’s decisions reviewed earlier by clarifying how to address si-
lence or ambiguity in the covered agreements.26  The proposal states that the 
panels and the Appellate Body cannot fi ll the gaps in covered agreements. 
The proposal also addresses the Appellate Body’s decision to elevate its own 
decisions to the level of binding international trade agreements by stating 
that prior reports are not covered agreements.27  
Finally, the United States has articulated a number of principles concern-
ing the reviewability of measures under the system.28  The principles cau-
tion panels against gratuitous or advisory pronouncements of law outside the 
context of specifi c disputes. The principles also emphasize that panels are not 
permitted to presume that a Member will choose to breach a covered agree-
ment when it has the discretion to avoid such a breach.
Another proposal suggesting an agreed negotiating history could offer 
some guidance to panels and the Appellate Body in interpreting the scope of 
their authority under the DSU, but is unlikely to be binding unless adopted 
as such by Members. Providing additional guidance on such areas as the 
interpretive approach and the measures subject to review offers the best op-
portunity to address the major underlying cause of what Members consider 
to be overreaching. 
[Proposals – Group 2]
The second group of proposals would improve the transparency of the 
DSS. They would require public access to written submissions and hearings, 
as well as give parties prompt access to the information the Secretariat pro-
25 Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and 
Clarifi cations of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Further Contribution of the United 
States on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, TN/DS/
W/82 (Oct. 24, 2005).
26 Id., TN/DS/W/82/Add.1 (Oct. 25, 2005).
27 Id.
28 Id., TN/DS/W/82/Add.2 (March 17, 2006).
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vides to panels and the Appellate Body. Timely access to a public fi le room 
(preferably online) for written submissions and non-confi dential correspon-
dence to and from the panels and the Appellate Body would signifi cantly 
address transparency concerns. It is not clear, however, that a fi fteen-day 
period for public summaries would be “timely” access. The level of concern 
expressed regarding the Secretariat’s input indicates that changes should be 
made to increase the transparency of the decision-making process.
To recap: Should the WTO Dispute Settlement System Be Modifi ed or Re-
formed?  And the answer is: Yes. While most Members support and recognize 
the system as a signifi cant achievement, reform is necessary to maintain the 
proper role of disputes in the WTO. Signifi cant proposals have been made 
along these lines in the DSU negotiations to reinforce limitations on panels 
and the Appellate Body and improve transparency. Improvements in both 
areas could resolve questions concerning the high violation rate, multiple 
complaining parties, and the fi xation with trade remedy measures. Improve-
ments to the system, however, should go hand-in-hand with measures that 
encourage self-restraint on the part of Members using the system. For ex-
ample, there should be some procedural consequences for Members that 
bring cases without regard to the strength of their case or without strong 
trade-related interests in the resolution of the issue. This concludes my pre-
sentation. Thank you. 
Spiro:  Thanks very much, Amy. So, we have some time for questions 
and discussion. So Paul, you want to lead things off? 
Paul Heald:29  Hi, I am Paul Heald. I am on the faculty here at UGA; 
I teach international intellectual property law. I have an argumentative com-
ment and a quick technical question. The comment has to do with transpar-
ency; two points about that. First of all, if the major reason to have more 
transparency has to do with increasing confi dence in the system, I am not 
entirely sure it is a “no-brainer” given our experience with televising the O.J. 
Simpson trial and what that did to erode public confi dence in the criminal 
justice system here. Letting people watch what is going on does not neces-
sarily breed more confi dence. 
But I have a more serious point to make, too. That is, it seems to me that 
if two sovereign nations have a dispute between themselves over whether 
one is complying with an international agreement or not, what they certainly 
29 Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
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could do is sit down in a conference room behind closed doors and try to 
resolve that dispute. In that situation, we would not expect there to be any 
transparency, and we really would not probably call for transparency. And we 
could all probably give quite a lot of reasons why we would not want there 
to be transparency because it might interfere, in fact, with the chance of an 
agreement being reached. I am not entirely sure why our expectations about 
transparency should change when those same two sovereign states decide to 
submit their dispute to a panel before the WTO. It is a choice that they – in 
effect – make ex ante by joining the WTO. 
Second – quick technical question – should the Appellate Body have the 
power to remand back a case to a panel when insuffi cient factual fi ndings 
have been made and they have decided what the law is, but they cannot de-
cide the case because the facts are unclear?
Spiro:  Responses? 
Dwyer:  With respect to confi dence in the system and transparency, I 
think what you have to recall is who the real party may be in some of these 
disputes, especially in a trade remedy case. You will have domestic industry 
involved. You will have, perhaps, foreign producers involved in a lot of the 
issues that are crucial to their businesses. So, they will have a strong interest 
in making sure that the process is fair when decisions are being made at such 
a high level. The U.S. government is pretty much their attorney and they 
have a limited amount of contact with the U.S. government in making cer-
tain arguments. For private parties to, at least, be able to watch the process 
might diffuse a lot of the tension concerning what goes on behind the closed 
doors and give them confi dence that the process is fair and that the rule of 
law does have meaning. I think that that would be one of the reasons why 
transparency is so important. With respect to the remand power, I cannot see 
why we would not want to remand to the panel for further factual fi ndings. 
I think it would be expedient. 
Kho:  Just quickly on your comment on transparency – I think if the 
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and the public and those on Capi-
tol Hill share your views, then the way that it was originally set up was to not 
be transparent. But, in fact, what we hear is the opposite of what you have 
expressed, and so we are trying to respond to what the public is reacting to. 
If there was full confi dence, we would not be talking about transparency, but 
there is not. And those are just the facts. We are trying to work something 
out to make sure that there is more confi dence; we are hoping it will work. 
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The power of remand – that is one. There are several proposals on remand 
right now in DSU review, and we are all considering these proposals. There 
is no one specifi c view.
On your specifi c question about insuffi cient factual fi ndings – currently 
the system works those things out by itself already. In a situation, for example 
– the one I am thinking of is Canada Dairy – in which, basically, there were 
new issues, and a new theory by the Appellate Body came up. They said: 
Well, there is a lack of factual fi ndings to support this, and then it got kicked 
back.30  There is essentially sort of a remand process as it is, and nothing bars 
a party from going and asking again for another panel. The question then 
becomes: Well, should you have a process that is much faster? And then there 
are a lot of procedural questions that come with that as well. For example, if 
you have three fi ndings and you want to remand a fourth because you can-
not make a fi nding, do you adopt three fi ndings immediately or do you wait 
until the remand process is done and then adopt all four fi ndings together? 
And if you separate them, what happens with the timing issue of being able 
to implement? And if there is no implementation, what happens there with 
respect to trying to fi gure out what the level of compensation is? Do you just 
take two of the three fi ndings that go forward, or do you have to consider 
the fourth? So those are things that Members have proposed – the remand 
proposals are still trying to work out. The questions have been asked. 
Georgiev:  I think that there is some tension between stating, as the 
theoretical basis of an approach to dispute settlement, enhancing its inter-
governmental character on the one hand, and transparency on the other. Ac-
tually, the argument against transparency, which has been expressed during 
the negotiations, was pretty much of an intergovernmental character. And 
there is some irony that there are governments which are proposing reform 
in terms of transparency (which I would support) on the one hand, and at 
the same time these same governments seem to favor, theoretically, an inter-
governmental approach. I think that enhancing transparency would enhance 
the judicial character of the system. It goes with the logic of enhancing the 
judicial character of the system. 
On remand, I do not think I can add anything. It is a technical question. 
It seems that there is unanimity on the necessity for having remand. But 
there are those technical questions which have to be answered, so it is not 
30 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and Exporta-
tion of Dairy Products, WT/DS103/RW2, WT/DS113/RW2 (July 26, 2006).
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very easy to fi x it. There are two proposals now. The fi rst is by six countries, 
and there have been questions to them – pretty tough questions, informally, 
because this is all informal – and it seems that they have not given real con-
vincing solutions to some of the problems of remand. And there is another 
proposal pending by Korea – who is proposing a solution – and pretty much 
it would look like suspension of the process. But then, of course, timeframes 
are important, so it is not clear how this will be solved. My guess is that this is 
something which deserves, and has a chance of, getting into a fi nal package. 
Kho:  Maybe. Let me just add one thing to that. (I have been away from 
Geneva for six months, so things are starting to come back to me.) The one 
question I have always had with respect to the remand proposals is: do the 
Members that are proposing it really understand what they are asking for? What 
is remand in their minds? They give examples and situations where a party 
with a dispute basically chooses not to follow a certain legal theory. They fol-
low another legal theory that gets to the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body 
says: Well, your legal theory does not work. This other legal theory should be fol-
lowed, and frankly, you do not have the facts to back up that legal theory. Is that a 
remand situation, or is that basically just bad strategy on the part of the party? 
And should they then deserve to be allowed a faster mechanism in order to 
speed up the process for them? Again, questions that need to be answered.
Spiro:  Professor Davey? 
William J. Davey:31  I have a couple of questions and a comment. A 
comment:  I wonder if the high rate of dispute settlement with respect to 
trade remedy cases, particularly involving the U.S., can simply be explained 
by the fact that those cases are seriously over-lawyered in Washington. With 
the annual review process of the U.S. countervailing and dumping laws, there 
is litigation almost every year in the controversial cases. And if you look at 
the WTO cases, most of them have parallel U.S. litigation. So I think it is just 
part of the typical case – you bring a case in the court of international trade, 
and you bring a case in Geneva as well. I think it is just the way these things 
are lawyered in the United States, combined with the fact that the U.S. has 
absolutely no discretion to compromise those cases. It has to be to be told by 
the court or panel to change. 
31 Edwin M. Adams Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; Former Director 
of the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO; Panelist (Panel 3: To What Extent Does the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System Have a Role in Global Governance? Should the Appellate Body Look to 
Sources Outside the WTO Agreements?).
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A couple of questions: On the permanent panel body idea, I have kind 
of long supported that; but the most serious question I have heard raised is 
that if you actually tried to implement it in Geneva – once you took account 
of the WTO’s need for regional balance in everything and the possibility of 
political tradeoffs – that you would probably end up with less qualifi ed indi-
viduals than you now get in the use of Australian/New Zealander type trade 
diplomats. I am just curious about the panel’s reaction to that. If they think 
that the way in which it might ultimately be chosen might be worse with 
people thinking: Oh well, the Appellate Body will correct any serious mistakes.
My second question is: although governments say everything is working 
fi ne – and that suggests that everyone should be happy with the system, and 
it only needs tinkering with – the number of consultation requests in 2004 
went down from a prior average of around thirty, for the preceding fi ve years, 
to twenty or so and then, last year, to about a dozen; and I am wondering 
if countries are actually starting to vote with their feet and leave the system 
because they are not really, in fact, so happy with the results they obtain. 
Spiro:  Reverse order.
Georgiev:  I will try to have a short answer to the fi rst question about a 
permanent panel body. You cannot base your answer – whether you should 
have a better system, as such – on a hypothetical answer or solution as to how 
that permanent panel or body would be selected. You would probably not have 
a better system than you already have for the Appellate Body; that is for sure. 
It would probably not be better. Is the system for the Appellate Body good 
enough? I do not know, and I do not know the answer to your question be-
cause of that. But I have an answer to the question whether (and you, I think, 
are a proponent of a permanent panel body) it is better to have a permanent 
panel body, even with a system which would be hypothetically as good as the 
system of selection of Appellate Body members. I would be curious to know 
your answer to that question, but my answer would be, that, probably, yes.
Kho:  I will just take Professor Davy’s questions in order, starting fi rst 
with the comment. I understand the point that you are making, but I tend 
to agree a little more with Amy’s view with respect to the U.S. system being 
a bit more transparent. When you look at the types of cases that are being 
brought and the claims that are being made, a lot of it is with respect to, for 
example, the methodology – some sort of review policy. Things like that are 
fairly transparent in the U.S. and much easier to get at when you can see the 
rationale (or lack thereof, depending on what your argument would be) in 
front of you. 
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There are other heavy users of AD (antidumping) systems – China, India 
come to mind – but the big problem there is the lack of transparency; you are 
not quite sure what to go after. And cases against some would be cases such 
as – you know there is a lack of transparency – and that is it. You would not 
be going after, for example, Article 2 issues, Article 3 injury issues.32  So 
you would be going after Article 6 procedural issues, perhaps Article 12.33 
You know – in our example, the United States – we recently were close 
to bringing a case against China, and it frankly was on one particular inves-
tigation. And they –overnight – terminated the investigation, so we did not 
have to bring the case. But when we were working on the case, we were 
thinking: We do not have a whole lot of information here. All we are going to 
be going after is the lack of transparency. It is a good thing that they decided 
to terminate, because we were just curious how cases like that would go. We 
had a solid case on the lack of transparency, but beyond that – to go after 
particular problems – that was a little harder for us to do. So, if you look at 
the substantive claims, there is a lot more to go after under the U.S. system 
than others. That is my view. 
The permanent panel body idea – some would argue that that is already 
in effect. In situations where – as you know, when parties cannot agree – the 
DG (Director General) picks with consultations with the relevant divisions 
within the WTO, and you see the same names come up over and over again. 
They have people that they rely on – that they choose – that come up again 
and again. Some would say: Well that is almost like a permanent panel body. 
But the difference would be – at least in the fi rst instance – you are giving the 
parties the opportunity to try to pick ones that they can agree to, and again, 
that goes towards building confi dence in the system. In fact, if two parties 
can agree to it, you can say to your constituents back home: We chose them. 
We think they are solid. We think they are unbiased. And we think that whatever 
decision they come out with is going to be the right decision. So I think that is the 
advantage of not doing a permanent panel body. 
With regard to your last question: Is everything fi ne? Consultation re-
quests went down in 2004; that is true. But speaking with respect to the 
U.S., it was more of a political decision among our “politicals” to focus on 
free trade agreements and negotiating those. So I do not know if you can say: 
Well, there are hardly any more disputes. But also, if you look at the way it has 
32 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art. 2 and art. 3, available at www.wto.org/english/docs_
e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf.
33 Id., art. 6 and art. 12.
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been working out – in the beginning when WTO came out, the developed 
countries were all excited: Look at this – a pure rule of law system. And most 
of the cases were “developed versus developed” countries. Then that started 
going down because, frankly, they realized it is just a fact of life that in a 
system of sovereign nations you are going to have some diplomacy; that is 
an undercurrent of all these decisions, of all transactions. Then through this 
process, developed countries are able to work things out a lot better. 
In the next panel, I think I am going to talk a bit about this, but some-
times, the DSS works in ways that we cannot quantify in the sense that once 
there are decisions that are made, you can go to your trading partner if there 
is a dispute and say to them: Look, this measure that you have in place is simi-
lar to another measure that previously was found to be inconsistent. So you know 
what? Save us all a lot of time, a lot of trouble, a lot of resources – let us just agree 
to this compromise. And a lot of that is happening. 
What you do see is that developing countries are getting more and more 
involved; they are starting to have confi dence in the system; they are starting 
to sue each other; they are starting to sue developed countries. And those 
numbers are going up. You know in the beginning of the fi rst year, I think it 
was like 104 – I cannot remember, not that high – but there was a big num-
ber of disputes just that fi rst year, and it was “developed versus developed.” 
So, I do not know if I would take a lot away from seeing the numbers go 
down last year, but who knows? Now that the gloves are off, for example, on 
China, would the disputes go up? Maybe. 
Dwyer:  Just with respect to the comment about “over-lawyering.” I 
understood that comment to recognize that, yes, there has to be a certain 
degree of forum-shopping when you have such a complex set of agreements, 
especially for anti-dumping, countervailing duty and safeguards, and you get 
results at the WTO. It is a much faster process than going the domestic 
route, and you have a clear answer, and they require you to implement. So I 
can see how that might lead to a number of disputes in that area. 
With respect to panelists, I cannot help thinking that it might help to be 
“on the job,” and you learn a lot when you are “on the job.” Professor Davy, 
have you not been a panelist? And going through that process, I can only ex-
pect or anticipate that you would get better and better at doing it, and doing 
it multiple times. Just as anything you do, the fi rst decision that you write is 
not the same as the last one, and you will have slumps. But I just think that 
the juggling of other demands on panelists might be diffi cult. I do not know 
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if it is even doable in some extremely fact-intensive cases to juggle a full-time 
job and be a panelist – or do you just stop everything? So having a permanent 
set of panelists might improve things quality-wise. 
Spiro:  I think we have time for one last question from Niko Zaimis, 
please. 
Nikolaos Zaimis:34  Thanks. Niko Zaimis. I work for the European 
Commission. First of all, a small comment about the title of the panel. When 
I saw the title: … the system should be modifi ed or reformed, my fi rst reaction 
was really to do what most panelists and Appellate Board members would do, 
which is to take their Webster’s English Dictionary and fi nd out what is the 
difference between modify and reform. Did the Dean Rusk Center ask us to 
address different things? But I am glad to see now that everybody thinks that 
reform is perhaps the correct word. 
Now, I think that what we have heard from the panelists this morning is 
that the criticism of the procedures and the need for reform can be grouped 
in two groups. The fi rst are the procedural ones, and the second are the sub-
stantive ones. On the procedural ones, I have to say that I fully agree with 
what Stephen Kho has said about the need to link with the public. We may 
not agree in all our proposals – you know, with the U.S. proposal on that 
– but I think there is a gap. And there is a lack of communication with the 
public, especially on technical issues such as international trade negotiations. 
There is a terrible need right now to be more transparent and try to connect 
once more with the wider WTO membership. 
My comment, though, is on the second group, which is about the sub-
stantive changes. And my question would be: what is the purpose of modifying 
the rules? It would be, of course, to resolve disputes in a better way. And the 
question is: has the system failed, so far, to resolve disputes? Has the Appellate 
Body, for example, failed to resolve a dispute it should have resolved? Has it over-
resolved disputes? Has it resolved disputes it should not have resolved because 
the text was, perhaps, silent? What is it we want to achieve with the substantive 
changes? 
Spiro:  Thoughts and closing observations.
34 Counselor, Head of Trade Section, Delegation of the European Commission; Panelist 
(Panel 3: To What Extent Does the WTO Dispute Settlement System Have a Role in Global 
Governance? Should the Appellate Body Look to Sources Outside the WTO Agreements?).
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Georgiev:  I think these questions are better addressed to Steve and to 
Amy than to myself. 
Kho:  I guess the fi rst thing I would say is the Appellate Body would 
actually pick up the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, not the Webster’s. So I think 
you have been in America too long, and I think you will be chastised when 
you go back to Europe. (laughter)
But on your question, I agree the system has not failed so far. This is 
going back to Professor Davey’s question, too – disputes are being resolved, 
but you have to expect that there is going to be one happy party and one un-
happy party. Being unhappy does not mean that the dispute is not resolved. 
And the U.S. has been on the end of being unhappy a lot, but again, our view 
is that the system works. I liken it more to arbitration than to a legal proceed-
ing – arbitration where you put before an arbitrator a limited scope of what 
to review, of the measures and of the claims, and they make a decision within 
that scope. So even though there are unhappy people out there, I think, at 
the end of the day, business gets done and disputes are resolved. 
Dwyer:  I do not have too much to add to that except that, yes, I do 
think that they certainly have resolved disputes. Have they over-resolved dis-
putes at times? I cannot imagine that we would have such a list of questions 
if they had not – one or two or twenty-fi ve times over – resolved a dispute by 
providing an advisory opinion that we do not appreciate or leading us in a 
direction or just telling us where they are going. And the result has been, you 
know, displeasure on the receiving end, to a certain extent. But is the dispute 
resolved? Would it have been resolved? Most of the time, yes; they do resolve 
many, many disputes in a completely satisfactory manner. I am only talking 
about the outlier cases that you just remember because they make you want 
to change the system a little, make it better. 
Spiro:  Very good. Well, I think this is a very interesting leadoff to the 
conference. We are going to have more opportunity, in the subsequent pan-
els, to follow up on some of these introductory observations. So I would like 
to thank the panelists very much for their participation. 
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After a Decade of Dispute Settlement Cases, 
Whom Does the System Benefi t?
Moderator: C. Donald Johnson, Director, Dean Rusk Center, 
School of Law, University of Georgia
Raj Bhala, Rice Distinguished Professor, School of Law, 
University of Kansas
Stephen Kho, Associate General Counsel, 
Offi ce of the United States Trade Representative
Eduard Pérez Motta, Chairman, 
Mexican Federal Competition Commission, Former Ambassador 
of the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the WTO
Johnson:  The subject of this panel is certainly an interesting one for me, 
from a political standpoint. Having been in politics, I know that the question 
of who is winning and who is losing in the WTO is a very important one. Pur-
suant to the Uruguay Round implementing legislation, we have – every fi ve 
years – a vote in the Congress on whether the U.S. should be in the WTO, 
or whether it should withdraw. Last June, this vote came up, and there were 
more people who voted against staying in than there had been the  previous 
time.1  It was still a safe margin – the vote was 338 to 862 – but I have to 
say that, in Georgia, we did not have quite that same result.3  The majority 
of members of Congress in Georgia voted to withdraw from the WTO, so 
1 Compare H.R.J. Res. 27, 109th Cong. (2005) (resulting in a vote of 86 – 338 in favor of 
withdrawing approval of United States from Agreement Establishing World Trade Organiza-
tion) [hereinafter Res. 27] with H.R.J. Res. 90, 106th Cong. (2000) (resulting in a vote of 56 
– 363 in favor of withdrawing approval of United States from Agreement Establishing World 
Trade Organization).
2 Res. 27, supra note 1. 
3 Representatives from the State of Georgia voted 7 – 6 in favor of the resolution to withdraw 
(yeas: Barrow, Deal, Gingrey, Marshall, McKinney, Norwood, Westmoreland; nays: Bishop, 
Kingston, Lewis, Linder, Price, Scott). Final Vote Results for Roll Call 239, http://clerk.
house.gov/evs/2005/roll239.xml (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
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this may be a continuing problem.4  This is a comment more, I think, on our 
delegation and their politics than the success of the U.S. in the WTO, but it 
certainly points to a growing political problem that should concern us. 
As we discuss the developments over the past ten years, we are not go-
ing to have a box score to review – as the sports pages review baseball games 
– showing us who is winning and who is losing, and more particularly how 
things are going with the players. We do have an excellent panel here today 
to discuss these issues in a more sophisticated manner.  
Let me briefl y introduce our members here again. Immediately to my left 
is Professor Raj Bhala, who holds the Raymond Rice Distinguished Professor 
of Law at the University of Kansas Law School. I fi rst met him in Washington 
when he was at George Washington University, and I was working at my law 
fi rm on the Bananas case.5  Raj is an expert on that case. He has written a 
very lengthy treatise on it called The Banana War,6 and I commend it to your 
reading. He is also a prolifi c writer in many other areas of international trade. 
He has a textbook that he is working on the third edition of – it should be 
out in 2007, I believe.7  Every month or so, I receive something in the mail, a 
new publication that he has written, so last night I urged the Georgia Journal 
of International and Comparative Law to get to know him well, because he 
can certainly add to the prestige of our Journal.  
The second panelist is Stephen Kho, and, of course, he was introduced 
to you in the previous panel. Stephen is the Associate General Counsel in the 
Offi ce of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) where he currently 
is in charge of all issues relating to China, and he touched on that a little bit 
in the last panel. Of course, this is an area of great interest to all of us. There 
have not been any cases, except for maybe one, where China was involved, 
I believe.8  But there may be more in the near future. In fact, we hear every 
day that there is going to be a case on intellectual property. We will see how 
that transpires. Prior to this position, Stephen was in Geneva, where he was 
4 Id.
5 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Dis-
tribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas, DS27].    
6 Raj Bhala, The Banana War, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 839 (2000).
7 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Matthew Bender 2000). 
8 As of the date of the Conference, China was the respondent in one case, DS 309. Mutually 
Agreed Solution, China – Value Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS267/8 (Oct. 6, 
2005).
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the legal advisor to the U.S. mission to the WTO and managed the dispute 
settlement portfolio. He has also participated in every stage of the WTO dis-
pute settlement process, as well as reviewed submissions and formulations of 
litigation strategies, so he is certainly well-qualifi ed to present on this panel. 
Last, but certainly not least, is Ambassador Eduardo Pérez Motta. Am-
bassador Pérez Motta obviously has a strong background in this area as well. 
He is currently the chairman of Mexico’s Federal Competition Commission, 
but he previously was the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the WTO, 
in charge of preparing Mexico’s participation in the Doha Ministerial Confer-
ence. He served as a Mexican chair at the Cancún WTO ministerial meeting, 
and although that meeting ended in a stalemate, things have picked up on 
Doha since that time. He has written quite a bit on this subject and we look 
forward to hearing from all of these men. I will start with Professor Bhala.  
Bhala:  Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks to all of you 
for coming. It was very nice of Ambassador Johnson to invite me, and I am 
grateful to him and also to André Barbic. They have worked very hard in put-
ting together this conference.  
Ambassador Johnson has actually posed a very hard question about win-
ners and losers. I suppose it is also a very American question and a very 
March Madness kind of question. One way to approach that is from a macro 
sort of level and take a look at statistics – try and identify trends and make 
some general statements – see what we can sort of deduce from the data. 
There are many different comments that have already been made on the last 
panel that suggest who some of the winners are or what some of the winning 
things might be, and maybe what some of the losing things might be. For 
example, it has been suggested that the rule of law has been a winner from 
the system, but different and perhaps opposing views have been suggested 
as to why. Those who favor a stronger judicial-type function and like a prec-
edential system – and I would count myself in that group – would point to 
those sort of successes. Others who favor a more arbitration-style system say 
that, to the extent the system is going that direction, it has advanced the rule 
of law. We have also heard some discussion about major countries benefi ting 
from the system, and I will say a little bit about some of the smaller countries 
and how they may begin to benefi t from it. I think one thing we can all agree 
on is that the winners include students and teachers of international trade 
law – if there is really a distinction between the two – because there is a lot of 
material for us to study, write about, and practice in.  
38
I would like to take a different approach to the winner-loser question 
– more of an inductive or inferential approach – and look at a few cases and 
see what we can infer from the cases as to who, or what, some of the win-
ning and losing trends are. Now, I subtly changed the ambassador’s question 
a little bit – he said: Who are the winners and losers? And now I am sort of 
adding who or what. So, some of the losers or winners are processes. The 
three cases I propose to chat a little bit about are the Cotton case9 (and I 
know there was some discussion about that last year), the Antigua Gambling 
case,10 and the Mexican Rice case11 – the Cotton case being an Ag case, the 
Antigua Gambling case being a GATT case, and the Mexican Rice case being 
a POI (period of investigation) case in the dumping world. I will just take a 
look at some of the arguments and fi ndings in the Appellate Body reports in 
those three cases and then maybe tease out a few observations about who, or 
what, is winning and who, or what, is losing.  
I will start with the toughest case, the Cotton case. This case was brought 
by Brazil during the period in which the Peace Clause applied12 in the Ag 
agreement.13  And the fi rst thing Brazil knew it had to do, and it did so 
successfully, was to knock out the American defenses under Articles 13(a), 
13(b), and 13(c) in the Peace Clause.14  In particular, Brazil had to show that 
two kinds of subsidies, production fl exibility contracts and direct payments, 
were not eligible for Peace Clause immunity under 13(a).15  That is because 
they were not “green box subsidies.”16  And then Brazil had to show that the 
9 Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R 
(Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Cotton, DS267]. 
10  Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Antigua 
Gambling, DS285]. 
11 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – United Defi nitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and 
Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Mexican Rice, DS295].  
12 The “Peace Clause” is more formally known as Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement, 
which “protects countries using subsidies which comply with the [A]greement from being 
challenged under other WTO agreements.”  Phase 1: The Peace Clause, http://www.wto.
org/English/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_peace_e.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). 
The Peace Clause expired at the end of 2003. 
13 See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 (1994) [hereinafter Agriculture 
Agreement].
14 See id. at Art. 13 (detailing non-actionable and/or exempt actions and measures).
15 See id. at Art. 13(a) (making non-actionable and exempt domestic support measures that 
comply with Annex 2 of Agriculture Agreement).
16 Generally, a “green box subsidy” is one that is permitted by the WTO. Agriculture Nego-
tiations:  Background Fact Sheet, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_
e.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
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other remaining six of the eight challenged subsidy programs were not eli-
gible for 13(b) immunity and could be challenged as “yellow light subsidies” 
causing serious prejudice.17  And then, fi nally, it had to get out – Brazil did 
– from under 13(c) on “export subsidies.”18
Now, if you look at the arguments on each of those, they tell you a little 
bit about the sophistication of the argumentation that we are now seeing in 
many WTO cases. For example, on the “green box” issue, with regard to 
whether production fl exibility contracts and direct payments were green box 
or not, Brazil had to take a careful look at those two subsidy programs, so it 
had to come to grips with the Commodity Credit Corporation;19 it had to 
take a look at the U.S. statute and see that, in fact, those two subsidy pro-
grams were not completely decoupled from output because the statute said 
to farmers: You can plant anything you want or nothing at all and get pay-
ments, as long as you do not plant fruit or vegetables. Therein was the coupling, 
and that was the argument Brazil won on. Now the U.S. made a fairly robust 
counterargument – that a negative limit and positive limit can have the same 
sort of effect, depending on how broad the positive limit is or how narrow 
the negative limit is. The U.S. might have gone a little further on it and made 
a GATT analogy and talked about positive lists and negative lists. The point 
of this is that you saw a high degree of argumentation on a very technical 
legal matter, and that is something that is coming out on a number of cases, 
this being a good example of it.  
To give you the 13(b) Peace Clause issue – there, Brazil had to basically 
rebut an American argument that support to a product is not the same as 
product-specifi c support. Here, with that argument, we saw a little bit of 
– maybe – the losing side of what is going on in the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding (DSU). Mind-numbing paragraphs going on for, I do not know, 
pages and pages about whether or not support for a specifi c product, which 
is the language under 13(b) is the same as product-specifi c support. Finally 
it was concluded that no, they are not. In fact, support for a specifi c prod-
uct covers both product- and non-product-specifi c support; therefore, all of 
17 Generally, a “yellow” or “amber light subsidy” is one that should be reduced. Id. 
18 See Agriculture Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 13(c) (exempting subsidies that conform 
to provisions of Part V of Agriculture Agreement). See also id. at art. 8-art. 11 (containing 
provisions that detail exempt subsidies).  
19 The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is a division of the Farm Service Agency (FSA) 
of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Farm Service Agency, About the 
Commodity Credit Corporation, http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=about&subje
ct=landing&topic=sao-cc (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
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the challenge and subsidy schemes come under the measure of support and 
can be challenged by Brazil.  We heard about the Oxford English Dictionary 
and the use of that. This is not fun reading. For those of you who have not 
taken a look at this Cotton case, it has – I think –  about 1,500 footnotes, or 
something like that, and it goes on for about 400 pages. Actually, I had to 
read it in preparation for a case review that David Gantz20 and I do. I was on 
the plane (the world’s longest commercial fl ight, which is Singapore Airlines’ 
Newark to Singapore), and it took me the whole fl ight to read that. But that 
is a good place to read it, where you are just in an enclosed space. You get 
some sophisticated argumentation when you look at some arguments. You 
get some really mind-numbing arguments in other instances.  
What else can we say from the Cotton case? I think we can say that one of 
the losers was the English language. I do not want to sound like Miss Man-
ners or some perfect writer; by no means am I. We are always getting better 
writing, but it is really atrociously written. It is endlessly redundant. Many 
times things are defi ned and then redefi ned fi fty pages later. Sometimes the 
same footnote is plopped down forty paragraphs later. You almost get this 
feeling that the Appellate Body members e-mailed in their different parts, 
and then it was just assembled. I would not care so much myself about it if we 
were not trying to advance the rule of law. The quality of writing really does 
matter if we are trying to develop a body. Whether they are judicial opinions 
or arbitral decisions that people can learn from – having a good written opin-
ion matters. It also matters with respect to legal capacity.  
One of the, perhaps, losers in the system so far has been the lack of 
participation by least-developed countries (the forty-nine least-developed 
countries); some of the developing countries, aside from Brazil and India 
and Mexico. I am not sure that an opinion like Cotton has much pedagogical 
value to lawyers in the “Bangladeshes” of the world – to teach them how to 
write, how to litigate cases. I think that is something that could be worked 
on. One reason for this, and I realize that this may be creeping back into the 
previous panel, is the need for translation. Some Appellate Body members 
have said privately that, unless they get an extension of time in which to issue 
their report (the ninety days), they lose about a week or two because of the 
need to translate into French or Spanish. I do not want to be insulting to any 
language, but we all know the statistics on the “widespread-ness” of English, 
20 David A. Gantz, Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law; Director, International Trade Law 
Program; Associate Director, National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, University 
of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. 
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and if you add people for whom English is a second language you easily top 
Mandarin, which is otherwise the most widely spoken. So, we should think 
about why not having just one good offi cial text issued in one language and 
then others can translate as they need to.  
Another loser that comes out of the Cotton case is the U.S. Ag commit-
tee – that is, the House and Senate Ag Committees. They proclaim that they 
checked with Brazil and the WTO before drafting the different challenged 
measures in the farm bills in 2002.21  Well, either they got it wrong still, or 
they were misled, but they certainly feel like they were losers from this. You 
might also say that one other loser might be the Cotton Four:  Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Mali, and Chad. How much will really change for them?  
Back to one last comment on that case to tease out something; for those 
who like a more judicial-style system. There was a pretty clear example of 
de facto stare decisis operating when the U.S. trotted out its argument from 
the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) to defend its export credit guarantees in 
Cotton.22  It trotted out the same argument that it lost on when defending 
FSC, specifi cally the remedial legislation, the Extraterritorial Income Exclu-
sion Act.23  The argument is that – well, the export scheme does not benefi t 
just exporters; it benefi ts a broader universe of people: lost in the fi rst case, 
the FSC; lost again in Cotton. You knew it was going to be the next para-
graph that the Appellate Body was going to cite to them. Okay, enough 
about Cotton.  
A couple of slightly easier cases, technically. The Gambling case – what 
can we get out of that?  The winners: one of the winners is the “mice of the 
world,” if you will; this is The Mouse That Roared, if you saw the movie.24  
This is Antigua challenging the United States. I read some statistic that An-
tigua’s economy is .007 percent of the American economy, and its popula-
tion is 80,000. That is about the size of Lawrence, Kansas. Antigua showed 
gumption in challenging the U.S. on this.  
21 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7901-8002 (2002).
22 Cotton, DS267, supra note 9.
23 FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519 (Nov. 
15, 2000), 106th Cong., 2d Sess.
24 THE MOUSE THAT ROARED (Columbia Pictures 1959). The movie to which Prof. 
Bhala refers is one in which the small fi ctional Duchy of Great Fenwick declares war on the 
United States, setting out to lose so that it may win in the end by receiving foreign aid. 
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Another winner in this case was clarity, especially in GATT’s scheduling, 
because, as you probably know, much of the case turns on whether or not 
the U.S. did in fact make a commitment on gambling services. The question 
became whether or not gambling services is an “other recreational service” 
(and the Appellate Body said it was and, therefore, the U.S. had made a com-
mitment), or whether gambling services was “sporting” (in which case the 
U.S. would have won because the U.S. said it was sporting, and the U.S. did 
not make a commitment on sporting).25  And so, we got some reminder of 
how important it is to be clear on GATT scheduling.  
We also have as a winner, specifi city. The Appellate Body said: You cannot 
just challenge a total prohibition. You cannot just throw all measures together 
and call it a total prohibition.26  You have got to be specifi c or, to put it dif-
ferently – for proceduralists among us – you have got to be very clear and 
specifi c in your pleadings as to what you are complaining about.  
Another winner in that case was consistency in methodology. For the fi rst 
time, the Appellate Body was faced with the question of how to evaluate a 
GATT Article 14 defense?27  The U.S. defense was public morality; banning 
offshore gambling from coming in because it is immoral. The Appellate Body 
looked to the same two-step test it uses under GATT Article 20.28  So, we 
saw some sort of legal methodology being applied in a consistent manner.  
All of those points about small parties willing to challenge big parties 
– clarity, specifi city, and consistency in legal methodology – those all advance 
the rule of law. The losers – for those who are more philosophically or theo-
logically inclined and wanted a defi nition and grand discussion of morality 
– forget it. It is not there. You keep reading the report, hoping that the Ap-
pellate Body will issue some obiter dicta saying: This is what we think morality 
in trade is about, and this what we think a legitimate invocation of GATT’s 
Article 14(a) would be.29  There is nothing like that. They just do not even 
want to get close to it.  
25 Antigua Gambling, DS285, supra note 10.
26 Id.
27 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art.14, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 (containing exceptions to rule of non-discrimination) [hereinafter GATT]. 
28 See id. at art. 20 (enumerating general exceptions); see also Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 
1996) (applying two-tiered analysis when applying Article 20).  
29 See id., art. 14(a) (listing exceptions to rule of non-discrimination). 
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Also, maybe more on the losing side is the strength of rationale. The Ap-
pellate Body logic, which ultimately sinks the U.S. in the case, is pretty weak. 
It is a few conclusory paragraphs that basically say the Interstate Horse Rac-
ing Act,30  which is not one of the challenged federal statues, created some 
discrimination against foreign gambling service providers. The U.S. could 
not justify that, and that is why the U.S. ultimately lost the case. So, we could 
have hoped for better reasoning in some of the cases.  
Finally, the third case from which you can maybe draw some broad points 
is the Mexican Rice case.31  This is a case where, basically, Mexico used 1997, 
1998, and 1999 as the three-year period from which it collected data on both 
dumping margin and injury.32  The subject merchandise was long-grain rice 
from the U.S., but for the injury determination, it used only six months of 
those three 12-month periods.33  It discarded the other six months of data. 
The U.S. said: You cannot do that, and the U.S. won.34  Here, we saw victory 
for due process. The Appellate Body does go fairly far down the line, saying: 
Look, procedurally these anti-dumping investigations have to be fair. How can 
you say they are fair, or, for that matter, even transparent, when you are collect-
ing data for three years, but then selectively using six-month periods?  
I guess the fl ipside would be that the losers from Mexican Rice would 
be all the investigating authorities around the world that are still sloppy. You 
might recall the Thailand-Poland H-Beams case, where there was also an is-
sue of sloppy investigation.35  I guess the overall point, in trying to answer 
Ambassador Johnson’s question, is that we can sort of look “top down” at 
some broad data trends, and we can also sort of look from the “trenches 
view.”  We can look at specifi c cases to see what we can get out of them in 
terms of who, or what, is winning.  
Ambassador Johnson:  Great. Thank you, Raj. Stephen?
Kho:  Good afternoon again. As before, I will just go ahead and men-
tion, as I am obligated to do, the ground rules with respect to – probably 
30 Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-515, 92 Stat. 1811 (codifi ed at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (1988)).
31 Mexican Rice, DS295, supra note 11. 
32 Id.  
33 See id. (noting that data collected came from March-August of relevant years). 
34 Id.  
35 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of 
Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).  
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irrelevant here – the media. My remarks are off the record with no quotes or 
attributions, and my views are my own and not necessarily those of the U.S. 
government.  
The question posed to this panel – Whom Does the Dispute Settlement Sys-
tem Benefi t? – can be viewed through several different prisms, in my opinion. 
One can certainly respond from the point of view of the general public or 
from society as a whole. Or, one can respond from the point of view of par-
ticular interest groups. For me, given my experience as a government offi cial 
representing the United States at the WTO, I would like to respond from 
the point of view of the WTO membership. From that point of view then, 
the question could be rephrased as: After a decade of dispute settlement cases, 
whom in the WTO membership does the system benefi t? And, I would also add 
that I have not thought of benefi t in terms of winning and losing or winners 
and losers. There are times, obviously, when losers can also benefi t from the 
system.  
I will answer this question in three parts. First, everyone benefi ts. Every 
country and every separate customs territory that is a member of the WTO 
benefi ts from the Dispute Settlement System (DSS). This is because, in my 
view, the DSS, for the most part, promotes the rule of law. I say for the most 
part because, as I mentioned before, when sovereign nations deal with each 
other, you have to expect diplomacy to continue to underlie every transac-
tion.  
Nevertheless, the WTO rules ensure that diplomacy does not overrun the 
DSS. For instance, in the old GATT days, Appellate Body decisions could be 
ignored simply by having one country – and usually it was the loser country 
– block the adoption of a report. In the WTO, the negative consensus rule 
applies,36 which means that, now, the only way a report can be blocked from 
adoption is if all 149 WTO Members agree not to adopt the report. Having 
the rule of law, in my view, benefi ts everyone. It upholds agreements that 
have been made by the Members through negotiations, it ensures that the 
WTO trading system is secure and predictable; it encourages Members, even 
within their own domestic systems, to abide by the rule of law.  
36 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (embodying “negative 
consensus” principles in Articles 6.1, 16.4, 17.14, and 22.6) [hereinafter DSU].
45
Second, and this might be a surprise to some, I believe that the DSS real-
ly benefi ts the smaller countries. Consider this: the fi rst WTO dispute settle-
ment case established that it is possible for a smaller economy, like Venezuela, 
to force one of the largest economies in the world, like the United States, 
into a dispute in the WTO and win.37  The WTO DSS puts every Member 
on a level playing fi eld when it comes to resolving disputes. It is one giant 
equalizer. This is why I sometimes cannot understand why some continue to 
argue that the DSS only benefi ts the big actors.  
Perhaps early on most of the users of the system were the larger trading 
countries, but that was probably because there was more trade between these 
countries; they had disputes among themselves because with more trade 
comes more disputes, invariably. It is a fact of life in every trading relation-
ship. In fact, it is quite normal in trading relationships to have disputes, and as 
the world trading system expands, more trading is done between “developed 
and developing” countries, as well as between “developing and developing” 
countries. One expects more and more economies to become frequent users 
of the DSS and, in fact, that is what is happening.  
In 1997, for example, 16 percent of the disputes were initiated by devel-
oping and least-developed countries. In 1998, the number rose to 19 per-
cent. In 1999, it was 33 percent, and in 2000, it jumped up to 54 percent. 
In fact, by 2005, 63 percent of the disputes were initiated by developing and 
least-developed countries. Also, of the 336 disputes initiated in the WTO 
since its inception, 78 of them were brought by developing and least-devel-
oped countries against developed countries, while 53 of them were brought 
by developing and least-developed countries against other developing and 
least-developed countries. Compare this number against the number of dis-
putes brought by developed countries against developing and least-devel-
oped countries, 77, which is comparable. You can see that the developing 
and least-developed countries are quickly recognizing the value of the WTO 
DSS for themselves and utilizing that system for their own benefi t.  
Third, the DSS benefi ts the WTO multilateral trading structure as a 
whole. As more and more disputes are resolved, and this is what I mentioned 
in one of my responses in the previous panel, the DSS itself becomes more 
and more of a prevention mechanism. It prevents future disputes, and from 
my point of view, it does so in two ways. It does so externally, and it does so 
internally.  
37 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
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First, it prevents future disputes externally by making it easier for a com-
plaining Member to talk a responding Member into withdrawing a measure 
that is similar to a previously determined WTO-inconsistent measure. This 
can happen either before a dispute is offi cially initiated or after a dispute is 
initiated. In the latter situation, the parties – usually during the consultation 
stage but sometimes even in the middle of the panel proceedings – agree 
to what we call a mutually acceptable resolution, and then the dispute is 
diffused. In fact, of the 336 disputes initiated so far, 79 of them have nev-
er reached the panel phase, and were either resolved or abandoned during 
the consultation phase. As a parenthetical, by the way, this does not mean 
that 257 disputes have gone through panel proceedings. This number, 257, 
would include disputes that are still actively consulting, or disputes that are 
currently in the panel process.  
Second, the DSS prevents future disputes internally. It does so by forcing 
Members to think twice before implementing laws that are similar to other 
laws previously found by panels and the Appellate Body to be WTO-incon-
sistent. Let us take, for example, the United States. The offi ce of the U.S. 
Trade Representative is tasked with representing the U.S. in the WTO, and 
as such, our staff has built an expertise in the fi eld of WTO law. Often, we 
are consulted by members of Congress when they are drafting laws and by 
various administrative agencies when they are drafting regulations – request-
ing that we review the draft laws and regulations so as to ensure that the U.S. 
is complying with its WTO obligations. This internal consultation process 
within the U.S. government helps to prevent questionable WTO laws and 
regulations from ever seeing the light of day, and this benefi ts the global 
trading structure.  
The prevention aspect of the WTO DSS is, of course, not something we 
can easily quantify (or even at all), but we should not underestimate its value. 
I cannot tell you the number of times USTR has had to weigh in heavily to 
prevent what we perceive to be WTO-inconsistent domestic rules from being 
implemented. I also cannot tell you the number of times we, as U.S. del-
egates, were able to convince a trading partner to not implement a possible 
WTO-inconsistent law or to remove an apparent WTO-inconsistent measure 
based on positions established in previous disputes. These are all future dis-
putes that have been avoided; all due to the existence of the WTO DSS.  
So, the WTO DSS is, therefore, in my view, benefi cial. It benefi ts every 
WTO Member; it certainly benefi ts the smaller economies and the develop-
ing and least-developed countries; it benefi ts the multilateral trading regime 
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as a whole. As more and more members join the WTO and as the WTO itself 
matures, there is no doubt that the DSS will remain benefi cial for years to 
come. Thank you.  
Johnson:  Thank you, Stephen. Our fi nal speaker is Ambassador Pérez 
Motta. 
Pérez Motta:  Thank you very much, and thank you very much for this 
invitation. Well, there has been some time since I left Geneva. This is the fi rst 
opportunity that I have had in a year and a half to go back to my previous 
life, so I am very happy to review some of the documents that I promoted 
when I was in Geneva.  
Let me fi rst say, just to briefl y answer the basic question of this panel, 
that the net benefi ciaries from a strong dispute settlement mechanism are 
the consumers from developed and from developing countries. If you start 
from the assumption that the international trading system is a system that 
promotes a more open trading mechanism among the different countries on 
services and on manufacturing goods and on primary goods in general, well, 
the net benefi ciaries of that system are going to be the consumers. So, you 
have a strong DSU and, actually, the people who are going to benefi t most 
are going to be the consumers.  
Now, if you divide the system between developed and developing coun-
tries, I would say that – and I think that this is consistent with what Stephen 
Kho was saying – in general, as in any rule of law system, the guys who are go-
ing to have more benefi ts from that system are going to be the weakest ones. 
So I would say developing, and especially the least-developed countries, are 
going to benefi t more from a strong and solid dispute settlement mechanism.
So the question then goes to the issue that was discussed in the previous 
panel: Do we have an optimal system, or should we have minor reforms of the 
system? What should we do with the system? How to do it? I think that the di-
agnostic that we had about two years ago in Geneva is still valid today. From 
what I have heard from this panel and from my colleagues from the Mexican 
mission in Geneva, I think the main problem is a lack of focus in the whole 
discussion of the dispute settlement negotiation. My impression is that each 
country is basically trying to use its own history in the system and trying to 
solve its specifi c problems through these negotiations, instead of looking at 
the system as a whole and looking at what could be the international or pub-
lic interest of the reform; I mean, what would be the benefi t for the whole 
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system of reform of the dispute settlement mechanism? I think that is the 
main problem. So, when you ask each and every delegation what they per-
ceive to be the problem the DSU, and what reforms they would be following 
or trying to pursue, they are going to tell you whatever they have been expe-
riencing in their particular cases in which they have been participating.  
What we did in the Mexican mission, and what we basically offered in 
the article of the book that is going to come out in the next few weeks, was 
basically to try to use a more academic mechanism, a more scientifi c analysis 
of the problem.38  Let us make a diagnostic; we have an experience of more 
than ten years already, so let us look at that experience in general, and let us 
see if there is a problem that we should solve. That is precisely what we did. 
We divided the problem into three basic areas: fi rst, access to the system; 
second, an issue of compliance; third, let us say, procedural issues. So in 
the third basket, we put basically anything else, everything else. Let me just 
briefl y tell you what our main result was, and what we got from that analysis 
– and I want to repeat that I think this is still valid today, two years after we 
made that analysis.  
In terms of access to the system, we have three issues: fi rst, the access of 
the developing countries, especially the least-developed countries; second, 
the issue of internal transparency; third, the issue of external transparency. 
In terms of access of developing countries – I will go basically to the main 
conclusions without going into the details – but our fi ndings are that this is 
not an issue, frankly speaking. Even if you look at what developing, or even 
less developed countries, would have to pay to go to these cases – to use the 
dispute settlement mechanism – and considering that we have the Advisory 
Centre,39 it is not really expensive to use the system. So that is not the prob-
lem. LDCs (Least-Developed Countries), at least until two years ago, had 
never used the system, and maybe there have been one or two cases after 
that,40 even though developing and LDCs are much more exposed to trade 
in relative terms than developed countries.  
38 Eduardo Pérez Motta, If the DSU is “working reasonably well’’, why does everybody want to 
change it? in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Dencho 
Georgiev & Kim van der Borght, eds., 2006). 
39  The Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL). For more information, see Advisory Centre 
on WTO Law, http://www.acwl.ch/e/index_e.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2006).
40 Bangladesh is the only LDC to have used the Dispute Settlement System; it did so 
by making a complaint against India in January of 2004.  Dispute Settlement:  Disputes 
by Country, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006).  
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Let us compare Mexico with the U.S.; in the U.S., trade is about 25 per-
cent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product). In the case of Mexico, it is about 60 
percent of GDP. If you look at the exposure of African countries – we have 
the statistics for African countries, and the average was 72 percent – they 
are much more exposed to trade. So, if there is a lack of compliance for any 
developed country on the WTO rules, that would have more of an affect, in 
relative terms, on developing countries than anyone else. That is consistent 
with the statistics that you were seeing before, and those are exactly the sta-
tistics that I have. 
In terms of access then, it is not really an issue, frankly speaking. In terms 
of internal transparency, in more than 90 percent of cases Members have par-
ticipated as third parties – and I mean for panel reports. For Appellate Body re-
ports, Members have participated as third parties in almost 85 percent, so pub-
lic submissions can be obtained from many active players. The average delay 
between issuance of fi nal paper reports to parties and circulations to the other 
Members is about 28 days. Frankly, I do not think this is a big issue either.
External transparency – it would be much better to have more transpar-
ency, of course. I would agree with the basic proposals that the U.S. has 
been making, but I do not think this is the main problem of the DSU – even 
though I think it would be good to have more transparency of the system 
than what we have today.  
I think the main problem is compliance. In my view, this is the crucial 
issue. I am not going to spend too long here. I see this problem more as an 
economist – I am not a lawyer even though my work today is with lawyers 
all the time, so I try to understand them better as I work with them – but I 
think this is a problem of economic incentives. I have many notes here, but I 
am going to try to explain it in a much easier way.  
I think the problem here is that if there is a country that does not comply 
and there is a panel, after three years, it might have to comply – either by 
retaliatory measures from the other country or through compensation. But 
it is going to take more than three years; on average, it is going to be a little 
bit more than three years, so that means you basically have a free lunch for 
three years. If the panel goes against you, then the only thing you have to 
do is change your rules, and that is it. And I think that is the main problem 
of the DSU. I think that if we do not change the system of economic incen-
tives to make lack of compliance costly, from the beginning, there is going 
to be, basically, a long-term problem of the working of the system. And this 
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problem is going to go much more against the weakest of the system; in the 
end, the big guys, if they do not have the DSU, can solve their problems 
politically. In the end, if the U.S. and European Union have problems – I 
am characterizing this a little bit, of course – they might solve their problems 
politically. But when you have a big problem – or you have a lack of compli-
ance between a big guy and a very small country – if you do not have general 
rules that can make the big country comply, then you have a problem. And I 
think this is the main issue here.  
How to solve this? Well, actually, we made a proposal that was not very 
well accepted by very many countries, including developing countries, and 
this is an interesting issue – i.e., why some developing countries did not like 
this proposal.41  My impression is that many developing countries, especially 
the developing countries that are closer to being developed – the emerging 
countries, we might say – want to have some fl exibilities as well. They prefer 
not to have a system that is strong enough so that the incentive not to com-
ply disappears. That is why when you say, Dencho Georgiev, that we never 
got the multilateral support from this analysis, this is the answer that I could 
have; because when we made this proposal in Mexico, I would have to say 
that we had to do it even against the opinion of many people in Mexico. That 
is the point – that the big interests in our countries, developing countries, are 
the same in that they want to have these fl exibilities in place.  
What was our proposal? Well, our proposal basically had three parts:  fi rst, 
early determination and application in nullifi cation and impairment; second, 
retroactive determination and application; third, preventive measures.42  That 
was basically the whole concept, which could completely change the struc-
ture of incentives. We also added what we called negotiable remedies, which 
is an interesting concept because it would be similar to making a market for 
remedies.43  We have to understand that, for many countries – let us take 
Ecuador and the case of Bananas;44 the last country interested in retaliation 
should be Ecuador because it would be like shooting your own foot. So, 
why not be able to sell the possibility to retaliate? I know this is, politically, 
a bump, but from a market point of view it would be much better. Just sell 
that possibility. Just sell your rights and see – maybe Japan would like to use 
it, or any other country, against the European Union.
41 Proposal by Mexico, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifi cations of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/23 (Nov. 4, 2002). 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 See Bananas, DS27, supra note 5.
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I would like to stop here. And thank you very much for this invitation.  
Johnson:  Thank you, Ambassador Peréz Motta. We will just open it up 
now to the fl oor for questions. We have plenty of time for discussion, and 
this is an interesting topic for discussion. If I could be so bold as to call on 
one member of the audience who I had hoped to be on the panel, and that is 
Nikolaos Zaimis, who is the head of trade at the EU Mission in Washington. 
I thought maybe we might like to have just a general comment about your 
perspective. 
Nikolaos Zaimis:45  Well, I would certainly have a comment. When I 
was working, before coming to Washington, in the dispute settlement unit 
in Brussels, one day, the Director General asked us that very same question 
(I think he wanted to report to the European Parliament):  How many cases 
have we won? How many have we lost? And believe me, it was one of the most 
formidable tasks we ever had to do because how do you count wins/losses? 
How do you defi ne victory or loss? Do you count as a win a case when you 
have won only on one claim (and have lost on all other claims), or, if you are 
the defendant party, when the complaining party has won three out of fi ve 
claims? How would you classify such a result?  So it was a very diffi cult and 
complex table that we had to produce to show that we had won most cases.
And for the benefi t of our audience – if you want to know the answer 
– never, never look into the websites of the European Commission or USTR, 
because we both always win, of course. Even in disputes between us, you get 
these press releases on both sides, which are, of course, very victorious. But if 
we think about something that Ambassador Pérez Motta said, that the DSS 
is there to serve a purpose, to resolve disputes; if the dispute is resolved, I 
think the benefi t goes to the system. We have seen from the previous panel 
discussions that the system does work. It does resolve disputes. Therefore, if 
the system works, then it is a benefi t to all, whether you are a defendant or a 
complainant party.  
Johnson:  Thank you very much. Other questions or comments? Am-
bassador Georgiev?
45 Counselor, Head of Trade Section, Delegation of the European Commission; Panelist 
(Panel 3: To What Extent Does the WTO Dispute Settlement System Have a Role in Global 
Governance? Should the Appellate Body Look to Sources Outside the WTO Agreements?).
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Dencho Georgiev:46  When I looked at the panel agenda, I linked it also 
to the question of the fi rst panel (whether the system should be modifi ed), 
and then I predicted what would be the outcome of this panel – that people 
would say that the system would benefi t everyone. Then, I thought that 
it is legitimate to ask this question from the point of view of: What should 
be changed? Should we look at who is benefi ting and who is losing as a result 
of certain changes? I thought that this question should be asked because if 
you fi nd, through some modifi cation, that someone – a defi nable group of 
countries, a category of countries – would be losing, and another would be 
winning, then that would be a good argument not to have this modifi cation. 
So, approaching it from the negative, it is a good question. Thank you.  
Johnson:  Thank you for the comment. And I would like to respond 
to the comment, especially to the extent of having posed the question. I 
addressed this a little bit in my introduction, but there is a great question 
amongst the populace, I think, in all countries, certainly in the U.S. I re-
member talking with the Indian ambassador to the WTO about his political 
problems in India – from my perspective, when I was in the U.S. government 
at USTR, I thought that India was gaining quite a bit by being a Member, 
not only in disputes, but also in negotiations. But in talking with him, he said 
that every time he came back to Delhi and other parts of India he would get 
mobbed by the people who thought he was caving in to everything that de-
veloped countries wanted, and that he thought the general population there 
did not think the WTO was a good thing for India. I suspect that is the case 
in many other countries. I would like to hear your perspective on Mexico.  
Pérez Motta:  This is a very interesting issue. What I said at the begin-
ning was that the main benefi ciaries of a stronger DSU are the consumers, 
and I really mean it; I really believe that. The problem is that the only voice 
that we never hear in the WTO is the voice of the consumers. If you go to 
the general counsel, to any discussion of any negotiating group, you never 
hear the argument of what is the benefi t for, or what is going to be the effect 
on, the consumers. So what Dencho Georgiev is saying is right; as long as 
the consumers are not on the radar of discussions – and what you hear are 
basically the interests of domestic interest groups – then you are going to 
never have any real, let us say, engine to discuss the public interest impact on 
the reform of such an important issue or such a crucial instrument like the 
dispute settlement mechanism.  
46 Ambassador of Bulgaria to the WTO; Panelist (Panel 1: Should the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System Be Modifi ed or Reformed?). 
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That is how I can explain why this discussion on the rules area of the 
WTO is not moving. It might not move at all, or it might have some chang-
es, but they are just going to be a minor change here and there just to say 
there was a reform or there were some modifi cations according, of course, to 
the mandate. And that is going to be it. In the other areas, those domestic in-
terests move you in the right direction most of the time because, in the end, 
you have the balances of power of different producers in different countries 
that, through their pressure, are going to liberalize here and there; maybe 
not enough, but at the end, it is going to move in the right direction. 
In this discussion, I do not see that balance, and that is a problem. This is 
a problem which is inserted in the heart of the system, which is the problem 
of compliance. Let me just give you an example: Maybe people would not 
like to see it, but in the case of Mexico, in the case of Fructose 47 (a recent 
case that we fi nally lost, which started while I was ambassador in Geneva), 
I told them we are going to lose this case; of course we are going to lose it. 
But, it was a decision by the Congress; the Congress knew that what they 
could gain was time. This is exactly what has been happening, and you know 
the erosion goes through the system. If they knew that they could pay from 
the beginning for an action that is clearly against the commitments of the 
country, they would have thought twice about it; at least they would have 
thought twice. But, if this is going to be for three years or more, let us do it. 
Somebody is going to pay for that.  
Johnson:  I think it is a very good point. Number one, consumers are 
generally the greatest benefi ciaries of freer trade and trade liberalization, but 
they do not have much of a voice in many countries, certainly in this coun-
try; primarily because they do not build up interest groups. They are just not 
as effective as what you call the special interests, which really are particular 
industries that know how to impact their congressional delegation and im-
pact USTR, impact the White House and have a greater impact than do the 
consumers who are the overall benefi ciaries of, not only the DSS, but also 
trade liberalization. For example, China is the 800-pound gorilla in trade 
these days, but there are many studies that show that trade with China has 
reduced our infl ation rate by 1 percent. There are obviously great benefi ts to 
consumers, but what is the impact of imports on industry?  Because it is the 
voice of the opposition to imports that is usually the most effective.  
47 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup 
(HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). 
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Another example is the Bananas48 case – we do not produce any bananas 
in this country, but it was the biggest WTO case that we had in the ‘90s, as I 
recall, and it was driven largely by one company, Chiquita. In full disclosure, 
my fi rm represented Dole Food Company, who also had an interest in it, but 
Chiquita was the driving force on that case, and it had very little to do with 
anybody else much, except, of course, the Europeans and the ACP coun-
tries49 and other non-U.S. interests.50  The political infl uence of Chiquita was 
enormous in affecting our trade policy. But back to the point of the people 
who walk into the Wal-Marts and retail stores who benefi t from these lower 
prices based on freer trade. They do not really express their voices and do not 
have an impact on trade in the same way that labor and domestic industry 
do. 
Bhala:  Maybe two comments: one on access and one on retrospective 
remedies. I think defi ning what we mean by access is important, and one 
indicator could be: who are the lawyers in the room? Are the lawyers that are 
arguing the cases for poorer countries from those countries, or are they law fi rms 
that are from developed countries? I think we are all familiar with this legal ca-
pacity issue, and we have heard offi cials from major developing countries say 
they still have to hire counsel in Brussels or in Washington. So, in effect, for 
them, and therefore for smaller poorer countries, the DSU is a system that 
causes sub-contracting back to developed countries – if you get the point. 
And we do not know the answer to that question because we do not, as far 
as I know, have statistics on which lawyers from which places are arguing 
which cases in the room – we cannot go in the room. We have heard, as in 
the Bananas case, that we have had QCs (qualifi ed counsels) and others ar-
gue cases.
On the retrospective remedy issue – that is one worth a lot of thought, 
too – it certainly would, perhaps, lead to greater deterrence generally (gen-
eral deterrence and specifi c deterrence), but if we think about what the other 
theories of punishment are, one of them is revenge – aside from deterrence 
and rehabilitation, is revenge. Would we want to have any sort of vindictive-
ness in our remedial system, and if we go to retrospective remedies, would 
that inject a bit of a revenge element? I do not know the answer to the ques-
48 Bananas, DS27, supra note 5.
49 ACP Countries are those in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacifi c. ACP Countries, http://
ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/country/country_en.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 
2006). 
50 For instance, North, Central, and South American countries, such as Belize, Canada, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. See Bananas, DS27, supra note 5. 
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tion. I am just trying to throw out the idea that the theory of punishment 
is going to be as important as an economic-based incentive analysis of the 
punishment.
Johnson:  Yes, Professor Davey?
William J. Davey:51  A couple of things on compliance and remedies. In 
thinking about compliance, it strikes me that the problem of compliance, so 
far, has not been developing countries not getting compliance, as much as 
other developed countries mainly not getting compliance from the United 
States.
If you think of all of the long-term cases of non-compliance, they, typi-
cally – with the exception of the Brazil-Canada Regional Aircraft case52 
– involve the U.S. And the ongoing ones that have not been corrected at 
all are relatively minor cases, involving the EU against the U.S., such as the 
Trademark and Copyright cases,53 and the Japan Anti-dumping case.54  I am 
not sure that compliance, so far, has been a problem for developing coun-
tries. They seem to have gotten the U.S. to at least remove the measures, 
which were typically safeguard measures. 
A comment on retrospective remedies – I think that you have to be care-
ful about how you put them in place. If you think in terms of still giving a 
country a reasonable period of time to comply, and if they comply – no retro-
spective remedy – you do not have to worry so much about the revenge idea. 
They do have a period in which they can take action. It is only when they do 
not take action that they are likely to be punished.  
You can argue that retaliation does not work all that well, but the fact 
is – and in most of the cases where it has actually been applied – it has led 
to change, usually fairly promptly. The Hormones case is the one long-term 
51 Edwin M. Adams Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; Former Director 
of the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO; Panelist (Panel 3: To What Extent Does the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System Have a Role in Global Governance? Should the Appellate Body Look to 
Sources Outside the WTO Agreements?).
52 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/
DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).    
53 Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 
15, 2000).     
54 Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001).  
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counter-example, I suppose.55  In any event, I think over time the system 
has to improve its timely compliance record, or countries will lose faith in it. 
Some form of retrospective remedy, I think, is essential in order to achieve 
that.
Kho:  I feel like I have to defend the U.S. government once in this process, 
and the only thing I would say in that respect is that I would agree that, gener-
ally, compliance is not as big an issue as some have made it out to be. With re-
spect to the U.S., we have complied. There are more cases brought against us 
than most other countries, and in most of those situations, we have complied.
I will touch upon that in just a second, but I do want to mention, with 
respect to compliance, the retroactive remedy proposal. I also agree that we 
have to be careful with that because that is really shifting the fundamental na-
ture of the dispute (of the WTO, really), which is this notion that you are not 
really in violation until you have been found to be in violation. The DSU is 
actually quite clear – you cannot go out there and say, one country cannot say 
to another: You are in violation. That is a violation, in fact, of an obligation of 
the DSU, Article 23.56  That was a case the EC brought against the U.S. and 
won on, based on that theory.57  So then, now to all of a sudden say: We have 
found you to be in violation and then you are going to have to pay all the way 
back to… when? – the inception? Well, then questions are asked: the inception 
of the time the measure was put in place? What if it was put in place before the 
WTO? What if it was put in place after the WTO? Also, the inception of a panel 
proceeding? Do you count when consultations occurred or afterwards? And then 
how do you quantify all of that?  Those are all questions I think, at the end of 
the day, really go against the nature of the current WTO system.  
I think if you want to change that, fi ne. If the membership decides that 
they want to change that and make it, frankly, more of a punitive action, 
okay. But I do not see it going there right now, and really we are looking 
at countries that generally act in good faith towards each other. Like I said, 
when disputes occur, you do not necessarily say: Well, somebody is acting in 
bad faith. Disputes occur just because there is a lot of trade and you are go-
ing to have issues.  
55 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 
13, 1998). 
56 See DSU, supra note 36, at art. 23 (providing that Members shall not make determinations 
to effect that violation has occurred). 
57 See Bananas, DS27, supra note 5.   
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Are there preventive measures – this notion that you can sell your rights 
to other countries because they have a better ability to retaliate? I do not 
know about that. That is really – we are getting down to bringing as many 
cases as you can so you can sell it to make money. It just sounds problematic. 
And this early action proposal, this notion of having a preliminary injunction 
– frankly, the WTO is not set up as a court right now. We can argue as we 
modify it in the future – do you want it to be more like a court or more like 
an arbitration as Professor Bhala mentioned? But right now, it does not have 
the capacity to make these determinations to enforce preliminary injunc-
tions, and those kinds of notions, again, are coupled with the fact that the 
DSU specifi cally says that nothing is in violation of the WTO unless it has 
been determined through the panel proceeding, through the Appellate Body 
proceeding, to be in violation.  
All of that raises a lot of questions about the current nature of the system. 
The big question behind all of that, too, is: can developed countries do these 
things against developing countries? And, would that not really hurt develop-
ing countries if the developed countries came to them and said: Look, you 
have a measure that is in violation, and we are going to retroactively seek rem-
edies. It may be a small measure, it may be something that does not hurt a 
whole lot, but given the fact that it is a small economy, each measure is going 
to affect them. So those are questions I think people are going to have to ask 
when they think about this proposal.  
The last thing I will say – the voice of consumers sometimes is the re-
sponsibility of the government. I mean, being in the government myself, our 
client is, in fact, the government as a whole. We are not talking about just in-
dustry. We are not talking about just the politicians. We are also talking about 
consumers. There are agencies within the U.S., for example, whose sole pur-
pose is to be the voice of consumers, like the CEA (Council of Economic 
Advisors) and Treasury to a certain extent. So, for example, the issue of gray 
market goods – the importation of gray market goods – that is a big Trea-
sury issue because, frankly, gray market goods are helpful for consumers.58 
Whereas industry would probably want to prevent gray market goods from 
coming into the U.S. because they would like to keep markets segmented, so 
they could continue to keep prices at an arbitrarily high level. 
58 A gray market good is “a foreign-manufactured good, bearing a valid United States trade-
mark, that is imported without the consent of the United States trademark holder.”  K Mart 
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988).
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Issues like that, where the government is in fact responsible for consumer 
voices as well –  for the U.S., for example, there are certain actions that I can 
think of in the past that we have not taken because the agencies responsible 
for the consumers say: Look, you just really need to think twice. And that is 
diffi cult, I think, in situations where, as you mentioned, Ambassador Pérez 
Motta, you are also going to have constituents within your government who 
do not care about international obligations; all they care about is domestic. 
We have it in Congress as well. People say: Well, you know, who cares about 
the WTO?  You are going to have to balance all that, and it is tough to be a 
Member of the WTO. It is tough to be a sovereign government and to have 
to deal with all these issues, but we trust and we hope that each of the gov-
ernments will take all of that into account; when they put forth a proposal, 
they will have to, to the best that they can, balance the voice of all the various 
constituents that they are representing. Thank you.
Johnson:  Professor McRae?  
Donald M. McRae:59  Just a comment, fi rst of all, carrying on from Raj 
Bhala’s point about students and professors benefi ting. I think one can make 
the case more broadly that the whole system of public international law has 
benefi ted from an active DSS; both in the fact that it actually works when 
other dispute settlement systems in public international law do not work as 
effi ciently and effectively, and also in terms of some of the jurisprudence – the 
development of the treaty interpretation rules, a vast body of jurisprudence 
that really has no parallel elsewhere in public international law. One of the 
things I think that this is doing is making public international lawyers a bit 
more aware of what is happening in the international trade law fi eld, and 
causing a bit more cross-fertilization in disciplines that really did not have a 
lot to do with each other historically.  
The question I wanted to ask the panel to talk a bit more about was the 
one that was raised by Ambassador Johnson – his comment about India and 
the Indian delegate going back and getting a lot of reaction. I wonder – if we 
had people from a variety of different countries here, we might get a different 
picture of the WTO from what we get in North America, including Mexico, 
where there is an active involvement with the issues. It is said, for example, 
that a number of African countries after the Cotton 60 case said: Okay, the case 
59  Hyman Soloway Professor of Business and Trade Law, Faculty of Law University of Ottawa; 
Panelist (Panel 4: Are the Current Methods of Enforcement of Dispute Decisions Effective? What 
are Alternative Methods of Enforcement?).
60 Cotton, DS267, supra note 9.
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is over; we now expect automatically the markets to be open. But, the DSS does 
not have that sort of immediacy. A few years ago – rather like the Indian com-
ment – I was on a panel with a Korean lawyer who was very negative about 
dispute settlement. It had not worked at all for Korea. They had paid lots of 
money to Washington lawyers, and they kept on losing. Now they are not 
losing as much. They are probably paying as much money, but they are not 
losing as much, and they may have a different view about it.  
For many countries, dispute settlement is just inaccessible. Morocco fi led 
an amicus brief,61 and that is an indication to me that they really were not 
on top of the third-party process. They got behind the ball and, therefore, 
they fi led an amicus brief – it is normally professors who do that and trade 
associations and NGOs. So I think that there is probably less understanding 
of dispute settlement. I am not sure that the Advisory Centre gets to a vast 
number of states that probably cannot afford the US$100,000 fee to start 
with or the rates of the Centre.62  They can barely afford to have a Mission in 
Geneva to keep up with the WTO on an ongoing basis. So I wonder whether 
or not there is not a larger group of countries out there to which the dispute 
settlement process is not accessible, and I wonder what can be done to make 
it more accessible to them and what needs to be done to provide a better 
understanding for a number of countries about what dispute settlement can 
do for them in fact.  
Pérez Motta:  What I would like to say is that there is, of course, a cost of 
accession to the system. It is not free, of course. My point is that, in relative 
terms, I would prefer to have a reform that imposes big costs to the country 
that is going to make an action that goes against its own commitments rather 
than trying to lower a little bit more the cost of access of using the system. 
And this is the whole point of the proposal that we were making.   
This is how the system works today. An early determination and applica-
tion of unifi cation or impairment would be to start from the adoption of the 
panel or the Appellate Body report. So, basically, I am assuming that, from 
the point of view of the system, you have not violated unless it is demon-
strated that you violated the system. You are just moving the point where 
the action can be taken, instead of waiting over three years that, in the case 
of the Bananas, cost – for a country as small like Ecuador – almost US$400 
61 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/
DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) (mentioning Morocco’s fi ling of amicus brief on July 22, 
2002). 
62 See supra note 39.
60
million. Now, if you take from those trade fl ows, if you see what would be the 
cost of using the lawyer from the Advisory Centre, it would cost you about 
US$10,000 or something like that – which is, from what you are losing, ab-
solutely reasonable.  
If you have the possibility of retroactive determination and application, 
you could start from where the measure was taken. You will have to develop, 
of course, the rules of how you could use this mechanism, but that possibil-
ity would completely change the whole structure of incentives. You could 
also add the possibility of preventive measures as well, as in a case where you 
have the possibility of an injury that has to be taken into account from the 
beginning. In the case of negotiable remedies, I understand that, especially 
to lawyers, that is an issue that takes some time to digest. I understand it, but 
from an economic point of view it is absolutely clear. There are a whole lot 
of analysis, papers and documents that have been made.  
You can just take the case of environmental issues – in the U.S., the pos-
sibility to develop a market of rights of contamination is just a clear applica-
tion of debt. It is just the same – actually, here is how we would develop this 
idea (we got it from somewhere else, but I think it makes a lot of sense) – the 
point is, in the end, to provoke a sales restraint, this is the whole issue. I mean, 
we do not want people not complying. What we want is for people to think 
twice before they decide not to comply. This is the whole issue, and what 
you are going to see with these kinds of reforms is a very strong reduction of 
cases. And you might say: Well, the system is not used. Well, that is much better 
because if the system is not used, it is because the system is working well. If 
you are not using the DSU, it is because the system is working well. Actually, 
if we take into account the number of cases that never go into a panel, that 
shows much more how the system works and how positively the system is 
working than the number of panels that you are fi nding.  
Johnson:  Ambassador Georgiev?
Georgiev:  On this same thing – access to the system – you were asking: 
Are there other solutions? I want to pose a question to Bill Davey because 
what the DSU says in Article 27 is that, to this end, the Secretariat shall 
“make available a qualifi ed legal expert from the WTO technical corporation 
services to any developing country member which so requests.”63  This is 
63 DSU, supra note 36, art. 27.2. 
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absolutely clear language. I do not think that anything must be added in the 
DSU or that the system has to be changed. It simply has to be implemented; 
the WTO Advisory Centre appeared because this was not implemented. It is 
very clear.  
The argument was that – and Bill Davey will correct me, of course, if I 
am wrong – but the argument was that you may, if you implement this pro-
vision, somehow compromise the neutrality of the WTO Secretariat. And 
I agree that this is very serious. And that is why I think that if you want to 
strengthen the system, if you institute a permanent panel body, you simply 
take the legal division out of the Secretariat and give it to that independent, 
impartial body. Then you would not have the problem of implementing that 
text which is quite defi nite. There is nothing elsewhere about the neutrality 
of the Secretariat giving legal advice. I am curious about how you would 
respond to this.  
Davey:  As a former member of the Secretariat, I, of course, would fi rst 
say that the WTO is a member-driven organization, and since certain power-
ful Members were all upset with the idea that the WTO would be staffi ng 
cases against them I think the Secretariat felt, and they made the argument, 
that it would compromise the basic position of the Secretariat, which is to be 
a neutral body that helps bridge differences between Members in negotia-
tions and so on. Because of that opposition, I do not think that it was ever 
seriously contemplated that the WTO would go so far as to have its own 
people argue cases. There are people in the technical cooperation division 
that do give advice to countries before litigation.64  There are consultants 
hired on a long-term basis, for decades, who are available, who do not make 
appearances before the panel or the Appellate Body generally speaking, but 
do advise on the submissions that countries make, and, in that sense, are 
playing a fairly important role. And there are additional consultants hired in 
specifi c cases. 
The Secretariat has gone quite a ways in providing some form of this. 
The line that generally has not been crossed is paying for people to actu-
ally appear in the meetings and make the arguments. Getting advice and 
comments on submissions or extensive help in making submissions has been 
64 Overview of the WTO Secretariat, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/secre_e/in-
tro_e.htm (last visited May 15, 2007). One of the Secretariat’s “main duties [is] to…provide 
technical assistance for developing countries.” 
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done. And it is a question of language, like all language – what does it really 
mean? If you have powerful Members saying: Well, it does not mean providing 
actual lawyers to argue cases before a panel – then the Secretariat is unlikely to 
go down that road.  
Georgiev:  Yes, but this line is not in the DSU, so I continue the question 
because I have been told by other people: Well, the Secretariat has simply to 
provide the money and – I would add – then cross that particular line of litigat-
ing before panels. How would you comment on that?  Is it purely a budgetary 
question?  Or, is that line really so enshrined in the DSU system itself?  
Davey:  The way that you describe it, it becomes a budgetary question 
if the only issue is that outsiders are okay as long as – if the person does not 
work full time at the WTO, it is okay for them to provide any service; then 
it is only a question of funding. But the WTO budget has always been ex-
tremely tight, and the idea that the WTO budget would pay anywhere near 
rates charged for legal representation by your typical law fi rm that does this 
sort of work is just out of the question. Would law fi rms work for what pan-
elists get paid, which is roughly US$350 to US$500 a day? I am not sure. 
That is less, I think, than what the Advisory Centre is paying its lawyers, so it 
would cost a lot of money, and I am not sure that the membership is going 
to approve it. 
Georgiev:  Let me ask you this question then:  Do you agree with me 
that the Advisory Centre and other solutions which are being asked about are 
coming into the picture only because this particular provision of the WTO 
DSU is not being implemented?  
Davey:  Well, there is a question of what it means, of course. But it is true 
that the Advisory Centre came into existence, I think, because there was a 
perceived need for cheap legal advice for developing countries and Article 27 
was not meeting that need. Had Article 27 been providing Advisory Centre-
like assistance, the Advisory Centre never would have come into existence. 
But it took a lot of money to set up the Advisory Centre from the developed 
countries that backed it, and if you remember the discussions, the major play-
ers – the U.S. and the EU – are not interested in funding this sort of legal 
assistance. Some member states of the EU were, but the EU itself was not. 
The U.S. kind of stayed out of the argument, actually, but I do not think it 
was interested in that sort of funding.  
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Johnson:  Nikolaos Zaimis has another question or comment.  
Zaimis:  Just to clarify one perception, especially for the students. It is 
not that governments would actually decide one day: Okay, now we are go-
ing to implement a measure which is in violation of the WTO. Usually what 
happens, in real life, is that you try to develop a law, a measure, which is 
WTO-compatible. It might not be immediately obvious, however, that there 
are angles that may render that measure incompatible with WTO law. Raj 
Bhala explained a few minutes before that many people in the U.S would 
not have foreseen, perhaps, that countercyclical payments could have been 
challenged because of the exception for fruits and vegetables,65 or the U.S. 
GATS gambling commitment because of the horse racing exception?66  Most 
of measures are in the gray area. It takes WTO experts within governments 
to be able to analyze and see if there is or is not a WTO violation.  
Which brings me then to the second question on access to the system: I 
think that the biggest problem for the developing countries is not the fi nan-
cial cost – you can hire a law fi rm even though they are extremely expensive 
– I know this, I used to be a lawyer (good news for law students who plan to 
practice in trade) – but rather it is a matter of human resources. How many 
developing countries really have the manpower, have the experts within the 
governments who can sit down, who can review measures taken by devel-
oped countries or other developing countries, analyze them, identify a WTO 
violation, and proceed then to Geneva? It does not happen. We see that from 
a practical perspective now during the negotiations for the Doha Develop-
ment Agenda.67  A lot of developing countries do not have the right experts 
who are able to negotiate the agreements that they would have to agree 
upon. So the lack of expertise is not something that can be easily resolved by 
the Advisory Centre, and it is not only a fi nancial issue. I would like to know 
what the panel thinks about this.  
Johnson:  Who would like to take that?
Kho:  I will venture an answer, and also plug the U.S. proposal for trans-
parency. I think one way to develop experience and expertise is to do things 
65 See Cotton, DS267, supra note 9.
66 See Antigua Gambling, DS285, supra note 10. 
67 See Doha Development Agenda:  Negotiations, implementation and development, http://
www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (containing 
Doha texts and relevant news updates).
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over and over, and to watch it. If you open up the panel and the Appellate 
Body proceedings, I think that goes in the right direction towards getting 
that sort of expertise, that sort of comfort level. I do know of countries that 
join as third parties in panels quite regularly in order to get that expertise, in 
order to get that experience. They do it not because they have a substantial 
interest, which is the so-called requirement to join as a third party;68 rather, 
they do it because, well, I guess you can call it a substantial interest in getting 
to know the system. That is why they do it.  
But those that do this are typically ones that can afford to have some 
manpower to actually sit through the process and to send the right people 
to think through it. Even though they do not need to submit much, or they 
give a very short third-party statement, that is all they do. I think if you open 
up the process for all to see, it is easier to learn from that process. It is easier 
to be accustomed to it and to feel comfortable with what is going on and to 
be able to predict how you could best deal with situations as they come. I 
think that would go a long way towards getting that sort of experience.  
In terms of the monetary costs, that has always been an issue and a ques-
tion, and we are appreciative of the Advisory Centre for being there and be-
ing able to support developing countries should they have a legitimate issue. 
Also, the Advisory Centre recently has partnered with some major law fi rms, 
including some U.S. law fi rms, because, frankly, U.S. law fi rms who want to 
get a piece of the action in the litigation are realizing that some countries 
just cannot afford them, so they are willing to take a price cut. Some of these 
law fi rms also, in generating future business, have provided free advice to 
these countries as well. White and Case, for example, very recently – was it 
the GSP case? I cannot remember, or Cotton, but they were there on a pro 
bono basis, representing Zimbabwe, I believe it was. These are all ways, I 
think, that we can get around the system. I think Professor Davey is right. I 
mean, who is going to pay money so that somebody else is going to bring a 
case against them? I am not sure that that is a viable path toward resolving 
this question.  
Pérez Motta:  Just briefl y, just one reaction to what you said at the 
beginning of your presentation. I think we should distinguish between two 
types of actions. There are some, let us say, public policies which clearly are 
in the gray area where you are not sure you are complying or not because the 
68 See DSU, supra note 36, art. 4(11) (enumerating “substantial interest” requirement to be 
joined as third party). 
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WTO – I mean, when you see these specifi c articles sometimes, as a result of 
a negotiation, they are not so clear; they are not so clear precisely because 
negotiators were not able to agree in clear-cut language. As a result, you have 
to consider that, basically, public policy is in that area because of lack of clar-
ity in the language. But there are many other actions that countries take, that 
they know are against their commitments, and they know it perfectly well. 
They know that it is going to take a long time to pay for that action, and 
they just do it because the system allows them not to pay for that decision. 
So, even for the fi rst type of situations, to have a stronger DSU in terms of 
compliance would be good because negotiators would have to be more care-
ful when they close the deal in that particular language since they know that 
they are going to be, in many cases, liable to a dispute settlement decision. 
So, I think it would be good for the two situations to have a much stronger 
dispute settlement mechanism at the end of the day.  
Bhala:  Let me go further out on a limb, which I think goes back to Pro-
fessor McRae’s question about what specifi c steps we could take to make the 
system more accessible. At least a few years ago, when they happened to look 
at it, the largest division at the WTO Secretariat was the translation division, 
both in numbers and budgetary consumption. Now that may have changed, 
and I may be getting the statistics wrong, but it is a very sizable part of the 
budget. So, before we even talk about expanding the pie, we might want to 
look at what we are doing with the existing budget.  
As we all know, the translations go into French and Spanish. There are 
128 million speakers of French in the world; that puts it at ninth in most 
commonly spoken languages. If you take out the French population, that is 
in France – about 61 million – so then the balance, say 60-70 million, would 
be in poor countries where we are theoretically translating the documents for 
them. Spanish places fourth at 417 million, so we would have to look at how 
many Spanish speakers are in developing countries for whom we are doing 
these translations. The point is – could we think about lessening some of the 
translation and reallocating those funds to the Advisory Centre or to imple-
menting DSU 27?69  I recognize that it is going to be politically incorrect to 
talk this way, but the demographic trends are what they are; we have 2 billion 
more people expected to learn English in the next decade, and in fact, many 
of the teachers of English now are non-native English speakers. Go to China 
or to India, and you have got non-native English speakers teaching English 
69 DSU, supra note 36, art. 27. 
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to the Chinese and Indians. So we have got a clear linguistic trend going on, 
and yet we have set up a system that is consuming a lot of resources that is 
based on 19th century-like demographics.  
Johnson:  Stephen Kho?
Kho:  I am sorry, but I just think it would be really interesting to see 
how the French would react to your proposal. (laughter)  Just very quickly, 
responding to Ambassador Pérez Motta’s concerns about compliance: I just 
wonder whether the premise of that thinking might be a little bit off, in the 
sense that it is not really my experience for most governments – where they 
make a calculated decision – to say: We are just not going to comply; we have the 
choice whether to comply or not, and we are going to choose not to. Oftentimes, 
it is a lot more complicated than that. Oftentimes, you have various factions 
within the government; some saying: Look, we are putting much more value 
in international obligations than others. Others saying: You know what? I have 
got to get elected next year, and my constituents are not really going to like what 
is happening here. Then query whether that situation, let us say, is going to 
cost more in retaliation. We all know that retaliation is a cost, not just for 
those being retaliated against, but also for those doing the retaliating because, 
frankly, trade is disrupted from both ends and people just get hurt from both 
sides. Just having a larger number of retaliations – I am not sure that fi xes the 
situation. We know, for example, the FSC’s retaliation is huge.70  The EC has 
decided to “un-retaliate” because from both sides we both feel the pain. So, 
I think this “choosing to comply” issue is not as simple as merely one coun-
try saying yes or no. I recognize that there are those of us who do put a lot 
more cachet in abiding by our international obligations, certainly. Some of 
us would say: Gee, why do we not comply?  In some of our cases, as you know, 
the Administration is out there saying to the Congress: Look, you have got to 
change the law. Frankly, we are not in charge of amending laws.  
I think those are more complicated issues, and I am not sure merely 
jacking up the volume or the price of retaliation will fi x them. Changing the 
economic incentives will really be, in fact, an incentive at the end of the day. 
Those are interesting options, and we are thinking about those things. But 
from our experience, I am not sure it would work.  
70 See WTO Decision of the Arbitrator on E.C. Complaint Concerning U.S. Tax Treatment 
for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002). 
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Pérez Motta:  As an economist, I always think that this is just a matter of 
the net present value. The politicians are going to evaluate this, of course, in 
a different way if they have to pay the cost rather than not paying any costs of 
doing that action. I agree with you that, in the end, this is an internal strug-
gle within the government, and you will have to fi ght with the Congress and 
with the different interests within the executive power as well. My only point 
is that if you could have a much higher and a clear cost of taking that action, 
there is a better way to sell the right public policy rather than the wrong one. 
That is the only point.  
Johnson:  Professor Wilner?
Gabriel Wilner:71  I am just wondering whether one could think in 
terms of an asymmetrical system, in the sense that developing countries have 
smaller economies and have more to lose by violations of the rules com-
mitted against them. And much like the system of preferences in reducing 
barriers – is it possible that one could think of more appropriate means of 
enforcement of their rights against violations by economic giants such as the 
U.S. and the EU?
Pérez Motta:  I did not understand the question clearly. Could you 
please just repeat the question?  
Wilner:  I do not know whether I can repeat the question, but I can 
repeat the idea. The idea is that there should be consideration of how viola-
tions of trade rules can be dealt with when they are aimed at a poorer coun-
try by a powerful trading state. When Japan violates the rules with respect 
to Malaysia or East Timor, could a differential system for dealing with such 
violations be found? 
Kho:  Just in response – my understanding of your idea is somehow pre-
mised on the notion that Japan would actually take a fi nding of a violation or a 
case brought by East Timor to be of much less consequence than a case being 
brought by, let us say, the United States. But that is not the case. I do not think 
countries go there and think, well, it is just some dinky little country suing me, 
so I really do not care. I do think countries are interested in abiding by their 
71 Associate Dean and Charles H. Kirbo Professor of International Law; Executive Director, 
Dean Rusk Center – International, Comparative and Graduate Legal Studies, University of 
Georgia School of Law; Moderator (Panel 3: To What Extent Does the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System Have a Role in Global Governance? Should the Appellate Body Look to Sources Outside 
the WTO Agreement?).
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international obligations generally, and they recognize that this is the WTO 
– 149 Members – and it is a single undertaking. I know we, for example, will 
take cases brought by us seriously regardless of the size, regardless of who it 
is, regardless of the issues. So I just do not see that – I mean, your remedy to 
the problem – I do not see the problem. I do not see countries distinguishing 
between a small country suing them and a larger country suing them.
Wilner:  We have been talking not about the process of making claims 
or the expense of making them. Rather, we have been discussing the loss or 
the extent of privation to the country which has suffered the violation of 
the rules by a big country. The issue here would be whether reform in the 
enforcement of the mechanisms, such as retroactive retaliation or payment, 
should not only give rise to the opportunity to bring a complaint, but, more 
important, to recognize and repair the actual harm done to the particular 
economy which has been injured by a violation of the rules by the big coun-
try. Such countries may then be less ready to engage in “inadvertent” viola-
tions of the trade rules, knowing that the remedy against them will be more 
direct, broader, and of longer duration than previously.
Kho:  Well, that is what we have been talking about, really. This goes to 
my point before – no country makes an easy decision one way or another to 
say: We are not going to violate – we have a choice one way or not. It is easy; it 
is either a turn-on or a turn-off issue, and we just choose to turn off. Nobody 
makes that decision. In fact, the violations that the United States is having 
diffi culty in bringing into compliance – as I mentioned before – are mostly 
against the EC, and they are mostly small dollar amounts. So again, when a 
country sues another country, I do not think that goes into the thinking; the 
size of the hurt, or the size of the pain of it. In fact, as far as the pain issue 
goes, you are already permitted under the WTO to retaliate based on your 
trade values. That is already being addressed in the WTO, so I am not cer-
tain, in addition to that, what kind of scenario that you are mentioning.  
Johnson:  Would you like to add something?
Pérez Motta:  Well, I have always been against the idea of having a sym-
metrical mechanism, especially in this area of the WTO. I normally do not 
like giving special, differential treatment because I think that generates so 
many distortions that, in the end, it goes against even developing countries. 
The only area where that could be at least an area of thought is in the case of 
retaliation because when you have a very small country that has the right to 
retaliate, in fact, it has the right to go against its own interests. If this small 
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country is going to retaliate against Japan, or even against another develop-
ing country – it does not matter by the size of the country against whom you 
are going to retaliate – I think that then you have a problem there. And that 
is why I think the possibility of a market for retaliation – let us put it that way 
– could be useful, at least to sell the right to someone else. In the end, it is 
not a good idea to retaliate. It is not the best action you can take. It is just the 
second best in any case. But it would be better to be able to sell it to someone 
else instead of shooting your own consumers with that action.  
Johnson:  Professor Van der Borght?
Kim Van der Borght:72  Just to add something along the lines of Profes-
sor Wilner’s suggestion. There was a proposal that was published last year in 
the Journal of International Economic Law by Marco Bronckers73 that does 
exactly what is suggested by Professor Wilner. And what he is proposing – I 
am misrepresenting him slightly here because I am picking only one element 
out of quite an extensive and complicated system, the element that is relevant 
here – but what he is proposing is that if the developing country wins in a 
case against the developed country, the developing country could choose to 
opt for monetary damages instead of retaliation. However, it would not work 
the other way around; the developed country could not demand monetary 
damages from the developing country. That is the only really concrete pro-
posal I have seen along these lines.  
Johnson:  Professor Davey?
Davey:  There is a modifi cation that I have endorsed at times, which 
would be that you could have it go both ways – but you would use a sliding 
scale adjustment based on per capita GNP so that the amount payable by the 
developing country would be relatively small. Switching to monetary com-
pensation would solve the problem to the extent that you could enforce it, 
which would be dependent on the fact that the developing countries cannot 
really effectively retaliate.74
72 Professor, University of Hull School of Law; Panelist (Panel 3: To What Extent Does the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System Have a Role in Global Governance? Should the Appellate Body 
Look to Sources Outside the WTO Agreement?). 
73 Marco Bronckers, Financial Compensation in the WTO—Improving the Remedies of WTO 
Dispute Settlement, J. INT’L ECON. L. 2005.8(101) (2005).
74 William J. Davey, Proposals for Improving the Working Procedures of WTO Dispute Settlement 
Panels in PREPARING THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND: IMPROVEMENTS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF 
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., 2002).  
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Johnson:  Let me ask you this question, the two of you, since you are 
familiar with this. Does that just apply in the asymmetrical case of the devel-
oped versus developing, or would it apply in the case of the EU versus the 
U.S.?
Davey:  I would let it apply in all cases. It is interesting that the U.S. 
now puts in its free trade agreements a provision on the respondent’s right 
to choose to compensate as opposed to suffer retaliation, at least in its recent 
free trade agreements.75  
Kho:  Does this work also between “developing and developing”?  
Davey:  It would not work very well. It would be in very small amounts, 
I suppose.  
Kho:  But the proposal that I have heard applies only to “developing 
versus developed” but never to “developing versus developing”. That is just 
a variation on the proposal that I have heard.
Van der Borght:  To diminish my misrepresentation of Marco Bronck-
ers, what he also proposes is that, if it is a case between two developing coun-
tries, it would then be a choice of whether you demand or not, and there 
could be mediation to decide whether it would be appropriate between two 
countries.76  As I said, it is quite a complicated proposal. 
Johnson:  Well, it is an interesting one. I assume that someone will bring 
this up tomorrow in alternatives to enforcement measures.77  Thank you so 
much, panelists, for a very interesting discussion.  
75 See, e.g., Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl., art. 
21.11, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/fi nal-text/index.
html (providing for dispute resolution by negotiations to determine mutually acceptable com-
pensation).
76 See supra note 73.
77 Panel 4: Are the Current Methods of Enforcement of Dispute Decisions Effective? What are 
Alternative Methods of Enforcement?
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To What Extent Does the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Have a Role in Global Governance?  Should the Appellate 
Body Look to Sources Outside the WTO Agreements?  
Moderator: Gabriel M. Wilner, Associate Dean and Charles H. Kirbo 
Professor of International Law; Executive Director, Dean Rusk Center, 
School of Law, University of Georgia
William J. Davey, Edwin M. Adams Professor of Law, College of Law, 
University of Illinois; Former Director of the Legal Affairs 
Division of the WTO
Kim Van der Borght, Professor, University of Hull, School of Law
Nikolaos Zaimis, Counselor, Head of Trade Section, Delegation of the 
European Commission
Johnson:  Welcome to everyone. We have an interesting program for this 
morning, and I appreciate all of you being here. 
I want to introduce the moderator for this panel, and that is Gabriel Wil-
ner. He has very many titles, and so I have to look at my notes here to make 
sure I catch them all. He is, fi rst of all, the Charles H. Kirbo Professor of In-
ternational Law; he is the executive director of the Dean Rusk Center; and he 
also is the associate dean of the University of Georgia School of Law, and he 
is in charge of the LL.M. program in that capacity. He, of course, specializes 
in international law. He has been here longer than most of us have – longer 
than most of you have been alive (laughing). Not really, but he arrived about 
when I was leaving the law school in my law school days, and I am sorry that 
I missed all the programs that he had.
Professor Rusk actually brought him from the UN. He was very im-
pressed with him, and he brought him down here, and we have all been 

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happy ever since. All of the alumni who have gone through our international 
program have great loyalty toward him. Of course, he teaches a broad range 
of international law courses. We have been trying to get him to slow down 
a little bit, but he will not do it. He teaches several courses each semester, 
quite often, and, of course, he runs the Brussels program, which was started 
back in 1973, and you can count up those years. It has been a very successful 
program. We have one of the largest, in fact maybe the largest, alumni groups 
in Brussels, and I think it is largely due to the Brussels program. If you are 
ever in Brussels during July, be sure and drop by and see him because he can 
introduce you to a lot of our graduates over there, as well as to the profes-
sors who teach European law in his course. He has also been an adjunct and 
visiting professor at the Free University of Brussels ever since 1976, and he 
has been a visiting professor at the University of Paris, served as an arbitrator 
of international disputes, and he was the author of the arbitration code in 
Georgia. It is my pleasure to introduce Professor Wilner, who will introduce 
the panel. Thank you.
Wilner:  Thank you very much, Ambassador Johnson. You are very kind, 
but of course my background has really nothing to do with what we are 
going to be doing today, and so we will move right on. This panel is en-
titled: To What Extent Does the WTO Dispute Settlement System Have a Role 
in Global Governance? – in the large sense, and – Should the Appellate Body 
Look to Sources Outside the WTO Agreements? These are sentences loaded 
with meaning and, perhaps, controversy, and we have a panel of experts on 
the subject who have been – like everyone else here – extremely active either 
in the academic and/or the practical pursuit of the work in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  
The fi rst of our speakers today will be Professor William Davey, who is 
the Edwin Adams Professor at the University of Illinois where he has taught 
international trade, European Union law, international business transactions, 
and corporate and securities law. From 1995 to 1999, he served as director of 
the legal affairs division of the WTO. We know that he has authored a number 
of very important texts and casebooks on the subjects of international trade 
and, of course, on European Union law.1  He is a member of the American 
Law Institute and serves as a member of the international trade committee of 
the International Law Association and on the editorial board of the Journal 
1 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (4th ed. 
2002).
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of International Economic Law, the Columbia Journal of European Law, and 
the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies. I think this is a very shortened 
version of a very distinguished curriculum vitae.  
Our second speaker today is Kim Van der Borght, who is a professor of 
law at the University of Hull and a fellow of the Center of Economic Law at 
VUB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) in Brussels. He is also a fellow of the Dean 
Rusk Center. He has had an extremely active, although still young, career in 
the international trade law fi eld. He has written a very, very interesting doc-
toral dissertation, which is on the very subject of the legal nature of the WTO 
dispute settlement, and which will be published shortly.2  In fact, Professor 
Davey had a lot to do with the preparation and publication of that book since 
he served as co-director of Kim Van der Borght’s dissertation. Professor Van 
der Borght has been teaching dispute settlement at the WTO here at the law 
school to a rather large class this spring.    
Our third distinguished speaker this morning is Mr. Nikolaos Zaimis, 
who is currently the head of the trade section of the European Commission’s 
delegation in Washington and is very much a specialist in EU-U.S. relations. 
Previously, he was the deputy head of the WTO dispute settlement and trade 
barriers unit at the EC’s Directorate-General for Trade, and before that he 
worked for a number of years in private practice in Brussels, focusing on EC 
and international trade issues. He joined the Commission in 1995 and ini-
tially worked in the anti-subsidy policy area and became head of the section 
dealing with trade barriers. He is a member of the Athens – Greece, of course 
– Bar. He, in fact, studied in Greece and in the U.K.  
These three gentlemen will discuss the very important issue of the role 
that the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) has in the general system of gov-
ernance in the economic side of international relations. And, of course, with 
respect to the second question, this hides perhaps the issue of whether or not 
the Appellate Body is strictly – what some consider to be – part of a unique 
arbitral system or whether there are judicial elements to its makeup and to 
its work, which, of course, would have an effect on the fi rst question. But to 
explain this further, I would like to call on Professor Davey, who will tell us 
much about the issues on the basis of his experience as an academic and his 
practical experience at the WTO Secretariat.  
2 Kim Van der Borght, The World Trade Court: An Analysis of the Legal Nature of the Dis-
pute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization (2006).
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Davey:  Thank you very much for that kind introduction. It is a great 
pleasure to be here. Athens is a beautiful place, and the campus is quite de-
lightful. I want to thank the Dean Rusk Center for inviting me to what, so 
far, has led to some fascinating discussions. As the chair indicated, the general 
topic for this panel is: To What Extent Does the WTO Dispute Settlement Sys-
tem Have a Role in Global Governance?; with a subtopic of: Should the Appel-
late Body Look to Sources Outside the WTO Agreements? I will try to offer some 
tentative thoughts on these issues, some of which are quite complex and, to 
some degree, relatively unexplored in WTO dispute settlement.  
As to the general question of the role of the WTO itself in global gover-
nance, Director- General Pascal Lamy gave an interesting speech last week 
in Geneva, at the Graduate Institute, on: The WTO and the Archipelago of 
Global Governance.3  It is an interesting speech, better done than speeches 
by his recent predecessors, and I would recommend it to you. It is available 
on the WTO website, currently half in English half in French, but I am sure 
it will all be in one language before too long. Among other things, Lamy 
distinguishes governance (in the sense of what is today provided by the gov-
ernment of a sovereign state) from that term as used in international law 
and governance (in the sense of dialogue and compromise in a system where 
there is no supreme power). Lamy likens the current international system as 
similar to this latter concept – thus, his topic of the WTO in an archipelago 
– in a chain of islands that are related.  
Now, to the extent that global governance refers to the idea of a central 
directing authority – the fi rst sort of governance that Lamy talked about – 
the WTO is obviously not that authority and will, likely, never be. As such, its 
DSS cannot and should not have a role in that sort of governance. However, 
to the extent that the latter concept is used – the idea of a system in which 
there are various power centers that engage in different aspects of regulat-
ing international relations – then the WTO can be seen, I think, as part of 
a larger system of global governance. If this latter view is accepted, then it 
is clear that the WTO has a role in that global governance, one shared with 
other international organizations and states.  
To the extent that the WTO has such a role, then it is inevitable of course 
that the WTO DSS is going to be involved in the WTO’s role. As such, the 
3 Director-General Pascal Lamy, The WTO in the Archipelago of Global Governance Address 
at the Institute for International Studies (Mar. 14, 2006) available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl20_e.htm [hereinafter Lamy].
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WTO and its DSS each have an important role to play in promoting the co-
herence of the international system. I use that term “coherence” – which in 
WTO-speak usually refers to the relations between the WTO and the World 
Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) – more generally, because 
I think it is, and should be, a broader concept. If that is the case, then our 
question becomes: What is the role of the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
in promoting coherence in global governance? And, to a large extent, this is 
a question of how the DSS, in dealing with claims raised under the WTO 
agreements, should deal with other international agreements and interna-
tional law more generally.  
It seems clear that the WTO agreements and their detailed rules cannot 
be applied in clinical isolation from the rest of international law. While there 
were suggestions that GATT was some sort of self-contained regime, the Ap-
pellate Body expressly and categorically rejected that idea in its fi rst report, 
U.S. Reformulated Gasoline.4  I agree with that position, although I prob-
ably have a more restrained view than the author of the Gasoline Report on 
how signifi cant a role international agreements and law should play in WTO 
dispute settlement. If WTO agreements cannot be considered in clinical iso-
lation from the rest of international law, my topic seems to involve two dis-
tinct issues:  (1) How should the WTO handle confl icts with other international 
regimes?; (2) How should the WTO Dispute Settlement System otherwise make 
use of international law principles and practices?  
As to the fi rst issue – how should the WTO handle confl icts with other in-
ternational regimes? – I would offer the following thoughts: fi rst, to a large 
extent, confl icts can be avoided through effective treaty interpretation, and 
obviously that approach should be followed wherever possible. Second, the 
problem of inter-regime confl ict, that is confl ict between two international 
agreements, can often be handled indirectly by giving appropriate deference 
to measures adopted by governments for the sort of reasons outlined in the 
general exceptions clause of Article 20 of GATT, or GATS Article 14.5  To 
the extent that this is done, it is likely that cases of real confl ict will be mini-
mized. Third, to the extent that a confl ict with another regime cannot be 
avoided through general interpretation or reliance on exceptions, it is useful 
4 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline, DS2]. 
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 20, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 14, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 
33 I.L.M. 1167, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
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to consider whether customary rules of treaty interpretation can be applied 
to resolve confl icts. For reasons I will expand on later, they may not be all 
that helpful, I think, in resolving many confl icts. But, let me talk about these 
three points in a little bit more detail.  
As to the fi rst approach, confl icts – to a large extent, as I mentioned 
– can be avoided through effective treaty interpretation. In other words, it 
may be possible to interpret the WTO obligations at issue so as to avoid the 
creation of a confl ict in the fi rst instance. In this regard, I think it would be 
appropriate, in interpreting WTO agreements, for the treaty interpreter to 
be cognizant of the impact of a particular interpretation of the WTO agree-
ments on other international agreements. I should stress, however, that the 
proper method of interpreting the WTO agreement remains to apply the 
basic approach outlined in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.6   
As we have all learned from the Appellate Body – although I would note 
that the same approach was applied by GATT panels prior to the Appellate 
Body – the Vienna Convention provides that “a treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context, and in light of its object and purpose.”7  The 
Vienna Convention defi nes “context” to include only the treaty itself and 
agreements made at the time of its conclusion that were accepted by all of 
the parties.8  In addition, subsequent agreement, subsequent practice, and 
international law rules may be taken into account, but only to the extent that 
all WTO Members have agreed thereto or are subject thereto.9  As such, this 
sort of context would not often be relevant. In particular, the fact that some 
WTO Members are party to other agreements would not make those other 
agreements necessarily relevant to the interpretation of the WTO agree-
ments. Similarly, the fact that another international agreement authorizes a 
violation of a WTO agreement would not be directly relevant to interpreting 
the WTO agreements.  
The terms of the WTO agreements would still need to be interpreted in 
light of their ordinary meaning. However, in determining that meaning, I 
think reference could clearly be had to sources such as dictionaries, a resort 
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
7 Id. art. 31.1.
8 Id. art. 31.2.
9 Id. art. 31.3.
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which has been a hallmark of Appellate Body jurisprudence; so much so, that 
some have joked that the new Shorter Oxford Dictionary is now essentially a 
covered agreement. (laughter) But, surely that dictionary is not the only pos-
sible source to look to for assistance in divining the ordinary meaning of terms, 
and, in that connection, I would argue that reference to other international 
agreements or principals of international law as interpretive aids would be ap-
propriate. It would not, of course, be appropriate to apply another agreement 
as such, but it is appropriate to assume that governments generally do not 
intend to create confl icts. Thus, considering other agreements may sometimes 
be helpful in divining the correct interpretation of WTO provisions. I would 
therefore suggest that there may be ability, perhaps somewhat limited, on the 
part of panels and the Appellate Body to interpret the WTO agreements so as 
to avoid confl icts. But it is important to remember that the WTO agreements 
assume that their rules may sometimes impinge unduly on governments, and 
that there are exceptions provided to deal with those cases.
A second approach to avoiding confl icts with other international agree-
ments is to give deference to WTO-Member governments and to their inter-
pretation of the WTO’s “general exceptions” clauses. To a signifi cant degree, I 
think the Appellate Body interpretation of GATT Article 20 and GATS Article 
14 have provided a signifi cant amount of “policy room” in which WTO-Mem-
ber governments may maneuver, such that they can follow policy preferences 
to a large extent – at least in those areas where the WTO might otherwise be 
expected to impinge on their freedom to do so. This, of course, is not a mat-
ter of resolving confl icts with other international regimes, but – nonetheless 
– because the subjects of other international agreements that are likely to raise 
confl icts with WTO rules often relate to the subject matter of the general ex-
ceptions clauses in the WTO, appropriate interpretation of those clauses also 
provides a signifi cant pathway to avoid confl icts between the WTO agreements 
and the other international agreements. I think that this, in fact, has occurred 
– in particular the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the public morals and 
public health exceptions of GATT Article 20 and GATS Article 14 have pro-
vided considerable policy space for WTO Member governments.
To be specifi c, the term “necessary,” a qualifi er for measures seeking the 
public morals, public health or enforcement exceptions, has been interpreted 
so as to favor WTO Member discretion in choosing the level of protection 
for public health; for example, in the Asbestos case.10  For public morals, you 
10 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measure Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001).
78
can think of the Gambling case.11  While the Appellate Body applies a sort of 
balancing test, contrasting the importance of the policy goal with the severity 
of the restriction on trade, it seems willing to accord considerable importance 
to the policy goals in these two areas. Where measures have not been able to 
meet the terms of the exception, it has typically been because of the presence of 
unjustifi able or arbitrary discrimination against foreign products, not because 
the measure did not fall within the general scope of the exceptions provision.  
There has been decidedly less deference given in cases where countries 
have tried to invoke the Article 20(d) enforcement exception, but the issues 
at stake in those cases, in my mind, are typically more economic in nature, 
and the defenses raised under Article 20 have often seemed rather strained. 
In the case of the “conservation” exception, which does not require that 
a measure be necessary for conservation but rather that it be “related to” 
conservation, that exception also has been interpreted more broadly than it 
was in GATT practice, such that there is considerable freedom on the part 
of governments to act in that area as well. The key point is that in a number 
of areas where international organizations might have been, or might be, 
expected to be active in the future, the existence of these exceptions means 
that confl icts may not be so likely to arise. Of course, I realize that there are 
not exceptions that can be applied to all areas where confl icting international 
obligations may arise; thus, what I have discussed so far is not a complete 
answer to resolving confl icts in global governments and promoting coherent 
approaches.  
That leads to the third subtopic: How to resolve confl icts that cannot be 
interpreted away or fi nessed through the application of an exception? Deferring 
for a moment the question of whether WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
should use them, it is instructive in the fi rst instance to consider standard 
rules of international law on dealing with confl icts between two international 
treaty regimes. In my view, they often are not all that helpful in resolving 
such a confl ict when the WTO agreement is involved.  
The basic rule to be applied per Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties is the lex posterior, or “last in time” rule.12  But, as Joost 
Pauwelyn of Duke University has noted in his book on confl ict of norms, 
that rule is not particularly useful in dealing with many modern treaties, par-
11 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Service, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
12 Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 30.
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ticularly one like the WTO agreement.13  The reason is that such treaties are 
regularly revised and regularly welcome new members. A “last in time” rule 
would lead to the odd result that for some WTO Members the WTO agree-
ment might be last in time vis-à-vis another agreement, but for other WTO 
Members it would be subsequent. Moreover, a change in the agreement 
gives the agreement a new date – the WTO agreement, in fact, is often modi-
fi ed on a weekly basis if you look at the schedules that are changed by action 
of the Director General. And, of course, it welcomes new Members several 
times a year. Such confl icting or unstable results that would result from this 
lex posterior rule make no sense, and I agree with Pauwelyn that it is not ap-
propriate to place very much reliance on this principle. It sounds simple, but 
in practice it may simply be too simplistic to be useful.  
A second confl ict-resolving rule is lex specialis, the idea that in the event 
of a confl ict priority should be accorded to the more specifi c rule as opposed 
to the more general one. Pauwelyn would place considerable emphasis on 
this rule for resolving confl icts. I have more doubts on that score. While I 
like the lex specialis rule – the rule seems simple and logical – I think, in fact, 
it is rather diffi cult to apply in practice. In the event of a confl ict between 
two provisions of two different treaties, the provisions will always be more 
specifi c than the agreements in general, and I am not sure how one decides 
the relevant degree of specifi city. For me, the idea is diffi cult enough to apply 
in a single treaty regime, such as that of the WTO – which I should mention, 
as an aside, has serious confl ict resolution issues of its own, internally – but it 
becomes quite indefi nite when multiple regimes are involved. While I would 
not rule out its use in interpreting WTO agreements themselves, I think it 
will often be the case that there is no truly principled way to decide which 
provision is more specifi c.
Indeed, within a single treaty regime in particular, the idea of effective 
treaty interpretation – ensuring that all of a treaty’s provisions are given 
meaning – while somewhat vague, often seems to be more useful. Pauwelyn, 
I might mention, suggests another rule: giving priority to what he refers to as 
“integrated” as opposed to “reciprocal” regimes.14  I also doubt its effi cacy, 
though, largely because, in my view, the WTO agreement can no longer be 
13 JOOST PAUWLEYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, HOW WTO LAW RE-
LATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press 2003).
14 Id.
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viewed as simply a “reciprocal” arrangement, thus the basis for his distinction 
would not be particularly useful.
The result of all that which I have been saying is that there will be cases 
– more under my view perhaps than under some other views – where there 
may be a confl ict that cannot be resolved. In that case, it seems to me that 
a panel and the Appellate Body have no choice but to apply the rules of the 
WTO agreement. The fact that a country cannot comply with two confl ict-
ing obligations is in the end the fault of that country for entering into those 
confl icting obligations. The two regimes themselves are not at fault. It is, in 
essence, for the country that entered into the confl icting regimes to resolve 
the matter or suffer the consequences. It could, of course, be argued that 
this unfairly advantages the WTO regime because, as noted by Lamy in the 
speech I mentioned earlier, the WTO has a more effective DSS than virtually 
any other international regime.15  It seems clear to me that the role of panels 
and the Appellate Body is not to resolve these confl icts between international 
regimes, but rather perform their defi ned function under the WTO agree-
ment and, in particular, under Articles 7 and 11 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU).16  The DSU’s function is to examine the claims made 
by the complaining WTO Member in light of the relevant provisions of the 
covered agreements, that is the WTO agreements, and reach appropriate 
conclusions in respect thereof.17   
Thus, I think the role of WTO dispute settlement in global governance is 
somewhat a passive one. It cannot resolve the confl icts that may arise except 
insofar as they can be avoided by appropriate treaty interpretation – bearing 
in mind that I mean interpretation of the WTO agreements in accord with 
standard treaty interpretation rules, which focus on the meaning of the WTO 
agreements. And, secondly, by appropriate interpretation of the “general ex-
ceptions” provision – so as to give appropriate deference to the government 
policy decisions of WTO Members, so as to enable them to adopt, indi-
vidually or collectively (pursuant to another agreement), measures relating to 
matters covered by the WTO exceptions. Where confl icts exist, it is not for 
the WTO DSS to resolve them, but rather for the WTO Members involved 
to reconcile those confl icting obligations.  
15 Lamy, supra note 3.
16 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal In-
struments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
17 Id.
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When serious confl icts arise, I think that the governments probably will 
be able to resolve them. While much is made of the inability of the WTO de-
cision-making process to take action, I would note that with regard to prob-
ably the most serious kind of confl ict that has risen so far – the lack of clarity 
in the TRIPS agreement18 with respect to the exception for compulsory li-
censing of drugs in public health emergencies – in fact, the WTO member-
ship was able to act and is in process of amending the TRIPS agreement.19 
I think my time is starting to run out, but I want to add a few words on 
the second topic, which I have not addressed quite as much: Should the Ap-
pellate Body Look to Sources Outside the WTO Agreements, as indicated? I think 
there is some role for using those agreements as sources to help interpret the 
WTO agreement. It should be stressed that there are many other occasions 
where panels and the Appellate Body can appropriately look outside the WTO 
agreement. For example, to get ideas on how to handle evidence, to decide 
what are concepts of due process in proceedings before the WTO, and so on. 
To date, I do not think panels and the Appellate Body have made that much 
use of such outside sources, but I think they probably will make more use in 
the future and that that is appropriate. So far, I certainly do not think that has 
caused any particular problems for WTO dispute settlement. And with that, I 
think my twenty minutes have expired, and I thank you for your attention.
Wilner:  Thank you very much indeed. I am sure there will be comments 
and questions as soon as the opportunity arises. Let me then pass on to Kim 
Van der Borght.  
Van der Borght:  Thank you very much. I would fi rst like to thank you 
for the invitation to this conference, and also to the Dean Rusk Center for 
inviting me to give a short-course on WTO dispute settlement, which I have 
enjoyed doing, as I always enjoy coming here.  
It is diffi cult to speak after the person who guided me through my PhD, 
because I can hardly disagree with him….
Davey:  Feel free. 
(laughter)
18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
19 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 6, 2005). 
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Van der Borght:  …so I will – (laughs) – only slightly. I think we agree 
on the basics, but I disagree somewhat on the conclusions. And I want to 
approach the question from the other side. I want to approach the question 
from the negative. The question has been:  What is the role of the WTO in 
international governance, and should the WTO Appellate Body, especially, look 
to outside sources to settle disputes? The answer in many cases has been: The 
WTO has no real role in international governance, and it should not look to 
outside sources. And that is the position I want to take – to look at whether 
this makes sense.  
Is it possible that the WTO has no role in international governance? 
Is it possible that the WTO can settle disputes by disregarding the rest of 
international law? By disregarding the rules of public international law? By 
disregarding the other treaties dealing with environmental issues, social is-
sues, human rights issues? I think we have to start at the beginning; the 
beginning is a preamble to the WTO agreements, and I would like to read 
to you the fi rst two paragraphs of the WTO agreement – the preamble that 
gives us guidance as to where the system stands with regard to the rest of 
international law, and that gives us guidance on how to interpret the WTO 
agreements. The fi rst paragraph of the preamble reads: 
Recognizing that their relations in the fi eld of trade and economic en-
deavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade 
in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance 
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development; 
Recognizing further that there is a need for positive efforts designed 
to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed 
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade com-
mensurate with the needs of their economic development.”20 
This does not indicate isolationism. It does not indicate that the WTO is 
here to deal with trade liberalization for the sake of trade liberalization, but 
20 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1144, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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rather, that the WTO is here to deal with trade liberalization to support and 
to complement the other organizations’ international governments. How 
else could the WTO make any effort in reaching these broader objectives: 
sustainable development; making positive efforts for developing countries? 
This is not within the legal framework of the WTO itself; it cannot reach 
these further goals without having due regard for the other international 
organizations and the rest of international law.  
This is, largely, the view of the Appellate Body – sometimes very explic-
itly, but lately a bit more discreetly. The Gasoline panel Appellate Body report 
has already been referred to because it is very explicit; it states that you can-
not reach WTO agreements in clinical isolation from public international law 
– even clearer, it says that you cannot read that the WTO agreements have to 
be interpreted in the real world – the real world where people live and work 
and die.21  It is not an optimistic message, but it is a clear message. It is not 
just about trade; it is about a lot more. It is about an encompassing view of 
what international trade does, and how it fi ts in with the rest of international 
law and international governments.
Now, what is the argument against it? Why would it not be the case that 
WTO is part of the system of international governance? Is there a legal basis 
to exclude the rest of international law? Could we say: We do not care about 
human rights? Or, we do not care about environmental protection? What we 
want is liberalization of trade – to have that as the prime, almost constitutional, 
value of international governance – disregarding all the rest? Is that possible? 
Well, some argue that it is possible, and they argue that on the basis of legal 
provisions in the DSU – particularly on three provisions which I would like 
to discuss with you.  
The three provisions are taken from, fi rstly, Article 3 and secondly, Arti-
cle 7 of the DSU. Start with Article 3: Article 3 states that WTO agreements 
have to be interpreted in accordance with the customary rules of interpreta-
tion of public international law.22  Note the reference to public international 
law – this could mean that public international law is part of the WTO sys-
tem; it helps us to look outward, look outside of the system. It could also 
mean this is an explicit inclusion of public international law, and all the rest is 
excluded. We only look at what is particularly referred to or expressly referred 
to as outside of the system, and nothing else is included; the idea of a closed 
21 Gasoline, DS2, supra note 4.
22 DSU, supra note 16, art. 3.
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list, a closed list excluding all the rest of international law with the exception 
of those rules of international law that are either co-opted into the system or 
explicitly referred to. This closed list – is that what the drafters of the WTO 
agreement, the DSU particularly, want to achieve? To exclude the rest of 
international law by including one rule explicitly? No. Why not? Because this 
cannot be done implicitly.  
The exclusion of the rest of international law as a rule of international law 
is possible. An international agreement can exclude the rest of international 
law. It can exclude further developments beyond the treaty you have agreed 
to, but that has to be done explicitly. This has been confi rmed by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in several cases – the Chorzów Factory 23 case,  the ad-
visory opinion on Namibia24 – and this case is not explicit. The DSU does not 
explicitly say: We have excluded the rest of international law, and the only rule 
that is relevant are the rules that we have explicitly entered into the DSU or the 
rules where we allow you by specifi c reference to go outside of the agreement itself.
If that is not what it means – if it is not an explicit exclusion – then why 
is it there? Because if it is not that, then this is a very odd inclusion. If it is 
not to exclude the rest, then it seems to be meaningless. The customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law would be applicable in any case. 
How else would you interpret the WTO agreement? It automatically refers 
you to the customary rules of interpretation. So, if the reason why this pro-
vision is there is not to exclude the rest of international law, it seems mean-
ingless. This would be an incorrect interpretation. We cannot interpret the 
treaty in a way that makes the words meaningless, so there must be another 
interpretation.  
The Appellate Body (again, in my favorite Gasoline report) states that 
we must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. What is the 
meaning and effect of customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law? Well, there was a very specifi c reason – and it is quite a technical 
reason – for why customary rules of interpretation of public international law 
are explicitly included in Article 3, second paragraph of the DSU.25  It has 
to do with its predecessor, with GATT. And here I have to disagree slightly 
23 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 17.
24 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16.
25 DSU, supra note 16, art. 3.2.
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– only slightly – with my promoter; that is in the sense that GATT had its 
own system of interpretation, and interpretation paid some lip service to the 
customary rules of interpretation, particularly in the way that was codifi ed by 
the Vienna Convention on Treaties in 1969.26  But, the real interpretation 
under GATT had little to do with adhering to strict rules of interpretation; 
it actually had little to do with strict rules of law in general. The emphasis in 
GATT was much more on fi nding a way to ensure that the decisions made in 
dispute settlement did not displease anybody too much, and that had to do 
with the way in which the decisions were adopted because you could block a 
decision at every stage.  
If a decision in a dispute settlement displeased anybody too much there 
was too much risk of blocking. So, the interpretation that it took of the 
agreement was not the real interpretation that we now see as the customary 
rules of interpretation as codifi ed in the Vienna Convention27 – which is, look 
fi rst of all at the ordinary meaning of the terms – but rather what is known 
as the “founding fathers school of interpretation of law.” The “founding 
fathers school” naturally became part of the GATT tradition because in the 
early days of GATT, who interpreted GATT agreements? – It was largely 
the drafters of the GATT agreements, and they really did not feel much of 
a need to look at the ordinary meaning of the words because they had writ-
ten the words. They knew what was in it, and reference to the text was not 
their prime concern because they knew what they had written and what these 
words were supposed to mean, even if that was not quite what they said. The 
tradition started in GATT of interpreting the agreement on the basis of the 
“founding fathers school of interpretation,” rather than the textual interpre-
tation of the meaning that is now the prime method of interpretation.  
The GATT agreement – GATT 1994 – encompasses both the text of 
GATT 1947 and all the interpretive practice and decisions made on the basis 
of that legal text, known collectively as the acquis GATTois, all the practice 
surrounding the agreements.28  Those two elements, the legal text of 1947 
and the acquis GATTois together make up GATT 1994. It imports the in-
terpretive practice of the old GATT into the new GATT agreement, and 
thereby into the WTO. Had there not been the explicit reference in Article 3 
stating that WTO agreements would be interpreted in accordance with cus-
tomary rules of interpretation of public international law,29 there would have 
26 Vienna Convention, supra note 6.
27 Id.
28 GATT, supra note 5.
29 DSU, supra note 16, art. 3.
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been a real risk that the interpretive practice on the WTO would continue the 
old practice of GATT. The old practice of GATT played fast and loose with 
the rules of customary interpretation of public international law as codifi ed 
in the Vienna Convention and placed an undue amount of infl uence on the 
“founding fathers school of interpretation,” the intentions of the drafters’ 
method of interpretation.  
So, in my view, the reason why it is there is not to exclude the rest of 
international law, but rather to ensure that interpretation of the WTO agree-
ment is in accordance with contemporary standards of interpretation of in-
ternational law as codifi ed in the Vienna Convention. The Appellate Body 
has confi rmed again and again that customary rules of interpretation are 
codifi ed in the Vienna Convention, and thereby, this is now the standard of 
interpretation, and not the old standard of GATT. That is the fi rst basis on 
which attempts have been made to exclude international law from the WTO 
agreements and from dispute settlement in the WTO.  
There are two more – staying in the same article – two more reasons why 
international law in the broader sense of the word could be excluded from 
WTO dispute settlement, thereby denying it a role in international gover-
nance. The same provision, Article 3: “the rulings and recommendations of 
the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and ob-
ligations of the Members” has been described by earlier panels as a warning 
not to overreach.30  There I agree. It is a warning not to overreach. It is a 
warning against judicial activism in the same way that Article 38 of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice emphasizes that the International 
Court of Justice does not make law, but that its decisions are only binding 
on the parties and not on the rest of the international community.31  In that 
sense, it is a clear indication that panels and the Appellate Body should not 
go beyond their mandate and that their mandate is limited. Their mandate is 
to settle disputes in WTO law.  
Does it mean that it has excluded international law? Does it mean that you 
can only look at WTO rules? Does it mean that nothing else matters beyond 
WTO rules? Well, no, it does not mean that. It does not mean that because 
that would be a rather hypocritical position and one that is not in good faith, 
which is more legally relevant than the fi rst reason. It is not in good faith 
30 Id.
31 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38, 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
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because it disregards the real legal position of the disputing parties. The legal 
position of disputing parties is determined not only by the obligations it has 
under the WTO but by the many other obligations it has and commitments 
it has under international agreements, including environmental agreements, 
human rights agreements, and many others. If you disregard the obligations 
the Member has under other agreements, in a way, you add to the rights and 
obligations; you change the legal position by giving primacy to their rights 
and obligations under the WTO.  
One very concrete example – it is a rather reduced existing confl ict (the 
Swordfi sh case32), but in a simplifi ed version. There was a dispute between 
Spain and, by extension, the EU and Chile. Spanish fi shers were trying; well, 
they were not trying, they were successful in catching swordfi sh off the coast 
of Chile in contravention of their obligation under the protocol attached to 
the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) – the protocol on highly 
migratory species, signed both by Spain and by Chile – which made catch-
ing swordfi sh in those conditions illegal.33  Now, what is the legal position of 
Spain and, by extension, the EU?  
If you look at only the WTO agreements, there is a right of transit. What 
Spain was asking for was – these were factory ships, so the fi sh was processed 
on board, frozen, and the idea was then to transit it through Chile and fl y 
it back to Europe – so that was what they were demanding, transit through 
Chile. And Chile said: No. They said: Yes, you have the right of transit under 
the WTO agreements and the GATT, but what you have caught is illegal. We 
have both signed these agreements that we are going to protect highly migratory 
species, and your catch is illegal. If the view is that the DSU cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations of the Members, and this means you can 
only look at the WTO rights and obligations and not at the rights and obliga-
tions of the real legal position of the Members in international law, then you 
could argue that Article 5 is the only thing that is relevant in this case.34  We 
simply decide this case on the basis of WTO rules, disregarding the rest of 
the legal position, thereby giving new rights to Spain – the EU by extension 
– to transit illegally caught fi sh; a right you do not have in international law 
because they had agreed – they had signed the protocol on highly migratory 
species.  
32 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Chile – Measures Affecting the 
Transit and Importing of Swordfi sh, WT/DS193/1 (Apr. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Swordfi sh, 
DS193].
33 See id.
34 DSU, supra note 16, art. 5.
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Is that what it means? No, because that makes no sense in international 
law, and it is not in good faith, which is the requirement under the DSU. The 
reason it is there – and let me repeat that I am in agreement with what Amy 
Dwyer said yesterday – is that this is an agreement against judicial activism – a 
warning that they should not overreach. They are not there to make general 
rules or to create new law, but only to apply the rules that are relevant. But, 
the WTO rules may not be relevant in a dispute; that has to be determined 
by looking at the broader legal context. They can only apply the rules that 
are really relevant for a dispute, and not only the WTO rules, disregarding 
the rest of international law.  
The reason why this is also important is – and this is also still in the same 
paragraph of Article 3 – because what the WTO DSS is supposed to do is add 
predictability to the system. Looking only at WTO rules and disregarding the 
rest of the real international legal position of a WTO Member would not add 
to the predictability, and certainly not the security, of rights; it would create a 
fl ux in the international legal position of individual states by sometimes em-
phasizing the WTO rules. Others would then accept the real legal position 
and come up with a completely different judgment, thereby really exacerbat-
ing the international legal confl icts.  
The third reason why it is claimed that the WTO has excluded, largely, 
the rules of international law – why only WTO rules are relevant for WTO 
dispute settlement – is based on Article 7, the terms of reference.35  Here, I 
am fully in agreement with Professor Davey – the mandate of WTO dispute 
settlement is limited. Article 7 states that disputes have to be settled on the 
basis of the covered agreements.36  What WTO dispute settlement does is 
settle WTO disputes. It does not settle other disputes. It has no mandate to 
settle environmental disputes or human rights disputes. It is a court of spe-
cialized jurisdiction, if we can call it a court. It has no general jurisdiction. 
It has no mandate to enforce any other rule of international law. It has no 
mandate to enforce environmental law. It has no mandate to enforce human 
rights standards. In that sense, it is not, as the speech of Pascal Lamy seems 
to indicate, a central government.37  
It is not a mechanism for the enforcement of international law in general, 
but that does not mean that it should not respect the rest of international 
35 DSU, supra note 16, art. 7.
36 Id.
37 Lamy, supra note 3.
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law. It has a role in international governance that is a limited role; a role that 
is there to respect the other international organizations – the rest of interna-
tional law – and to play its limited role in settling only WTO disputes; settling 
WTO disputes where WTO rules are relevant. If they are not relevant, they 
should not settle the WTO disputes but accept that they are not relevant; 
that the dispute is being brought to the wrong forum, that it is not a WTO 
dispute.  
Those are the three main reasons why some argue that public interna-
tional law – in the broader sense – is excluded from WTO dispute settlement, 
and why the WTO should not have a role in international governance. In 
short, I can only disagree. I think there are real reasons to deny the WTO 
its just position as part of the international government structure, but this 
proper role is a limited role. It is a role in international trade law – but ac-
cepting that international trade law is only part of public international law 
and that there is no real distinction, no real boundary between international 
trade law and the rest of international law. The WTO dispute settlement plays 
its role within its fi eld of international law, but with full respect of the rest of 
international law. Thank you.  
Wilner:  Thanks very much. And now we move on to Mr. Zaimis, who 
will put all of this together and give us the answer. (laughter)
Zaimis:  Thank you. You were about to say Professor Zaimis, eh? I would 
like to thank the Dean Rusk Center. Ambassador Johnson, I am really hon-
ored to be here with you, especially sitting at such a high level panel. As I 
said, I am not a professor. I am a government offi cial, and I noticed that 
if there is room for disagreement between professors, then maybe there is 
room for a bit more disagreement between government offi cials and the aca-
demic world.  
The question that we were invited to address today, I think, has two di-
mensions: One, is a political dimension – if the DSU can have a role in global 
governance? – and the other, a legal dimension – whether the Appellate Body 
can look to sources outside the WTO agreements? We tried to address both of 
these issues with a caveat – one has to be very careful when using the words 
“global governance” with governmental authorities, so as to avoid heart at-
tacks. To avoid heart attacks back in Brussels, I would be obliged to say that 
what I will be saying to you now does not necessarily refl ect the views of the 
European Commission.  
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With that in mind, let me start with the fi rst – let us say – “political” 
dimension of the question. First of all, soon after the conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round, WTO Members started realizing that the effects of the agree-
ment they had just signed went far beyond the areas – the classic areas – of 
trade policy (which were tariff protection, border discrimination) to touch 
upon a number of issues principally affecting domestic policies and lawmak-
ing. Suddenly, issues such as what food standards to develop and apply for 
internal health controls or whether subsidies favoring local producers can be 
granted, were open to challenges from other WTO Members to an extent 
that had not been seen before the Uruguay Round years.  
Government authorities and WTO Members realized that the number of 
previously considered purely domestic issues could be challenged by other 
WTO Members, as they had an effect on trade. This development occurred 
with a parallel realization that a dispute settlement had been established 
through which measures could be challenged, while the rulings delivered 
through this dispute settlement could be enforced through trade sanctions. 
Thus, it was realized that WTO law, trade law, was gaining unprecedented 
importance in comparison to other public international agreements. And 
this, in my view, to a very large extent, was thanks to the existence of the 
dispute settlement mechanism.  
Today, international negotiations are currently taking place with a view 
to further expand and deepen the reach of WTO law – and I am referring to 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).38  Negotiations are currently tak-
ing place, and they are, in theory, expected to end at the end of this year. 
Under these negotiations, for example, rules on development aid or internal 
regulations on the movement of foreigners would be affected through any 
agreement on the aid for trade chapter or the services mode 4. Mode 4 is the 
part of the services negotiations which talks about the citizens of one WTO 
Member going to work temporarily in the country of another WTO Mem-
ber to offer their services.39  It is one of the more controversial issues of the 
negotiations. 
With this, therefore, broader context, I think it would be a fallacy to 
expect that WTO law can remain an isolated element in a self-contained 
environment – what the Appellate Body has described as “clinical isolation.” 
38 Doha Development Agenda (2001), available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/
dda_e/dda_e.htm.
39 Id.
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I have always liked this term “clinical isolation;” it reminds me of hospitals, 
doctors in white robes, but, of course – if one thinks of it – hospitals are the 
places where you fi nd most of the viruses around. If you want to get in touch 
with a virus, a hospital would be the place to get it. Clinical isolation does not 
exist, not even in the real world.  
Another reason is that even though, as we have said, the WTO impacts 
a number of domestic policies, the WTO does not have a real mechanism 
to update the covered agreements so as to keep in touch with international 
developments. The only real legislative function is that of international ne-
gotiations. I just referred to the DDA negotiations, which, however, occur 
far apart from each other – easily more than ten years apart. The last round 
was the Uruguay Round, concluding in 1995. Now we are in the middle of a 
new round.40  We do not know when it will be concluded, probably the end 
of the year. To be frank with you, this deadline looks increasingly diffi cult 
to meet, so we could easily be speaking about a round being concluded in 
2008 or 2009. So we may see even fewer rounds in the future, and this is 
provided that the current round succeeds. If there is no success in concluding 
the DDA round, we may not be seeing a new round for many, many years 
to come.  
In this context, the DSU remains the only effective mechanism which 
can take into account, in the interpretation of WTO agreements, internation-
al developments. A so-called dynamic, updated interpretation of WTO rules, 
I think, would ensure that WTO law and the DSU rulings remain in touch 
with reality in a global context. These are developments, therefore, that man-
date a political need for WTO law, through the DSU, to play a major role 
in the development of a consistent and coherent web of international agree-
ments. The question, therefore, is not whether the Appellate Body should 
have a role in global governance, but rather how it should play this role.  
Now, with regard to the more legal dimension, WTO case law clearly in-
dicates that both panels and the Appellate Body have not limited themselves 
to the four corners of the WTO covered agreements. They have referred to 
general principles of law – good faith, standing, legal representation – to cus-
tomary international law, and even to other non-WTO treaties. For example, 
just to remind you of a recent case – the Brazil Frozen Chicken case that the 
EU lost – where the harmonized system convention concerning the inter-
40 Id.
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national classifi cation of goods was characterized as “context.”41  Moreover, 
as we have heard also from both panelists before, DSU Article 3.2 explicitly 
confi rms that WTO covered agreements must be clarifi ed in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.42   
In this respect, I will remind you again that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, which is part of the rules of 
interpretation referred to before, directs that in interpreting a treaty account 
must be taken, not only of the treaty itself in context of the WTO treaty, but 
also of any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-
tation of the treaty or the application of its provisions, as well as any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relation between the parties.43 
Accordingly, I would say that the EC is quite happy about the WTO juris-
prudence, which has so far refused to leave the multilateral trading system in 
clinical isolation.  
But of course, the above is the easy part. The diffi culty arises as to how far 
can WTO panels go in that direction. To be more precise, the even more dif-
fi cult part is to what extent WTO panels or the Appellate Body are at liberty 
to “dis-apply” WTO law on the basis of a defense premised on non-WTO law. 
So far, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have avoided this question with 
the exception of developments we are going to discuss in a few moments.
On this hard issue, I think that we would be favoring an open approach. 
For example, to consider that confl ict rules – like lex specialis, lex generalis 
– apply, and, generally, to recognize that the WTO is not a self-contained re-
gime. Of course, the procedural question, I recognize, is much more diffi cult. 
One example: whether panels can set aside Article 11 of GATT44 because, for 
example, the Basal Convention prohibits the export of hazardous waste.45  I 
realize that there will be some tension within the DSU, which on the one hand 
mandates the panels and the Appellate Body to fi nd whether or not there is a 
violation of Article 11, and on the other hand allows a panel to say that Article 
11 is not applicable.46  But, of course, if one wants, everything is possible.
41 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classifi cation of Frozen Boneless 
Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005).
42 DSU, supra note 16, art. 3.2.
43 Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 31.3(c).
44 GATT, supra note 5, art. 11.
45 Basal Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basal Convention]. 
46 GATT, supra note 5, art. 11.
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The advantage of an open approach would be the avoidance of WTO 
rulings which are made and enforced even though they do not correspond 
to what international law says as a whole. Its disadvantage would be that 
WTO panels would have to rule in the course of their reasoning on matters 
of non-WTO law, for which there are sometimes specialized international or-
ganizations. So, all sorts of things could be drawn into the WTO. And just to 
clarify, I am not sure whether the EC line is fi rm on this, so I express personal 
views. In any event, the answer does not need to always be the same; this can 
be examined on a case-by-case basis.  
In that context, let me talk to you about two recent developments: the 
fi rst is the Mexico Soft Drinks case, or Fructose case, as you may know it.47 
The Appellate Body noted that it saw no basis in the DSU for panels and 
the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes and that the WTO 
DSU could not be used to determine rights and obligations outside the cov-
ered agreements.48  This Appellate Body reasoning raises some concerns. Of 
course, panels and the Appellate Body do not have the function to adjudicate 
non-WTO disputes. I think we are all in agreement on this. But, interpret-
ing and applying non-WTO law and ruling on non-WTO applications where 
this is legally relevant for deciding a WTO dispute does not necessarily mean 
adjudicating a non-WTO dispute. In its submissions before both the panel 
and the Appellate Body, the EC – and I refer to the European Communities 
because as you know, for the WTO, we are the European Communities and 
not the European Union – had consistently maintained that panels and the 
Appellate Body have an incidental power to interpret non-WTO interna-
tional law, and we had asked that the dispute should not be decided on the 
basis of any such jurisdictional limitations.  
It remains to be seen how far-reaching the Appellate Body fi ndings are, 
and what practical effect they may have for further cases. In particular, a 
question remains about what precisely the Appellate Body understands by 
determining rights and obligations outside the covered agreements or adju-
dicating non-WTO disputes. In other words, whether the above-cited para-
graphs would also preclude interpretations of rights and obligations under 
non-WTO agreements when such agreements relate to issues governed by 
Article 20 of GATT, or when bilateral or multilateral agreements binding on 
the parties to a WTO dispute are invoked in the context of a WTO dispute. I 
47 Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measure on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/R 
(Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Soft Drinks, DS308].
48 Id.
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think that it is unlikely that in this case – Mexico Soft Drinks – that the Appel-
late Body wanted to reverse its case law – that the WTO agreements are not 
to be read in clinical isolation from public international law. Therefore, it can 
still take into account international law when applying the WTO agreements. 
However, where, precisely, lies the borderline between taking into account 
international law and adjudicating non-WTO disputes is likely to remain a 
contentious issue for future cases.  
Beyond this concrete case, the relationship of WTO and non-WTO law 
is, of course, a highly complex question which can come up in numerous dif-
ferent constellations. As I said before, I guess we can say that we believe that 
the WTO system should be open to relevant rules from outside the WTO, 
and, to the extent that such rules are relevant in a dispute before the WTO, 
panels and the Appellate Body should have incidental jurisdiction to interpret 
and apply them. Of course, the big question is: When can non-WTO law be 
said to be relevant in a WTO dispute? I do not think I have a hard and fast 
rule on this, and I think that really depends on the specifi c facts of the case 
and the specifi c provisions involved. I had prepared an example, but I will not 
take your time with it. Perhaps we can refer to it at the discussion.  
What should a panel decide if it is confronted with a WTO Member 
raising a bilateral agreement in a WTO dispute which would have given a 
different conclusion to the dispute had it been applied? What should a panel 
decide? As I said before, I would favor an approach which would take into ac-
count these other international agreements, as only a global approach would 
really give expression to the will of the two WTO Members concerning their 
trade economic relationship. Under an alternative approach – under the ab-
sence of confl ict provisions – a WTO Member may end up with two differ-
ent and confl icting international obligations. I think this was an issue that 
was discussed and raised by the previous panelists. In that particular case, in 
the Mexico Soft Drinks case, there is an anti-exclusion clause which has not 
been invoked by Mexico;49  that is Article 2005.6.50  It would have been 
interesting to see whether, if Mexico had invoked that clause, it would have 
informed the conclusion of the panel and the Appellate Body.  
An outcome which would ignore other bilateral or international agree-
ments would weaken and discredit WTO law at a time when it is – as I was 
49 Soft Drinks, DS308, supra note 47.
50 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993).
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just explaining at the beginning – politically imperative that WTO law actively 
contributes to a stable and coherent web of international agreements. Perhaps 
the answer could partly lie in the explicit recognition in other agreements of 
the importance of WTO law and the central part this law plays in global af-
fairs. I will bring you one recent example, which I think is of big interest. In 
the recently approved UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (UNES-
CO Convention) there is a specifi c provision, Article 20, which recognizes 
the peaceful coexistence of WTO law with the UNESCO Convention.51  This 
Article 20 is called Relationship to Other Treaties, Mutual Supportiveness, 
Complementarity, and Non-Subordination, and it says very briefl y:
Parties recognize that they shall perform in good faith their obligations 
under this Convention and all other treaties to which they are parties. 
Accordingly, without subordinating this Convention to any other treaty, 
(a) they shall foster their mutual supportiveness between this Convention 
and the other treaties to which they are parties… and (b) when interpret-
ing and applying the other treaties to which they are parties or when en-
tering into other international obligations, Parties shall take into account 
the relevant provisions of this Convention.  
Paragraph 2:  
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and 
obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are par-
ties.52   
I am sure that lawyers will have a fi eld day in interpreting Article 20.  
Let me close by saying that, panels could use non-WTO law as context 
for interpreting WTO law when this non-WTO law is directly or indirectly 
referred to in one of the covered agreements. An obvious example would 
be the indirect reference to the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) export credit arrangement in Annex 1 of the 
Subsidies Agreement.53  So, following what we have seen happening with 
the UNESCO Convention, I think it would be interesting to see to what 
51 United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization Convention on the Pro-
tection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005 [hereinafter 
UNESCO Convention].
52 Id.
53 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14.
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extent the panels and the Appellate Body will take a similar approach with 
non-WTO law, which itself, directly or indirectly, refers to the WTO. These 
are diffi cult legal questions which are raised, and I think that for WTO law 
fans there will be guaranteed hard and interesting work for the years to come. 
Thank you.  
Wilner:  Thank you very much indeed. We have had three talks and ap-
proaches that looked at the issues involved in the application of non-WTO 
law in various contexts and have dealt with them in very specifi c ways. I won-
der whether there is anyone among the conference panelists who takes, let us 
say, a more restrained view. All three panelists seem to give some scope for the 
application of other treaty rules and public international law, in general, in 
the work of the panels and, particularly, the Appellate Body. Is there anyone 
who would want to take a tack that, in fact, the WTO system is somewhat 
closed and refers only to the DSS? That it is specifi c only to these substantive 
provisions and that, therefore, the panels do not have, nor does the Appellate 
Body have, the jurisdiction or the competence to deal with other law, other 
approaches, or even other bases of interpretation except for the rather obvi-
ous ones of, perhaps, treaty law? Does everyone agree with the members of 
the panel’s approach? I think Mr. Kho was not in the room when I made this 
offer to anyone on the panels who might want to have a more restrained view 
– that is, supporting the notion of a system which does not include references 
to sources other than the agreements themselves. Well, then we are all agreed 
and that is that. Are there further comments or questions?  
Zaimis:  One question to Professor Davey: You discussed the possibility 
of a confl ict between two different international obligations and said there 
may be cases where it may be very diffi cult to compromise and fi nd a solu-
tion, something that would be able to satisfy both agreements. Then you 
suggested that it would be a Member’s error that it had to face two different 
and confl icting obligations. Let us assume that this stands and this is correct. 
What would be the advice to governments, considering that there is already 
a vast number of international agreements which are already in place and are 
part of the WTO? What would be the advice with regard to future agree-
ments in order to avoid this question?  
Davey:  I do not know. Be more careful? (laughter) I mean, you can see 
what governments try to do. They try to do what was done in the UNESCO 
Convention; these provisions that say (a) we are consistent with everything 
else; (b) this does not affect any other obligations – nothing we have said so 
far suggests that we, in this new convention, are in any way subordinate to 
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anything else. In other words, everybody wins. And the hard issue comes up 
when you do have a case where there is a real confl ict and the question is, 
is it a defense to a WTO violation? That is a hard question. Is it a defense 
to a WTO violation to invoke another agreement and say that agreement 
somehow trumps the WTO obligation or there is a general principle of inter-
national law that trumps the WTO obligation? I tend to think that the situ-
ations where you can make the argument that the other obligations trumps 
WTO are probably going to be – there will not be that many where you can 
make that argument. Now if it is jus cogens – you can say that under the prin-
ciples of the Vienna Convention it is context and, therefore, you can use that 
context – maybe you could.  
What I was trying to do – what I was saying – is come up with practical 
ways to avoid these issues a bit through interpretation of the obligations to 
begin with and then the exceptions. I think, actually, for most of what would 
be jus cogens you can imagine the public morals exception would cover it 
– human rights or something like that if you really had that confl ict. For the 
Swordfi sh case, you could argue that Article 20(g) actually gives Chile the right 
to do something, and that is actually a more practical way to approach the case 
than to try to fi gure out which of these two agreements was earlier or later in 
time, or which is more specifi c.54  Is the agreement on fi sheries more specifi c 
than the agreement on shipping goods when the issue is about the shipment 
of goods at that point, when the fi shing is over? The fi sh was packaged, basi-
cally, so it is not really fi sh anymore. It is cut up fi sh parts or something like 
that. So, how would you say what is the more specifi c agreement?
Often, I think you can interpret the agreements to avoid a confl ict – that 
is the way, as a practical matter you try and avoid this sort of thing. But, 
there probably will be cases – and you can imagine with these provisions like 
in the UNESCO Convention – I mean, what are you supposed to make of 
that if you are a panel? If you read that, how would you interpret that? You 
have the same problem within the WTO complex of agreements that we were 
talking about yesterday. There are ambiguities where the negotiators could 
not agree. Well, this is another example of where negotiators could not re-
ally agree as to what the relationship of the UNESCO Convention is going 
to be with other agreements, so they kept writing until they had covered 
everyone’s position and then they said: Well, that is fi ne. But, for a dispute 
settlement mechanism, that is very diffi cult to deal with. 
54 Swordfi sh, DS193, supra note 32; GATT, supra note 5, art. 20(g).
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I will make one further comment. I suspect that the Appellate Body’s 
comments in Soft Drinks were a way to deal with that case. They do not in-
dicate that the panels cannot ever look at other international obligations in 
deciding WTO rights, because – and you can think back to the Bananas case 
– in some instances, how do you interpret the Lomé waiver without looking 
at the Lomé Convention?55  It would be impossible to know what it meant. 
So, I think they overstated – they wanted to dispose of the Mexican argu-
ment – that the unproved U.S. violation of NAFTA was a defense to what-
ever we did to them in the WTO; they did not want to address it directly, and 
this was an easy way to dispose of the argument56 – I do not think they will 
go very far along that line in the future.  
McRae:  I just want to take that a little bit further because it seemed to 
me that you are saying that most cases can be resolved through interpreta-
tion, but there may be diffi cult cases where you do have a confl ict. Surely, 
all cases have to be resolved through interpretation. That is, where there is a 
confl ict – as long as there is an allegation of a violation of a provision of the 
WTO, even though the defense may be that there is a confl ict with some oth-
er treaty or rule of international law – the WTO panel or the Appellate Body 
cannot say that there is confl ict but that they cannot resolve it. They still 
have to fi nd a way of interpretation. It may be, as you say, very diffi cult to do 
in some cases, and the UNESCO Convention would lead people to scratch 
their heads and say: To what extent is that something the Appellate Body can ac-
tually interpret? But, nevertheless, it has to resolve the case. Or, do you think 
the panel or the Appellate Body could say: The confl ict is too great; we cannot 
interpret it? I know you say lex specialis is not really helpful and lex posterior is 
not very helpful. Nevertheless, even though they are not very helpful, at the 
end of the day, can a panel or the Appellate Body say: We cannot decide this 
case even though there is an allegation of violation of WTO law?
Davey:  That is where I would say that, in the end, if there is a real confl ict 
that they would go with WTO rule. The violating country would be in the 
unfortunate situation of having confl icting obligations and be found, perhaps 
under both regimes, to have violated its obligations. So in the end, I would 
not say we cannot decide it. I guess what I meant was that you could not in-
terpret your way out of the confl ict problem through interpreting the obliga-
tion or interpreting an exception. You would still have to interpret what the 
55 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
56 Soft Drinks, DS308, supra note 47.
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obligation was, and if there was a violation and no defense available, then the 
respondent loses. I think in WTO dispute settlement that, ultimately – unless 
you can fi nd one of those rules of interpretation; i.e., all the parties to the 
WTO are also parties to this other agreement, and therefore it is part of the 
context and you can work further with it in that regard – you may just have 
to fi nd that the country violated the WTO agreement and reject the defense, 
even though it is true that it has a confl icting obligation. So, if it complies 
with the WTO, it is going to violate this other obligation.  
Wilner:  Does not the fact that you are in a WTO-specifi c forum give 
an advantage to the view that, in fact, the confl ict has to be settled in accor-
dance with the basic rules set out in a system to which the parties have been 
referred?  
Davey:  The question is: how far do you go in using some interpretive 
principles to recognize a defense that is somehow outside of the WTO? This is a 
conservative panel. I would say, actually, most people agree that there is some 
application of international law that is going to get into the WTO – but, 
there are those that would argue no. They would use things like lex specialis 
to say, well, this regime is more special than the WTO and more specifi c than 
the WTO in this specifi c instance, so the WTO loses, and the WTO panel 
should say that.  
Wilner:  Perhaps not only that but, as Kim Van der Borght said, there 
may be situations – if the WTO system is part of a more general international 
system – where the WTO DSS really has to resort to using other conventions 
and acts as a dispute settlement body of the general international system 
rather than only that of the WTO. I think that is what Professor Van der 
Borght had in mind. Do you have any further comment on that?  
Van der Borght:  Maybe just shortly on the proposed solution to the 
Swordfi sh case, saying: Well, essentially, it is no longer fi sh it is foodstuff because 
they have been processed. In that case, there is not really any defense anymore 
on the basis of the protocol on highly migrated species within the WTO 
context. You have solved it by excluding the protocol and by disregarding 
the illegally caught fi sh, which is really disregarding the bad faith of bring-
ing this claim because it is a claim to transport this foodstuff that it now is 
– a right that they do not have because they should not have caught it in the 
fi rst place.  
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Davey:  You could have a rule that said we do not allow anything derived 
from something caught in violation of international agreements to transit. 
That is relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; Chile 
could still invoke the 20(g) exception.57  I do not know enough about the 
facts to know whether or not the case would be good for that, but it sounds 
initially like it could be possible.  
Van der Borght:  I think it is possible in the future because now they 
know they should do this, but it is unlikely to be in their law already.  
Davey:  Right. That may be true. That is just an implementation issue.  
Georgiev:  I want to react to your last remark, which seems to be shared 
by Professor Davey, that the WTO Appellate Body or the DSS should apply 
WTO law if there is confl ict at the end of the day. Well, that takes me to the 
remark of Kim Van der Borght, who said in his initial intervention that you 
can do this only if you accept that there is a primacy of WTO law over other 
international law, because otherwise it will not work. It is a general concept 
which you apply because of these general considerations. Nothing shows that 
there has been this general view that by creating the WTO and dispute settle-
ment, you also institute the primacy of WTO over other international law. 
This conclusion from ‘unsubstantive’ law – the primacy – is about substan-
tive law and you cannot derive it from a procedural provision or system of 
provisions, contrary to what substantive analysis, like Kim Van der Borght’s, 
has shown of the WTO agreement, preamble, et cetera, et cetera – I do not 
need to repeat that. I fi nd it problematic, Bill Davey, to say: Well, at the end 
of the day, that is what the WTO Appellate Body and DSS has been instituted 
for, to apply WTO, so it has to apply WTO. No, it is not that. It is you, in fact, 
enforcing a primacy of one set of rules over another set of rules.  
I would probably belong to those whom you have mentioned at the end 
of your last conversation – as trying not to sort of discard the principle of lex 
specialis, but look at it more seriously and not apply it only when it obviously 
cannot be applied. This whole dispute reminds me of what you had in the 
EU in the ‘60s. And here, all of you are specialists in European Community 
law; there was this similar debate about the concept of European Commu-
nity law as a separate legal order.58  And this concept was in fact invented by 
57 DSU, supra note 16, art. 20(g).
58 See, e.g., Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport v. Netherlands Inland Reveu Admin, 1963 
E.C.R. 1, Case 294/83, Parti Egologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, 1986, E.C.R. 
1339.
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the European Court of Justice.59  It is a judicial creation, this concept. But 
can you do the same thing now? That is the question. Well, I think that after 
all you cannot do what the European Court of Justice has done by positing 
that European Community law is separated from international law because 
you have the explicit provision of WTO law that it operates within inter-
national law. And then, in the European Community, look what you had 
subsequently – primacy was, in fact, accepted, fi rst implicitly and then also 
explicitly, by the member states, by the masters of the treaties, the Herren der 
Vertraege. So, the situation is different. You cannot do what has been done in 
European Community law in WTO law. That would be my view.
Davey:  One reaction is – what we are actually talking about is a wide 
variety of situations. If you actually have what you can constitute as interna-
tional law – international law in the sense that it is binding on all govern-
ments – then the Vienna Convention allows you to take that into account 
as context in interpreting the WTO agreement. What is more likely to come 
up is not that sort of international law, unless you are willing to recognize 
principles of international law quite easily, but rather where you have inter-
national agreements that confl ict, where you do not have identical member-
ship. There are interpretive principles that can solve a problem if the dispute 
is between A and B, and A and B have entered into another agreement in 
confl ict with the WTO that does not – and enforcing that agreement in the 
relation between them – cause any third parties to be hurt under WTO rules. 
There is actually a Vienna Convention provision that would arguably allow 
that sort of interpretation; 41, I think.60   
The problem is when you have A and B, part of the WTO membership, 
in a separate agreement that has a confl ict with the WTO, but there are other 
Members of the WTO that are not parties to that arrangement, and they are 
complaining about a problem. And that is what most people are concerned 
about when the issue is: do you give WTO primacy? That is the actual case that 
they are thinking about. Some of the Members of the WTO have entered 
into a separate agreement on the environment, an action is challenged by a 
WTO Member that is not a party to that agreement, and some people would 
say it should be a defense – that there is this other agreement that is more 
specifi c perhaps to the provision giving rise to the WTO violation. But if the 
complaining WTO party is not a party to that other agreement, I would say 
that you would apply the WTO rule…
59 Id.
60 Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 41.
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Georgiev: …Unless the other is qualifi cations of customs or interna-
tional –
 
Davey: – International law, which it could be. There you get into an issue 
as to how willing you are to recognize general principles of international law. 
Is it a very narrow thing? Piracy is bad; slavery is bad; there are certain human 
rights. Or, is it kind of a broad range of things that are – what some people, 
what the U.S. – would view as potentially emerging principles but not yet 
generally accepted? I do not know.  
Zaimis:  Just one reaction to the point you mentioned about European 
law: I think the situation is, as you said, quite different in terms of, for ex-
ample, judicial activism – which we are trying to condemn in the WTO. If 
it were not for judicial activism, the EU would not exist today. I would not 
be here talking to you if it were not for these fi rst decisions of the European 
Court of Justice about direct effect. So there is room for judicial activism in 
international life and the result can be positive.  
Georgiev:  Yes, but what I referred to was that there is a difference. You 
have a subsequent blessing – in the case of European Community law – you 
have the subsequent blessing, implicit or explicit, by member states of the 
European Union, which here you do not have. And I have doubts whether, 
in the legal system of the WTO, you can have it at all, in any form other than 
explicit; which is, I guess, not possible. There is a difference, for the purposes 
of the separation of one legal order or legal system, from international law; 
this is the age-old confl ict between the monists and the dualists in interna-
tional law.
Professor Bodansky:61  I wonder whether it might be helpful to dis-
tinguish between situations where some other part of international law re-
quires a state to do something inconsistent with a GATT obligation and sit-
uations where international law merely permits a state to do something that 
is inconsistent with GATT obligations. It seems to me the fi rst situation is 
an easier one than the second. It is hard for me to imagine that if a state 
is required by a multilateral environmental agreement to do something 
– under the Basal Convention or the Convention on International Trade in 
61 Emily & Ernest Woodruff Chair in International Law, University of Georgia School of Law; 
Moderator (Panel 4: Are the Current Methods of Enforcement of Dispute Decisions Effective? 
What Are Alternative Methods of Enforcement?).
103
Endangered Species62 – that that requirement would not be considered to 
fall under Article 20(g) and therefore be a defense to a GATT violation.63
The harder case, I think, is where some other part of international law 
permits a state to do something. For example, under the precautionary prin-
ciple, states can do things even in the absence of scientifi c certainty.64  They 
are not required to do so, but they are permitted to. But if some aspect of 
WTO law imposes some other requirement involving science, then you have 
a confl ict, and that seems to me, perhaps, the more diffi cult case – where 
simply relying on the kinds of approaches that Bill Davey mentioned might 
not end up leading to a solution. Thanks.  
Davey:  That is a problem within the WTO agreements as well. What 
is a confl ict? Do you have a true confl ict, which is, you are supposed to do A 
under one agreement and not A under another agreement? Or, is it, you have 
permission to do A under one and are prohibited from doing A under another? 
The Appellate Body really has not been real clear about that, but panels have 
taken differing approaches to that – whether or not the second example of 
a confl ict is really a confl ict or not. One panel report basically said it is not a 
confl ict because you can comply with both obligations. But, sometimes if you 
– as the principles of what, broadly, you could say effective treaty interpreta-
tion would suggest – follow that, that basically writes whole sections of the 
one agreement out of existence by basically saying: You cannot do it because 
you have got this other obligation. So, part of it is defi ning the confl ict, and 
then part of it is, what is the multilateral environmental agreement? Do all 
WTO Members belong to it, and is that the case? Or, are there some WTO 
Members that do not belong to it and are they involved in the case? There 
are a lot of permutations that forever make it hard to generalize.  
Wilner:  I suppose there is another permutation where states – it is con-
ceivable, in the area of trade or a related area – enter into an agreement that 
is clearly incompatible with their obligations. I suppose you could say, well, 
they entered into this in bad faith, but then it may be so tangential that it is not 
bad faith but represents another concept, another view of international trade 
law. If you were to talk about lex specialis or “later in time,” and give primacy 
62 Basal Convention, supra note 45; Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species, Mar. 13, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (1973).
63 GATT, supra note 5, art. 20(g).
64 See, e.g., Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 fi nal 
(Feb. 2, 2000).
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to any of these concepts, states could, over a period of time, diminish their 
obligations towards the international trading system by entering into these 
special agreements. This, I think, is an argument for saying that there is in 
fact a hierarchy of norms and rules in the area of trade, and that the area must 
be occupied by the WTO system and its substantive conventions. 
If, in fact, we want to broaden the system, then the treaties themselves 
must be broadened to include considerations other than just the specifi c 
trade rules themselves. I would think this would be the most useful and the 
most direct way of dealing with the problem of the wider obligation of states. 
I understand there are some practical diffi culties in including human rights 
and labor standards, and matters of that sort, in the WTO system. It seems 
to me that the most direct way of broadening the competence of the WTO 
dispute system is by specifi c reference to, and incorporation of, treaties on 
other aspects of the international system. This approach would be the best 
way of broadening the reach of the dispute settlement of the WTO system.  
Johnson:  Let me just ask a specifi c question about trade and labor that 
Professor Wilner just mentioned. Let us take two countries, A and B, who 
are both members of the WTO and also members of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO). Country A decides to embargo, or put some tariff that 
is prohibitive on Country B’s products, based on A’s claim that B is violating 
ILO core labor standards. Country B claims that it is not violating the ILO 
standards and takes A to the WTO and the case ultimately gets to the Appel-
late Body. If you are on the Appellate Body, what is your position?  
Zaimis:  We are glad we are not the Appellate Body. (laughter) That is 
a real situation; labor standards have been used in a positive way by WTO 
Members. For example, the EU is now using labor standards in its new gen-
eral system of preferences program, whereby GSP preferences are available 
to a number of countries; but if certain of them have signed certain ILO 
conventions, then they will get extra benefi ts under the GSP.65  That is the 
new system that is currently being applied since the fi rst of January. And of 
course, in the future one of the benefi ciaries – that does not get the GSP plus 
benefi t – may challenge this by saying: I meet ILO standards without having 
signed the convention. I do not want to invite trouble, of course, but this is 
something that is in our thinking. That is a way of using labor standards in a 
positive way. But I understand your question relates to trade sanctions for a 
65 Council Regulation 2501/2001, 2001 O.J. (L346) 1 (EC).
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country that does not meet labor standards. To what extent this can be taken 
into account, and if there is an Article 20 defense – this is an open question, 
and I do not think I have a black and white answer to that.  
Davey:  I think “public morals” is the fi rst exception as the one that 
might apply. There might be some issue as to whether or not consumers 
distinguish the products that resulted from that – such that you could justify 
a fi nding of “non-likeness” – but that would probably be kind of diffi cult. I 
think that most people think that would be a problem these days, but there 
are a couple of avenues you could argue.  
Johnson:  But the Appellate Body would not be in a position of inter-
preting the ILO standards as to whether or not Country B has violated – so 
you would argue against that, I presume.  
Davey:  Well, at the moment, given what they said in Soft Drinks,66 they 
would probably not want to do that. The declaration in Singapore says you 
should leave these matters to the ILO, which does have a system of impos-
ing sanctions on countries. It is seldom used; Burma, I think, is the only one 
that has ever been so targeted. But there is a different mechanism available 
that all WTO Members said ought to be used, instead of the WTO, to solve 
these. You could argue that. That would be another reason why the Appellate 
Body would try and avoid this. Certainly, I do not think they would rule on 
whether or not there had been ILO violations.  
Van der Borght:  They would not have to rule on it if there was a deci-
sion of the ILO because the ILO procedure is basically “naming and sham-
ing.” So, once the report is out at the ILO, you would not need a ruling of 
the Appellate Body of whether there was a violation of labor standards. They 
could do it on the basis of the ILO report.  
Zaimis:  I think perhaps, politically, it would also depend on what viola-
tion we are talking about. 
Johnson:  Let me just add, on behalf of the U.S., we actually had an 
agreement with Cambodia where we also used the “carrot approach” as op-
posed to using the negative approach in offering additional quotas to Cam-
bodia – but Cambodia was not a Member of the WTO, so that is not really 
66 Soft Drinks, DS308, supra note 47.
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relevant here. I guess my question is, if you had a clear violation of, let us say, 
child labor or slave labor – that may get into the moral issue – but if you have 
a clear violation, and under the WTO there is no real basis for blocking the 
trade or withdrawing Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to that violating 
country, I just wonder… that is really what my question is. I think you have 
probably addressed it, but I just wanted to clarify it in the post analysis.  
Zaimis:  If it is child labor or slave labor, as you call it, perhaps the 
public morality clause could be extended to justify a measure under Article 
20. I think the interpretation of Article 20, in the future, will be gradually 
expanded, in line with international developments.  
Wilner:  Would this be in the same vein as the extension of jurisdiction 
– of the implicit extension of jurisdiction – through the use of some general 
WTO clauses or GATT clauses, so as to bring about the inclusion of certain 
norms in other aspects of international system without ever having to change 
the actual treaties?  
Zaimis:  Well, the Appellate Body has already done it – I am sure Profes-
sor Davey would know – they have interpreted Article 20 in different ways 
throughout the last ten years. For example, the concept of “sustainable” de-
velopment was brought into Article 20 even though the word sustainable is 
not there. This is simply in keeping with other developments in other fora in 
the international context. Because environment was not –sustainable devel-
opment was not – perhaps an issue in 1947, it was not inserted into Article 
20. It has become an issue since 1947, and that is why the Appellate Body 
interpreted Article 20 so as to incorporate this principle. I think that they will 
be using interpretive tactics to cover new concepts and refl ect new political 
sensitivities that will arise as a result of international developments.  
Van der Borght:  On the example of labor standards, I think the prob-
lem of trying to fi t it into Article 20 is really trying to avoid the issue of the 
way that the relationship works between rules of international law. If there 
is a claim from a country saying: Well, we are very disappointed. We cannot 
get our full advantage from the WTO system because we cannot export t-shirts 
or shirts that are made by children, I think the answer of the Appellate Body 
should be to send them away and say you have no rights under the WTO 
to do that because there are binding conventions that you have signed in 
the ILO. The Appellate Body should take a much fi rmer stand on that and 
not try and fi nd a way of integrating this through an exception in the WTO 
– rather than expanding their jurisdiction, keeping it very limited. The juris-
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diction of the WTO DSS is on trade, not on trying to gain unfair advantages 
that the country really does not have.  
Johnson:  Just to follow up quickly on this point: if there is a question 
about whether that country – Country B, let us say – has violated the child 
labor standards (because quite often we have that controversy) or if it has 
not been adjudicated in the ILO, and if Country B does not happen to be 
a member of the ILO – so it does not have that obligation under the ILO 
– in that case, the Appellate Body would have to, in the situation you posed, 
acknowledge the ILO standards if Country B were a member of the ILO and 
if it had been adjudicated in some way in the ILO. But if not, that is the more 
diffi cult question. Does the Appellate Body then look at the standards – look 
at the facts – and make a determination that might exempt Country A from 
providing MFN status to Country B?  
Van der Borght:  If it is child labor, these core labor standards are seen 
as a refl ection of basic human rights standards. The problem with that is 
the Appellate Body does not have the competence nor the jurisdiction to 
enforce human rights standards, so it could not really do that because that 
is beyond the scope of its competence. What it could do, I guess – because 
it always has the right to ask for advice or for an expert – is it could ask for 
the advice of the ILO to see whether these standards are being respected or 
not and then act on that. But that is really a situation where I do not think I 
have an answer at the moment. If there is a clear violation and the ILO has 
acknowledged that there is a violation, then the case is much easier. If the 
country that is violating core labor standards that are seen as basic human 
rights standards is not a member, then it is much more diffi cult because I do 
not think the Appellate Body can really assess whether these violations have 
taken place or not. That is not part of the jurisdiction, and enforcing human 
rights standards is certainly not within the jurisdiction of the WTO.  
Wilner:  There is of course the initial question of whether, from the very 
beginning, the Appellate Body or the panel should consider the relevance of 
a violation of some other norm or another rule in another system given the 
fact that its jurisdiction is limited to answering, or to dealing with, the very 
specifi c question of whether there has been a violation of the WTO treaties 
themselves. I suppose the Appellate Body could take the position that: There 
has been a violation of the WTO rules, of the substantive rules, and there may be 
a violation of the other rules, but that is not within our jurisdiction. You really 
need to go somewhere else for that purpose. Or, do you say that the Appellate 
Body by its nature, or inherently, can send parties away by saying: Well, there 
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is a confl ict but we give primacy to child labor standards over your obligations to 
adhere to the agreements; that is the basic purpose for this DSS. I think that is a 
real dilemma that seems to me can only be resolved by a change in the basic 
rules themselves, rather than by having the Appellate Body try to expand the 
jurisdiction of the court by its bootstraps.
It remains to me only to thank the panel for this most stimulating morn-
ing and also I want to thank the organizer, the brains behind it all, Don 
Johnson, for having made all of this possible.    
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C. Donald Johnson:*  The moderator of this panel has asked me not to 
“lay it on thick.”  It would be very easy to do because he has a great back-
ground. Professor Daniel Bodansky is the Emily & Ernest Woodruff Chair 
in International Law. He teaches a broad range of international law courses 
and his specialty is international environmental law. The old joke is that ev-
erybody talks about the weather and nobody does anything about it. Profes-
sor Bodansky is the exception because he is in charge of climate control and 
is one of the world’s experts on that subject. He also serves on the editorial 
board of the American Journal of International Law and is actively involved 
in the American Society of International Law. At the meeting next week we 
have some controversial issues to take up, and he will be resolving those is-
sues I am sure. Without further ado, I’ll turn it over to Dan.  
Daniel M. Bodansky:  Thanks, Don. I guess as a climate change person 
I can take credit for the nice weather here today, so you can send me your 
* Director, Dean Rusk Center – International, Comparative, and Graduate Legal Studies, 
University of Georgia School of Law; Moderator (Panel 2: After a Decade of Dispute Settle-
ment Cases, Whom Does the System Benefi t?).
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thanks afterwards. This is our last panel of the conference but certainly not 
our least panel. The topic for the panel this morning is: Are the Current 
Methods of Enforcement of Dispute Decisions Effective?  What Are Alternative 
Methods of Enforcement? In thinking about these questions, it is useful to put 
them in a wider frame.  
Enforcement is a means to an end. The end here is compliance or, per-
haps even more broadly, effectiveness in changing behavior in the direction 
of greater compliance. So, in thinking about the question of enforcement 
this morning, I think we need to consider: How much compliance is there 
currently with World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement decisions? 
How effective are they in changing the behavior of WTO Members? What are the 
reasons why states comply or do not comply?  How big a role does enforcement play 
in determining compliance? How much more compliance could we get through 
alternative, stronger methods of enforcement? And would these stronger methods 
of enforcement have any costs – for example, to other goals of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System (DSS), such as the peaceful resolution of disputes?  
In order to think about these questions regarding the adequacy of en-
forcement and alternatives to the current approaches, we have an extremely 
distinguished panel. Since their detailed biographies are in the program, let 
me just introduce them very briefl y. Our fi rst speaker today will be Charles 
Verrill, who is a partner at the fi rm of Wiley, Rein & Fielding in Washington, 
D.C. Mr. Verrill heads the fi rm’s international trade law and policy prac-
tice group, and he has had extensive background in that capacity, working 
on trade issues and dispute resolution issues under the WTO. Our second 
speaker is Professor Marsha Echols, Professor of Law at Howard University. 
She has written extensively on trade law issues, focusing in particular on food 
safety issues. Our fi nal speaker today will be Professor Donald McRae, who 
is the Hyman Solway Professor of Business and Trade Law at the University 
of Ottawa in Canada. Professor McRae has worked both as an academic and 
for the government on trade issues. Without further ado, let me turn it over 
fi rst to Charles Verrill.  
Charles Verrill:  Thank you very much. I would like to express my ap-
preciation for the invitation to come here. It is my fi rst trip to the University 
of Georgia, and I defi nitely hope it will not be my last. It is such a lovely 
campus; thank you for having me here. 
The topic I am going to address today is: Are the Current Methods of En-
forcement of WTO Dispute Decisions Effective? What are the Alternative Methods 
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of Enforcement?  From a strictly legal perspective, the obligations adopted in 
the Uruguay Round leave little room for ambiguity about what is required of 
Members found to have violated WTO obligations; Article 21.1 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) requires “prompt compliance” with Dis-
pute Settlement Body (DSB) rulings,1 and if it is not practicable for a Member 
to comply immediately, then Article 21.3 allows a reasonable period of time 
to comply.2  Under most interpretations of international law, Members are re-
quired to implement these WTO decisions as a matter of international law.
Despite the clarity of these obligations, the record of compliance in the 
real world of politics and sovereign interests is not unblemished. There have 
been occasional lapses, but I believe there is suffi cient evidence of compliance 
by Members to conclude that the system we have today is reasonably effective. 
Indeed, given the legal and practical obstacles to compliance in many instances, 
it is in fact possibly surprising that there is such a level of compliance.
This morning, I would like to go through a couple of instances where 
compliance has been very diffi cult by the United States. I would also like to 
illustrate how those diffi culties delay, and sometimes muddy the water of, 
compliance. Before doing so, I would like to read to you a comment that 
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy made in a very interesting internet chat 
that he participated in a couple of weeks ago.3  During this chat, Mr. Lamy 
took questions from around the world and answered them spontaneously. 
When asked whether the WTO dispute settlement methods are effi cient 
enough, Mr. Lamy responded: 
I take great pride in the WTO DSS. While it can certainly be perfected, 
over its fi rst 10 years of existence (and building on the previous expe-
rience of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) it has allowed 
countries, big and small, to bring trade disputes and obtain redress. It 
compares favorably with other systems of dispute resolution in interna-
tional law and it is very prompt, even when compared to domestic judicial 
1 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 2.1, Apr. 
5, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
2 Id., art. 21.3.
3 WTO, Transcript of Internet chat with WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, (Feb. 
21, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/dgchat_21jan06_e.htm (fol-
low “Transcript of Mr. Lamy’s Internet Chat”) [hereinafter Lamy Transcript].
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processes. Despite these successes, one of the challenges is to ensure that 
small countries can better participate in the system and, particularly, to 
make sure that when they win a case they can obtain prompt compliance. 
These are some of the issues being currently discussed in negotiations.4  
I believe this is a reasonable assessment of the effectiveness of the DSS 
and the manner in which it works. I would now like to go through a couple 
of instances where the United States has had a very diffi cult time complying; 
yet at the end of the day, compliance won out.  
The fi rst instance relates to the Continuing Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act (CDSOA) or Byrd Bill, as it is commonly known.5  This was legislation 
passed by Congress in the dark of night and at the inspiration of Senator 
Robert Byrd of West Virginia. The Byrd Bill was designed to reward com-
panies that brought anti-dumping or countervailing duty cases. Companies 
that successfully brought these cases received the proceeds of anti-dumping 
or countervailing duty revenues collected by the Customs Service. This leg-
islation was very popular in the United States. Millions and millions of dol-
lars of duties that were collected were taken from the General Treasury and 
given to a variety of American companies, including some of our clients. The 
largest recipient was a company that manufactures ball bearings, the Timken 
Company.6  You can imagine the bill’s popularity with the domestic interests 
that bring trade cases.  
The Byrd Bill, however, was not very popular with our trading partners. 
The European Union, together with 11 other countries, initiated dispute 
resolution proceedings at the DSB, and they eventually won.7  The panels 
and the Appellate Body all agreed that the Byrd Bill was, in fact, a remedy for 
dumping that was not authorized by the anti-dumping agreement and, there-
fore, was WTO-inconsistent. Additionally, the Appellate Body found that the 
Byrd Bill acted as a nullifi cation and impairment of Members’ obligations.8 
The Bush Administration promptly announced that it would seek repeal of 
4 Id.
5 Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. §1675(c) (2000).
6 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ISSUES AND EFFECTS 
OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 29 (2005), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05979.pdf (graphing CDSOA payments during fi scal years 
2001-2004).  
7 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS217/11 (Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Dumping, DS217].  
8 Id.; Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/
DS217/R (Sept. 16, 2002).
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the Byrd Bill, but the supporters of the Administration were unable to move 
legislation out of the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee (where the 
Constitution requires this type of legislation to originate). For many people 
in Congress, the WTO action on the Byrd Bill was an affront to U.S. sover-
eignty, and yet another example of over-reaching by bureaucrats in Geneva. 
Supporters of the Byrd Bill in Congress argued that the United States should 
be free to spend the revenues from duty collections without WTO oversight. 
Powerful lobbies rallied in support of maintaining the Byrd Bill in force, and 
they made clear that it did not make any difference to them that there would 
be retaliation if the U.S. did not conform to its WTO obligations.  
After Congress failed to act, the lack of U.S. compliance “within a rea-
sonable time” was referred to an arbitrator at the DSB. The arbitrator de-
termined a methodology for calculating retaliatory duties based on the trade 
damage caused by the Byrd Bill.9   Pursuant to the arbitrator’s formula, the 
EU and Canada and Japan initiated retaliatory duties of 15 percent on certain 
exports from the United States with a total value of approximately US$91 
million a year.10  After the retaliation went into effect, a provision repealing 
the Byrd Bill was inserted in the Omnibus Budget Act of 2005.11  This inser-
tion was almost identical to the way that the Byrd Bill was enacted in the fi rst 
place – slipping it into an omnibus bill, without any hearings or debate on 
the issue. The Senate bill, which did not contain a similar provision repealing 
the Byrd Bill, was adopted. Because of differences between the two bills, it 
was necessary to go to conference. Before that conference was initiated, 72 
senators signed a nonbinding resolution which instructed the Senate confer-
ees not to accept any compromise or any bill that included a repeal of the 
Byrd Bill.12  This maneuvering set the stage for compromise in the conference 
proceedings; a measure that repeals the Byrd Bill as of October 1, 2007, the 
beginning of the next federal fi scal year.13  Reimbursement of duties will not 
end then because the bill, as passed, included a provision stating that distri-
9 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000: Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/
ARB/EEC (Aug. 31, 2004).
10 See Dumping, DS217, supra note 7 (discussing suspension of applications and concessions 
under GATT and imposition of additional 15 percent ad valorem duty on imports of certain 
products from U.S.).
11 H.R. 4241, 109th Cong. (2005).
12 Senate tells Conferees to Reject Byrd Repeal in 72-19 Vote, INSIDE US TRADE, Nov. 25, 2005.
13 Defi cit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, §7601, 120 Stat. 4 (2005).
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bution of collections would be authorized for all imports into the United 
States that had entered before October 1, 2007, even though the liquida-
tions occur long afterwards.  
This compromise, and the preconference maneuvering, illustrates the 
diffi culty of obtaining passage of legislation to conform to WTO obliga-
tions where powerful U.S. interests are in opposition, even if the executive 
branch actively supports compliance. These circumstances inevitably lead to 
a compromise that is less than perfect compliance with WTO obligations, but 
which is necessary to achieve the desired result. The Byrd Bill maneuvering is 
a good example of the kind of trade-offs that go into this compliance activity 
on the part of the United States. At the end of the day, everybody got some-
thing. The supporters of the Byrd Bill received an assurance of distribution 
for years to come. The Administration was allowed to notify the DSB that 
the U.S. had indeed conformed to its obligations under the WTO; although, 
of course, there was an objection from the EU and others saying: Wait a 
minute, this is not compliance at all because you did not immediately repeal a 
bill; you left it to be phased out over a period of years. This situation is similar 
to the case with the Extraterritorial Income and Foreign Sales Corporation 
(FSC) – the tax issue which has been so controversial over several years.14  It 
is likely that the U.S. will continue to pay retaliatory duties until the Byrd Bill 
is ultimately phased out.  
I have other instances of this sort of compliance activity in the U.S., 
which, given the time, I will not go into. My basic conclusion – based on the 
response of the United States in the Byrd Bill dispute and in quite a lot of 
others that I have looked at – is that, yes, Pascal Lamy was right. The system 
is reasonably effective and the evidence bears that out.  
The second question is whether there are alternative methods of enforce-
ment available that would be preferable. Here, the issue is one that should 
be explored further by the WTO, and I am sorry that it is really not being 
considered in the Doha Round. As you know, typically, dispute resolution 
involves noncompliance and responsive retaliatory duties on the same prod-
ucts and within the same agreement. In other words, if there is a GATT 
violation, then you focus the retaliation on similar products that are covered 
by GATT.  
14 Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” 
WT/DS108/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1999) [hereinafter FSC, DS108]. 
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In one instance where this procedure was not utilized, Ecuador suc-
ceeded in obtaining, with the United States, WTO rulings that the banana 
discipline maintained by the EU was in confl ict, not only with GATT 1994, 
but also with the Agreement on Services.15  Ecuador is a very small country 
relative to the EU, and the concept of Ecuador retaliating against the EU 
(for violation of the obligations of the EU) by imposing duties on imports 
of European bananas was, of course, not likely to achieve anything because 
there were no such imports. As to retaliatory duties on industrial goods that 
are imported into Ecuador, the amount of trade is such that it would seem 
unlikely to cause a ripple on the European trade scene. For these reasons, 
Ecuador asked the WTO for authority to retaliate against the EU based upon 
the suspension, by Ecuador, of its obligations to the EU under the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).16   
Ecuador successfully argued to an arbitrator that it would not be appro-
priate for Ecuador to retaliate by imposing duties on imports from Europe 
because most of those imports were inputs into manufacturing or assembling 
in Ecuador; therefore, imposing duties on them would be counterproductive 
and would actually be harmful to Ecuador. Ecuador also was able to demon-
strate that it should be authorized to take this kind of action because of the 
importance of bananas to the Ecuadorian economy. In the end, the arbitrator 
agreed that Ecuador could suspend its TRIPS obligations relative to the EU. 
The panel made certain observations about how Ecuador could and should 
implement the retaliatory action, including methods that would avoid hav-
ing a spillover effect in other markets. Ecuador never had to implement this 
authority because it settled the Banana dispute with the EU.17  I have a 
very strong suspicion that the settlement was prompted by the arbitrator’s 
decision that Ecuador could suspend TRIPS, which would have been a very 
dramatic action.  
This issue is going to be raised again, and very soon, because Brazil is 
impatient with the U.S. reaction to the WTO decision which held that U.S. 
15 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas, DS27].
16 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299. [hereinafter TRIPS].
17 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under 
Art. 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
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subsidies to the cotton industry violated the Subsidies Agreement.18  The 
U.S. has taken partial action to conform to this WTO determination, but 
other subsidy practices remain unchanged, and compliance is obviously go-
ing to be very diffi cult for the U.S. to achieve given the powerful farm lobby 
that supports those subsidies. Now Brazil has asked for authority to suspend 
the TRIPS agreement, and obligations that it has with respect to the U.S., as 
a way of forcing the U.S. to take action sooner rather than later in respond-
ing to the decision of the Appellate Body. That decision is still pending.  
My sense is that this is probably going to be a good opportunity for the 
WTO DSB to explore the parameters of this kind of cross-agreement retali-
ation. This is the kind of retaliation that could really make a difference for 
the small countries that seek to enforce obligations owed to them by larger 
countries but do not have the means to do so; for example, as was the case 
with Ecuador. Secretary-General Lamy has said that the alternative methods 
of enforcement are being considered in the Doha Round, but I was unhappy 
to discover that in the draft text that has been circulated by the chairman 
of the dispute resolution negotiating group there is no change proposed to 
Article 22, which is the enforcement section.19   
I would like to conclude by making reference to what I regard as one of 
the interesting distinctions between the world of investment and the world 
of trade. As you all know, the individual in the WTO system has no standing. 
A person who is injured as a result of the failure of another WTO Member to 
comply with a WTO obligation – for example, a banana producer in Ecuador 
– has to rely on its government to assert the WTO obligations. There is no 
recompense to the banana producer in Ecuador for the violation by the EU, 
which has an economic impact on the producer in Ecuador.  
Interestingly enough, a very different picture emerges when you look at 
the architecture of investment law, which has emerged without any multilat-
eral body like the WTO. In fact, investment is only minimally touched in the 
WTO agreements and, a couple of years ago, the developing countries killed 
a proposal to consider investment commitments in the Doha negotiations. 
At the same time, there has evolved, since 1959, an investment law archi-
18 Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R 
(Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Cotton, DS267].
19 DSU, supra note 1, art. 22.
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tecture based upon bilateral investment treaties.20  The fi rst one was signed 
between Germany and Pakistan.21  It provides, as most of them still do to 
this day, that investors from Germany will be entitled to fair and equitable 
treatment in Pakistan, will be entitled to security of their investment, will be 
free from expropriatory action without adequate compensation, and so on. 
The interesting thing about these agreements is that most of them require 
states that are parties to the agreement to consent, in advance, to compulsory 
arbitration of any dispute arising under the agreement. So, if a German inves-
tor in Pakistan fi nds that its investment has been unfairly tampered with, i.e., 
denied fair and equitable treatment, that investor can force the government 
of Pakistan to compulsory arbitration, usually at the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes at the World Bank. However, lately 
most of these bilateral investment treaties have included the option of select-
ing from a variety of arbitral fora.  
There are 2,400 of these treaties in effect. About three-fourths of them 
have been ratifi ed, and the amount of litigation that is ensuing from those is 
enormous. I am involved in cases against Canada, Ghana, and Zimbabwe of 
all places. While I do not know that it would be appropriate to even think of 
incorporating this concept of state liability to individuals in the WTO, I think 
the comparison between the situation of investors and the situation of traders 
is such that it deserves a lot of consideration as to whether this should be the 
next way of enforcing WTO obligations. Thank you.  
Bodansky:  Thank you very much. Our next speaker is Professor Marsha 
Echols.  
Marsha A. Echols:  Thank you very much, and thank you Ambassador 
Johnson and to the Dean Rusk Center for inviting me here. I am very pleased 
to be here today. The topic that we have for this panel is fairly broad, like the 
topics for other panels. In trying to determine how to address the two ques-
tions, I thought about my areas of interest, of course, which are agriculture 
and food-related issues, and trade in agriculture and food. There have been 
many disputes about agriculture or food before the WTO. I decided to look 
at a few of those to try to determine whether there are some problem areas, 
some issues that are worth focusing on.  
20 See Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Frame-
work on Investment at the World Trade Organization: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 
26 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 95, 115 (2005) (noting that fi rst bilateral investment treaty was 
signed between Germany and Pakistan on November 25, 1959.).
21 Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Nov. 26, 1959, ICSID 92-93 (1992).
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I decided to concentrate on the Hormones case22 and the Bananas dis-
pute,23 which have been through years and years of the dispute settlement 
process with still no real satisfactory outcome. These cases raise several policy 
issues also. The dispute regarding geographical indications is one that I think 
has been much simpler and perhaps resolved, but maybe for a different rea-
son.24  I also considered an ongoing dispute: the existing confl ict between 
the U.S. and the European Communities (EC) concerning biotechnology 
or genetically modifi ed organisms.25  We have a fairly recent draft of an un-
published panel report, but there is the possibility of a second biotech case 
involving different issues.26  Cotton and Sugar are major agricultural disputes 
that have been before the WTO, as Charles Verrill just mentioned, but I de-
cided not to consider these disputes.  
As you know, the Hormones case – one of the fi rst to be considered by 
the WTO – was pretty much a classic U.S.-EC dispute regarding food safety. 
Yet, the case began to raise the whole question of the meaning of the WTO 
rules for consumers, going beyond the whole question of importers and ex-
porters, and focusing on what is in the interest of the public: How does a 
government take into account the interest of the public during WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings or afterwards? Can the public interest be considered?  If 
part of your population is interested in trade restriction – what would be called 
“protectionism” – is there any option for the government that is faced with this 
confl ict – a confl ict not between two international agreements, but between an 
international agreement and the desires and the very public furor from its citi-
zens? Additionally, when considering this confl ict, it is important to take into 
account the fact that we are in democratic systems. So, in that sense, the Hor-
mones case begins to look at the WTO rules and their growing importance in 
domestic issues as opposed to border issues, which used to be the case.  
The Bananas case raises a different kind of confl ict that could have an 
impact on how you enforce. The case was, again, not a dispute between the 
22 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [herein-
after Hormones, DS26].
23  Bananas, DS27, supra note 15. 
24 E.g., Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R, (Mar. 15, 2005) [here-
inafter Geographical Indications, DS174].
25 Panel Report, European Community-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Biotech, DS291].
26 See generally, Alan Sipress & Marc Kaufman, U.S. Challenges EU’s Biotech Food Standards, 
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2001).
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U.S. and the EC, but really a dispute between banana producers in Latin 
America against banana producers in the Caribbean and Africa. It was almost 
as if these two trade powerhouses were surrogates for another kind of confl ict 
and dispute that was going on. The dispute also raised the question of the 
trade preferences and programs – preferences that were given to, of course, 
the former colonies of a group of countries. The case was one of the fi rst 
instances in which it was very clear that the interests of developing countries 
are not always the same, so there may be internal confl icts within that group. 
So how do you enforce? How do you implement a ruling when these poli-
cies, circumstances, and considerations are at play?  
The Geographical Indications case, again U.S.-E.C., can be considered 
in a much simpler context.27  It can be considered in the context of rural 
development as opposed to intellectual property or agriculture; however, the 
case can be considered in a more narrow context, and so, the implementation 
can be a little narrower. If the U.S. is satisfi ed with the changes to the EC 
rules announced recently, then perhaps it can be one of the quickest cases to 
resolve, and it raises fewer questions about enforcement.28   
In the Biotech case, again involving the U.S. and the EC, the biotechnol-
ogy dispute has a huge spillover effect; this case going on now concerns the 
EC’s delays or suspensions of approvals of imports of food products using 
biotechnology.29  That dispute has been addressed by a panel which was a 
year late in coming up with a draft report.30  I think it certainly, again, raises 
the question of the role of the WTO rules – in the context of democratic sys-
tems – when a very large portion of a population is not in favor of the result 
that will come with enforcement of the trade rules. Those are the cases that I 
thought about in trying to look at the questions that have been posed.  
Biotechnology, like Bananas, gives you an idea of the spillover effect of 
a WTO dispute that is to be decided under trade rules – rules whose effect 
can affect a whole economy and a whole country, certainly for Bananas. You 
have industries in many Caribbean countries, banana-exporting countries, 
which are being destroyed with the notion that those countries should sim-
ply adapt and fi nd other industries to concentrate on. Is that a rational ap-
proach? Again, can you look at this legal issue in isolation from the social and 
economic effect of what is going on? How do you, within the WTO system, 
27 Geographical Indications, DS174, supra note 24.
28 Id.
29 Biotech, DS291, supra note 25.
30 See id. (including issue date of Sept. 29, 2006).
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bring into consideration some of these other factors? I think the rules have 
been intentionally written so that you do not consider them; that it is just a 
trade issue, it is a spillover effect from Bananas. A spillover to enforcement 
of Biotechnology will affect not just the EC members but many countries in 
Africa, which, until this point, have said that they would not approve other 
countries’ exports of biotech products as imports into, or for production 
within, their countries. If the United States is eventually successful in the Bio-
technology case, will the U.S. be able to use that ruling for enforcement, not 
just by the EC, but in Africa also? The spillover effect of some of these WTO 
rulings can be very broad and have social as well as economic consequences. 
In looking at the issues – we are talking about post-recommendation 
issues: How should you act? What is required after there is a recommendation 
from the DSB? The question concerns enforcement, and I thought: Is there 
any enforcement of a WTO ruling or recommendation? I think the answer 
is no. There is no enforcement. Implementation, compliance and trying to 
restore a balance, yes; but no enforcement in the sense you think of with the 
New York convention on arbitral rulings and the enforcement powers that 
would come naturally from a court.31  There is no legal way to make an of-
fending country change its rules, to change its measures, to actually come 
into compliance; there is no way of saying that they have to do that.  
To me, the delays in some of the disputes that have been ongoing show 
this failure of enforcement or the lack of enforcement power. An offending 
country can delay using the rules that exist. There is no way to effectively 
stop that delay. The counter effect is for the complaining party to suspend 
concessions eventually, but, to me, that is different from enforcement. What 
you are trying to do after the recommendation from the DSB is to convince 
the respondent to come into compliance and to implement the recommen-
dation in some way to restore the balance. The DSU seems to use both the 
words “compliance” and “implementation,” but never “enforcement.”  So 
we are looking at different types of measures or actions on both sides that are 
designed towards compliance and compliance with a recommendation.  
The recommendation itself uses very general language, and is basically a 
direction to the responding country to come into compliance and to fulfi ll 
its WTO obligations. Yet, the recommendation is written so generally as to 
leave it up to that country to determine how it comes into compliance, and 
31 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965).
121
that is a good thing. But the general language is also part of the diffi culty in 
attaining compliance because it takes time to determine how to act, how to 
change a law, how to change your measure with citizens’ input, and how to 
achieve a measure that the complainant agrees is suffi cient in bringing the 
offending country into compliance.  
With regard to this compliance or implementation, the objectives – if 
you look only at the DSU they seem to be fairly limited. One is to have a 
prompt settlement of the matter. Again, “settlement” is coming into compli-
ance with the recommendation and fulfi lling your WTO obligations. Prompt 
settlement and prompt compliance are two different objectives that seem to 
be in the WTO DSU. A third objective seems to be to preserve the rights and 
obligations under covered agreements, as the previous panel was discussing. 
This reference to covered agreements seems to be a limiting factor as to what 
the compliance measures should be and the oversight of the DSB for all of 
these agreements.  
Before going on to look at what actually happens, there are some quotes 
that I would like to read from the DSU to show you the focus there – what 
I think is a fairly narrow focus, with a few exceptions: “Prompt compliance 
with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure 
effective resolution of disputes to the benefi t of all Members.”32  So, it seems 
to be to the benefi t, not just of the parties to the dispute, but to the benefi t 
of all Members. Is it that you benefi t all Members by maintaining a legally 
oriented system by coming into compliance, or is there another way to ben-
efi t all Members? Also, does that give some fl exibility to look at the broader 
context? That is a quote from Article 21.   
At the beginning of the DSU, Article 3.5 states, “All solutions to matters 
formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of 
the covered agreement, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with 
the agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefi ts accruing to any Mem-
ber under those agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of 
those agreements.”33  Now, again, those objectives can be much broader 
than the narrow rule that is at issue during a dispute. There is language that 
might work towards both a narrow and a broader interpretation of obliga-
tions of the respondent, and also towards what the DSB can consider as it 
decides what its recommendation should be. When considering a benefi t to 
32 DSU, supra note 1, art. 21.1.
33 Id., art. 3.5.
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all Members and a balance of the rights and obligations of Members, not 
just the disputants, then perhaps this in an area in which you can think more 
broadly about what should happen.  
The methods of compliance are spelled out in Article 22, and it seems 
hard to go beyond those in terms of what the respondent should do, but I 
think it might be possible for the DSU itself to be a little broader.34  The fi rst 
choice is withdrawal of the measure, and there is a time limit on this with-
drawal.35  This “reasonable period of time” has been extended very often in 
disputes. If, again, in a democratic system or in a political context the country 
believes it cannot withdraw the measure or come up with a solution that is 
satisfactory to the complaining parties, then you are thrown into compensa-
tion and/or – completely – into suspension of concessions.36  Compensation, 
I think, is a good alternative in a political dispute – a highly political dispute 
– but it really is there as an alternative, temporarily; it has to be agreed to 
– and this never occurs – so, it really is not an option.  
I think there are two methods for coming into compliance: the fi rst method 
entails the respondent who is fi rst to take some action – withdraw the measure 
or come into compliance; the second method is an option given to the com-
plainant. So, that again is beyond what we normally think of as enforcement. 
The complainant can suspend concessions, and then parties are in another 
series of disputes about the level of suspensions that can be agreed or approved 
by the DSB and for how long.  There have been cases which involve disputes 
that go to this understanding of suspensions of concessions – what can be sus-
pended, the value of the suspensions, how long they can be there in effect, and 
whether the authorization for them should be ended because there has been 
the withdrawal of a measure or some action to come into compliance?  All of 
this is not enforcement. It is a mixture of compliance and some kind of autho-
rization for a countermeasure, or some response by the complainant, when 
that fi rst option of the respondent is not fulfi lled fairly quickly.
I think everyone recognizes the role of developing countries – the dispute 
settlement process and its impact on developing countries is fairly important 
– and that more thought needs to be given to this subject. I picked from the 
DSU a few provisions that refer to developing countries, and they again take 
differing perspectives:37  (1) If the party complained against is a developing 
34 Id., art. 22.
35 See id.; see also id., art. 3.7.
36 Id., art. 22.1. 
37 Id., art. 12.11.
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country, there should be restraint in the response. What does that mean? How 
is it carried out? Is that something that is special to developing countries? (2) 
There should be particular attention to matters affecting their interest. Again, 
what does that mean? How do you pay particular attention, and must this be 
done within the context of a narrow reading of covered agreements? There 
can be further appropriate action that, again, takes into account developing 
countries’ interests, and there seems to be, within that special consideration, 
the ability to consider the impact on the economy of developing countries. 
Again, there is some fl exibility, even in the agreement as it is now, in what can 
be done when the interests of developing countries are involved.  
I just pointed out, that in coming into compliance, there are many things 
going on at once. The respondent country has to make a statement to the 
DSB about what it intends to do. As I have said, it has a reasonable period of 
time. There are options available, but the matter stays on the agenda of the 
DSB and can be raised by anybody over a long period of time until the matter 
is resolved. If a country who was not a party wants to raise the matter again, 
within what context? What could they say? What issues could they raise?  
In terms of coming into compliance, an issue that has been problematic, 
and that remains so, is the issue of “reasonable time.” If I have to go back in a 
democratic system and change my laws, what laws should respond to the will 
of my citizens, my public, what does that mean? How long do I have to do 
that? Also, suppose what you are asking me to do is contrary to the interests 
of my citizens; how should I balance all of this and what should I do? So how 
long do I have to respond under “reasonable time”? Also, what if I try to 
withdraw the measure and get thrown out of offi ce for doing it? Should this 
be the result? Why not compensation in a highly political setting?  
The suspension of concessions has been problematic because it really 
hurts, not just the one that will not allow imports, but it hurts industries in 
the country that is taking the retaliatory measures. It hurts small businesses. 
It hurts the importers. It hurts the distributors. It hurts the producers in the 
country who are using these materials as raw products for their manufactur-
ing. I think that the whole compliance situation presents a problem.  
Considerations that I think need to be discussed are democracy and dis-
pute settlement. How do you make all of this work together? How do you 
make this work for developing countries if they are the complainants or when 
their measures are challenged? What are the broader implications of dispute 
settlement? The previous panel talked about this issue, but look at the Ba-
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nanas case; socially, economically, culturally – what are the broader implica-
tions of dispute settlement, and is there a way to take them into account? 
The involvement of other institutions was considered as well. How can you 
induce them to discuss or consider the broader implications, the broader 
impact, or even the economic impact? How does the WTO work with some 
of the regional trade arrangements? How does it work with the World Bank 
in disputes? Certainly a panel can bring in experts. Should it go beyond the 
DSB? Should a ministerial council really be looking at the broader implica-
tions of disputes? Should we consult with the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development, Mercusor, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, 
or the InterAmerican Development Bank, to truly understand what all of this 
means and recognize that, yes, we have a body of legal rules, but the WTO 
does not operate in isolation and everybody should be aware of this reality? 
Thank you.  
Bodansky:  Thank you very much. Our last speaker is Professor Donald 
McRae.  
Donald M. McRae:  Thank you very much. I would like to thank the 
organizers from the Dean Rusk Center for inviting me. I guess they knew, 
when they contacted me, that there  is always a pretty good chance that if 
you ask someone from Ottawa in any period between February and March 
they will jump at the opportunity, and I did. I am very pleased to be here. I 
should also say that I am not going to give you a tirade on soft wood lumber, 
which is what you can also expect when many Canadians come south and 
discuss trade issues.
In looking at how enforcement – if it exists – works in the WTO, I think 
it is a mistake to simply focus on the issue of retaliation, which is what people 
think about when they think about WTO sanctioning. Retaliation, when it 
occurs, comes in only after a period of steps involving implementation; the 
ultimate goal in the WTO is implementation of the ruling. In most instances, 
it occurs without any formal reference to sanctions or to retaliation. There is 
an implementation process, and this process has already been referred to by 
the two previous speakers.  
After a decision by a panel or Appellate Body is adopted by the DSB, a 
state has a time to indicate how it is going to implement the ruling. The state 
then has a reasonable period of time to effect that implementation. If a state 
cannot implement within a reasonable period of time, then there is an op-
portunity for other states to challenge whether implementation has occurred; 
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the matter, as has been pointed out, is kept under surveillance by the DSB. 
Implementation of WTO rulings – or enforcement if you like – is part of a 
longer process, and if you compare it with other international judicial bodies 
you fi nd this is really quite unique.  
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decisions are binding – period – and 
there is no monitoring process or implementation process for its decisions.38 
There is a possibility you can go to the Security Council to get enforcement 
of the decisions of the ICJ; however, I am not aware of that actually hap-
pening. If you take a look at the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, you will fi nd there is also no implementation process.39  Since the WTO 
has an implementation process (I will slightly disagree, although perhaps it 
is a matter of wording, with Professor Echols) it has a kind of enforcement 
process – that other judicial bodies do not have. In that sense, what we have 
in the WTO is a fairly novel and a fairly effective process. This is somewhat 
similar to Pascal Lamy’s comments that were mentioned earlier.40   
When we are talking about enforcement in the WTO context, what are 
we really talking about? I think that much of the discussion about enforce-
ment confuses a couple of things: One is the remedy that fl ows from the 
breach of an obligation under the WTO agreements. The other is what can 
be done if a party does not live up to its remedial obligations. If you con-
sider a contract law model, the remedy for the breach of contract is either 
monetary damages or specifi c performance. Failure to pay damages leads to 
potential sanctions such as distraint on property. The objective of the remedy 
is compensation, although it does have a minor deterrent element.  
Well, how does this distinction between remedy and enforcement play 
out in the WTO context? I think the remedy in the WTO context is very 
clear. The remedy is to remove the nonconforming measure and come into 
compliance with WTO obligations. Enforcement, to the extent that it exists, 
is comprised of the other two elements referred to in Article 22: compensa-
tion or retaliation.41  It may sound rather odd to put it this way, but in fact, 
these are both measures designed to induce parties to come into compliance, 
38 International Court of Justice, Rules of Court, art. 95 (1978), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicrulesofcourt_20050929.htm 
(last visted May 20, 2007).
39 International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, see http://www.itlos.org/ (last visited May 
20, 2007).
40 Lamy Trancript, supra note 3.
41 DSU, supra note 1, art. 22.
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and they are only in place until a party does come into compliance. Com-
pensation has been mentioned as denoting the making of new concessions 
in other areas, and withdrawal of concessions involves retaliation – in other 
words, withdrawing concessions to the other party in breach of the contract. 
Although it does not look like enforcement in the domestic law context, the 
idea of sanction has become very much part of the language surrounding 
WTO dispute settlement. Steve Charnovitz has identifi ed the change from 
“GATT-speak,” which is about rebalancing concessions, to “WTO-speak,” 
which is about trade sanctions.42   
Although the GATT retaliation process was largely theoretical because 
only once was it authorized, the sanctioning process of retaliation or with-
drawal of concessions is really just an act of self help. If an offending state 
did not restore the balance of concessions itself by removing the offending 
measure, the offended-against state could, with the approval of the GATT 
Council, restore the balance itself by removing concessions equivalent to the 
level of impairment. Basically, you countered another state’s refusal or limita-
tion of market access by refusing or limiting market access to that state. The 
idea has a simple, contractual rationale. If the other party delivers on only 
part of the bargain, you do not have to pay the full price. Of course, this con-
tractual rationale makes sense in a reciprocal relationship where A bargains 
with B, and the resulting agreement involves either concessions on both sides 
or obligations on both sides; if B fails to perform, then A is relieved of its 
obligations to B. This kind of model accorded somewhat with the original 
GATT negotiating practice of offer and request.43   
Nevertheless, in a multilateral trading system where, for many states, 
concessions are not gained through bargaining but through the application 
of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) provision to someone else’s bargain, 
the idea of rebalancing concessions has a real degree of artifi ciality. Also, 
it undermines, to some extent, the multilateral nature of a system; while a 
nonconforming measure applies to all GATT contracting parties, the rebal-
ancing only occurs in respect of the complaining contractual party. So, there 
is no real rebalancing in any multilateral sense. Again, Steve Charnovitz has 
referred to the language of WTO scholars asserting that governments and 
arbitrators have moved away from rebalancing.44   
42 See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 A.J.I.L. 792 (2001).
43 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 20, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
44 Charnovitz, supra note 42.
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Today there is a more explicit objective of inducing compliance, and as 
a result, we now talk about sanctions. But, I think in moving away from the 
underlying contractual theory of withdrawal of concessions, we have ended 
up with a degree of incoherency. Essentially, the result of responding to a 
trade-restrictive measure is the restriction of trade with the offending state. 
That is, under the guise of promoting freer trade, by placing pressure on 
the state to maintain its liberalizing commitments, the system adopts a trade 
restriction. Moreover, as I just pointed out, that sanction has fairly perverse 
consequences. It targets other industries in the offending state, and it hurts 
both the exporters from that state and the importers and consumers in its 
own country. Hence, the perversity of the sanction is that it hits innocent 
third parties. The argument that a sanction will produce a constituency in 
one country in favor of compliance is countered by the fact that it produces a 
constituency in the other country against the use of the sanctions.  
These consequences – and not to mention the fairly obvious fact that re-
taliation, if it is to work at all, is probably only available to larger economies 
or between economies of similar or equivalent size – have led to searches for 
alternative sanctioning mechanisms. You see quite a lot in the literature on 
mandatory compensation, the advance preparation of lists, collective retali-
ation, the use of domestic courts through which decisions are made self-ex-
ecuting, fi nancial compensation, the withdrawal of related rights to use the 
dispute settlement process, and – one I rather like that was mentioned yester-
day – tradable retaliatory rights, which is the idea that you would sell another 
country the right to hurt its own consumers in order to open markets for 
you. It sounds like a pretty good deal. I am not quite sure the exchange will 
operate very effectively.  
Regardless, all of these alternatives have their own problems. In particu-
lar, if you take the fi nancial compensation proposal by Marco Bronckers, he 
identifi es the compensation proposal as both a form of compensation and as 
a form of sanction to put pressure on the other country.45  Apart from the 
oddness of describing compensation as a sanction, what happens if the fi nan-
cial compensation is not paid? You still have to have some kind of sanction to 
force the payment of the sanction, if you like.
  
When discussing other ways of dealing with this so-called enforcement 
problem, we have to keep in mind that we actually do not have much of a 
45 Marco Bronckers, Financial Compensation in the WTO – Improving the Remedies of WTO 
Dispute Settlement, J. INT’L ECON. L. 2005.8(101) (2005).
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problem. Bill Davey made the point yesterday and in an article in the Journal 
of International Economic Law a few years ago.46  His survey of the fi rst ten 
years showed something like an 83 percent implementation rate. Even where 
implementation had not strictly occurred and there was not a substantial 
number of these cases, other ways around implementation had been found. 
Although technically implementation had not occurred, the parties obviously 
had worked out some deal. No one really understands how Canada and Bra-
zil seem to have come to a resolution without withdrawing the measures.47  I 
now can fl y in Canada on Embraer, so I suspect you can probably fl y in Brazil 
on Canadair. Both Embraer and Canadair are the two aircraft involved in 
that dispute, so maybe there is some sort of deal that was worked out be-
tween the two countries.  
The problem of implementation, which Bill Davey addressed and has 
been mentioned in this conference, is probably more one of delay. It takes a 
long time for implementation, and that may be part of the diffi culty. Further-
more, and I think Steve Kho made this point yesterday, in most instances fail-
ure to implement is not simply a willful disregard of WTO obligations. You 
will fi nd states that have implemented quickly in some instances and taken 
an extraordinary period of time in other instances. So, we are not talking 
about states that are simply perennially in disregard of their obligations. We 
are talking about domestic implementation problems that occur, and often 
there are political consequences of implementation. Professor Echols made 
this point earlier. Are you prepared to have the government fall in order to 
live up to your WTO obligations? These are diffi cult questions. Simply try-
ing to fi nd new means of pressure, sanctions, or forms of retaliation may not 
resolve the problem.  
In my view, what we need, perhaps, is to think less of sanctions and to try 
and deal with what I would refer to as chronic problems of non-implementa-
tion. I think the only clear example of that is the Hormones case.48  The FSC 
case may or may not become a chronic problem of non-implementation; 
maybe it will be resolved.49  The only clear example of chronic nonimplemen-
tation so far is the Hormones case. What we need to think about is not a sanc-
46 William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Decade, 8 J.I.E.L. 17-50 
(2005).
47 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by 
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/2, (Aug. 4, 2000). 
48 Hormones, DS26, supra note 22.
49 FSC, DS108, supra note 14.
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tion, but maybe an alternative remedy – going back to the distinction that I 
made earlier. In doing this, and I think that in substance what I am going to 
say has been said by Professor Echols when she discussed compensation, we 
have to look again at compensation.  
The essence of the compensation alternative under the DSU is that Mem-
bers can negotiate compensation in the form of market access to other areas 
as a temporary measure until the nonconforming measure is removed. That 
is the way compensation exists at the moment, and it is hardly ever used; it 
is an option to provide an incentive for implementation. When you look at 
the current proposals for DSU reform, people are talking about improving 
compensation as a mechanism but still keeping it as a temporary measure to 
encourage implementation. In my view, we should explore the opportunity 
or possibility of making compensation a remedy and not leave it simply as a 
voluntary or even mandatory sanctioning device that can be used on a tem-
porary basis until the offending measure is removed. That is to say, in some 
circumstances, WTO Members should be able to provide market access of an 
equivalent benefi t as an alternative to implementation through the removal 
of the nonconforming measure. I am not saying that this should be a univer-
sal option. I am saying that this may be a way of dealing with a certain limited 
number of cases.  
Now, the arguments against the idea of compensation as a remedy will 
readily spring to mind, so let me fi rst talk about arguments in support. First 
of all, compensation does provide an outlet for states that do have a chronic 
non-implementation problem, where the political cost of implementing is 
simply too high.  
Secondly, such compensation is actually a trade-liberalizing, rather than 
a trade-restricting, measure. Admittedly, the WTO inconsistent restriction 
will remain, but instead of countering this with further trade restrictions 
what would happen is that compensation would, at least, maintain the status 
quo in terms of overall market access, even though it may not be in the same 
areas.  
The third advantage is that compensation would result in what I would 
call a “real-rebalancing.” Instead of rebalancing in respect only of the com-
plaining party, the market access would be available on a MFN basis for all 
WTO Members. Also, since the non-complying measure has a potential im-
pact on all WTO Members, the compensatory market access should also be 
available to all WTO Members, whether or not they are complaining parties.
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A fourth advantage is that it ensures the cost of noncompliance is borne 
primarily by the noncomplying Member. Now, under the existing retalia-
tory regime, the cost of retaliation, as has been pointed out, is borne in part 
by the Member that is retaliating. This Member has to bear the cost of the 
noncomplying measure, and it has to bear the cost of the retaliatory measure 
to its own imports and to its own consumers. Under a new compensation 
regime, it is the Member in breach who has the burden of noncompliance. 
The noncomplying Member has to decide what part of its economy it will 
now open up to account for the fact that it has now closed off another part 
of its economy. The question becomes: Who is going to win and who is going 
to lose within the state that is in violation, not within the state that is trying to 
retaliate?
I think compensation also provides a degree of fl exibility if one thinks of 
compensation in terms of being done partially or wholly. For example, the 
United States still does not have FSC case ruling in place. There is still the 
grandfathering question that the last Article 21.5 panel found against it.50 
If alternative market access was provided as a substitute to dealing with that 
fi nal part of FSC, could it be one way of fi nding a solution?  
Now, for the arguments against the compensation approach: fi rst of all, 
fi nding alternative market access might be a diffi cult question and it may 
mean that you will have to look in other areas – in other goods areas or ser-
vices, perhaps – for that market access, but this issue is no different from the 
problem of fi nding where to retaliate. Also, to make this work, you would 
have to have a system similar to what we have now for retaliation. There 
would have to be the possibility of arbitration on the appropriate level of 
market access. The complaining state would need to have input into what the 
areas of access should be and the right to have at least part of a real benefi t 
stemming from these areas.  
Another argument against compensation as a remedy as an alternative to 
removal of a nonconforming measure, is that it may serve as an incentive for 
states simply not to implement. This is a potential problem, which is why I 
am not suggesting that it be a universal alternative. I think it should be a re-
stricted alternative, and maybe it should not be available for certain kinds of 
violations. For example, I do not think it would be an appropriate alternative 
in a safeguards case. Safeguards would have to be removed, and you should 
not have the compensation alternative to removal of a safeguard measure. 
50 See id.
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Compensation would be, in a sense, an incentive to implementation because 
the alternative the state would face is opening up a different area of its econ-
omy – a diffi cult domestic political question itself. So, a state would have to 
determine which diffi cult political question it is going to face – dealing with 
the industry that is benefi ting from a noncomplying measure or dealing with 
some other part of the economy.  
A third diffi culty with compensation is that there is still a problem if the 
Member refuses to open its market in another area. This problem relates to 
the fact that we really do not have, as Professor Echols said, any real kind of 
enforcement. We do not have any real kind of sanction in the WTO. Frankly, 
I have a feeling that the search for sanctions – although, as Steve Charnovitz 
said, the language we use now is a bit illusory – is the same as in any area of 
international law. Sanctions, at the domestic level, ultimately depend upon 
the power of the state to exercise force. We do not have that power at the 
international level – maybe such a power was part of the original conception 
of the United Nations Charter. But, it has not worked and it is not likely to 
work. We have to accept the fact that there is no magic form of sanctioning 
out there. Therefore, what I am suggesting is that we think of alternatives to 
implementation as a way of promoting the objectives of the WTO.  
A further objection to compensation is, to some extent, a technical legal 
objection, and it gets into the debate between Professor John Jackson and 
others about whether there is an obligation to comply with a WTO dispute 
settlement.51  Is there a legal obligation to comply?  Originally, it was a de-
bate between Professor Jackson and Judith Bello.52  More recently, as Bello 
has more or less acknowledged, the debate is between Jackson and one of his 
coauthors, Alan Sykes.53  Alan Sykes and Warren Schwartz have suggested 
that there really is no legal obligation because the WTO encourages effi cient 
breach.54  The WTO says you can violate your obligations as long as you 
pay compensation for it because it provides this compensation alternative. 
51 John H. Jackson, Comment, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding – Misunderstand-
ings on the Natue of Legal Obligation, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 60, 62-63 (1997) (“The DSU lan-
guage…strongly suggests that the legal effect of an adopted panel report is the international 
law obligation to perform the recommendation of the panel report.”).
52 Compare id. with  Judith Hippler Bello, Comment, The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Less Is More, 90 Am. J. Int’l L.  416, 416-17 (1996).
53 See Judith Hippler Bello, Book Review and Note, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 984, 987 (2001) (re-
viewing John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law 
and Economic Relations (Cambridge University Press 2000). 
54 See Warren F. Sykes & Alan O. Schwartz, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and 
Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. Legal Stud. 179, 181 (2002).
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Therefore, you do not have any legal obligation. Professor Jackson has rather 
convincingly pointed out that there are a variety of reasons supporting the 
assertion that there is a legal obligation to comply with a WTO dispute settle-
ment. I have a feeling that in this debate there is some confusion between 
the nature of the remedy and the legal obligation to comply. I do not think 
the fact that domestically contracting parties are able to breach and pay dam-
ages without getting jailed or receiving some other sanction should lead us 
to conclude that there is no legal obligation to carry out your contract. The 
law does impose a legal obligation to carry out your contract, and it imposes 
consequences if you do not. In any event, as I previously stated, the ability to 
compensate through market access would not be available as a remedy across 
the board.  
A fi nal concern people may have is that this proposal sounds somewhat 
like a backdoor way of renegotiating your concessions. Under Article 28 of 
the GATT if you want to get out of certain concessions you have made, you 
have to go through a process of negotiating an agreement.55  Compensating 
through market access would be a different way of doing what Article 28 
tries to set limits on. Again, if it was a wholesale allowing of compensation as 
an alternative, then I think that might be a greater concern. If it is circum-
scribed and constrained, then perhaps it is a lesser concern of getting around 
the obligations imposed by Article 28.  
I do not think the objections to the proposal are overwhelming. I think 
that the search for a better sanction in the WTO is illusory. Therefore, we 
should start to think of alternative remedies to deal with those cases where 
implementation by removal of the offending measure is simply too diffi cult 
for a state, where the domestic political costs are too high. In these circum-
stances, we should think in terms of mandatory compensation, or opening 
market access, as an alternative. Thank you.  
Bodansky:  Thank you all very much. At this point, I would like to open 
it up to comments or questions from the fl oor. Perhaps I could exercise my 
chair’s prerogative and ask an opening question to kick things off. It is for 
Professor McRae. My question may have a simple answer. Does your pro-
posal involve displacing the sanction of removal of concessions, or would it 
be supplementary? It seems to me that your proposal addresses the problem 
of a state that would like to comply but fi nds it diffi cult to remove the specifi c 
55 GATT, supra note 43, art. 28 
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offending measure. Thus, this state would welcome an opportunity to have 
some alternative means of compliance. But, there may also be some situa-
tions where you need more of a stick; in such cases, there might still be a role 
for removal of concessions as a sanction to try to induce countries to change 
their behavior.  
McRae:  I was not suggesting that you have to get rid of retaliation. I 
was really looking at what are alternative ways of ensuring that we get more 
compliance. Therefore, this was a route that provides an opportunity for 
states. But, states that still want to use the retaliation option, and think they 
can, should not have this option taken away.  
Gabriel Wilner:56  Would retaliation or compensation be alternatives 
that either of the two states involved, or the various parties involved, could 
decide upon, or would these alternatives be open only to the complaining 
party who won in the panel? Perhaps an alternative would be to allow the 
parties to negotiate as to whether one or the other remedies would be better 
for both.  
McRae:  It seems to me that there are two ways of proceeding. What I 
had in mind was that a state that has been unable to implement would, after 
a certain period of time, be able to choose compensation as an option. The 
Hormones case strikes me as a possible case; how many years are we going to 
go on with the Hormones case being unimplemented? There reaches a certain 
time where the state should be able to declare that it is not going to be able 
to implement, and therefore, in a sense it would choose the mandatory com-
pensation option. You would also have to think of arbitration (this would 
make lawyers happy), in other words – arbitration: whether it is appropriate 
to take the option at that stage or whether it should be circumscribed in 
some way. The other approach would be to simply change the existing com-
pensation option in Article 22 to a fi nal alternative and not just a temporary 
measure. This would mean that compensation would have to be agreed to by 
both parties. So there are two ways of getting at it.
Echols:  I think the parties have not been able to agree on compensa-
tion in most instances, so in terms of your last scenario, I think you would 
56 Associate Dean and Charles H. Kirbo Professor of International Law; Executive Director, 
Dean Rusk Center – International, Comparative, and Graduate Legal Studies, University of 
Georgia School of Law; Moderator (Panel 3: To What Extent Does the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System Have a Role in Global Governance? Should the Appellate Body Look to Sources Outside 
the WTO Agreement?).
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be just where you are now. The parties would not reach the point where it 
could be used. Now compensation has to be agreed upon by the two parties 
and suspension of concessions has to be approved by the DSB, so you are 
trying to change that option. Who has to agree to this other proposal, and 
do you take away this last option of retaliation? If the WTO is about market 
opening, it seems that if a country is willing to open its market that should 
have more weight than allowing someone to basically retaliate. You are left 
with a measure that does not comply, and what do you do about that? Should 
the compensation be a “super-compensation”? You have talked about it be-
ing multilateral. Maybe that is what makes it all right, but I think that if you 
say that both parties have to agree to compensation as it is now, it will not 
work.  
Nikolaos Zaimis:57  I have just a couple of comments and two small 
questions. One concerns what happens once a WTO Member claims that it 
has complied with a specifi c recommendation: who is responsible for determin-
ing whether the Member has complied?  Let us assume there is a case where a 
WTO Member was condemned for not having complied, and then a trade 
sanction is taken against it. Then one day this Member complies, or claims 
it complies. Who is to decide whether it is complying? In my view the obvi-
ous answer is: an Article 21.5 panel initiated by the complainant. Yet, what 
happens if the complainant has imposed sanctions and simply does not want 
to go to an Article 21.5 panel, but rather wants unilaterally to continue with 
trade sanctions? It is apparent that that is more or less the situation in the 
Hormones case that you mentioned.58   
My second question relates to the actual size of the problem. We have 
seen cases where the economic size of the problem is in itself problematic 
because the amounts involved are so small that there is a certain degree of in-
ertia on both sides. In such a case, on the part of the complainant, you do not 
want to take sanctions; indeed, it would be ridiculous to impose sanctions for 
US$2 or US$3 million, for example. On the other hand, the loser, the party 
that has not complied, would argue that because of the insignifi cance of the 
amount there is no real political will to take action. This is a catch-22 situa-
tion, so I want to ask if you have any comments or recommendations.  
57 Counselor, Head of Trade Section, Delegation of the European Commission; Panelist 
(Panel 3: To What Extent Does the WTO Dispute Settlement System Have a Role in Global Gov-
ernance? Should the Appellate Body Look to Sources Outside the WTO Agreements?).
58 Hormones, DS26, supra note 22.
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Echols:  When you are thinking about compensation, there is a point at 
which you say you will not change the measure but rather open your market 
for some other products. I think the idea of letting the retaliation go on and 
on simply undermines the credibility of the WTO system. That said, I think 
we are talking about a very small number of disputes. I agree that most of 
the recommendations have been complied with. Whatever we talk about, we 
should realize that the solution should not be disproportionate to the fact 
that we are only talking about either very small cases or very big ones. What 
do you do in those two instances?  
McRae:  In respect to your fi rst question, it seems there is a bit of a gap in 
the existing procedures where you do have one party saying it has complied 
and the other party is not prepared to take it to an Article 21.5 panel but is 
still saying that there has been no compliance. I would have thought that if 
one was designing a new system, one might provide that, at a certain point, 
the party in compliance can go to the DSB and say: We have complied. The 
DSB can then formally set up a panel to make that determination. However, 
the idea of bringing a panel against yourself, is a rather odd concept.  
Echols:  I think the option is to challenge the party that is continuing 
to impose the retaliation. It is a new case. I said dispute about a dispute. 
That is basically what you can have, and you can do it as an Article 21.5. If 
it does not happen that way, maybe you can do it as a new dispute. Why are 
you imposing extra tariffs or measures against my export? It is again a market 
access issue.
Steven Kho:59  Professor Echols does raise a good question and one that 
is worth a lot of discussion. A lot of what Professor Echols and Professor 
McRae have said is in fact happening now. The EC, in the Hormones case, es-
sentially has a new dispute.60  I believe the EC in the past has also sued itself 
with respect to Bananas.61  I cannot remember the exact name, but there was 
a case in which the EC had challenged itself in order to show compliance. 
This is an area that I think certainly is worth further consideration.  
I am particularly interested in Professor McRae’s initial thoughts and pro-
posal of compensation because in the past when people talk about compensa-
59 Associate General Counsel, Offi ce of the United States Trade Representative; Panelist 
(Panel 1: Should the WTO Dispute Settlement System Be Modifi ed or Reformed?; Panel 2: After 
a Decade of Dispute Settlement Cases, Whom Does the System Benefi t?). 
60 Hormones, DS26, supra note 22.
61 Bananas, DS27, supra note 15.
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tion, you immediately think monetary compensation. Here, you are propos-
ing a sort of market access compensation which is focused more on those 
agreements that have a traditionally market access element – those that can 
somehow be put in certain tariffs, like the GATT related to goods and pluri-
lateral agreements and the government procurement agreement,62  which also 
has sort of a market access bent to it. But, I am curious to know what you are 
thinking is behind retaliation and compensation. When you have retaliation it 
is often limited to the party that has brought the case, and it is focused on the 
trade levels of that party and how it is affected. Compensation is solely focused 
on the party that has brought the case and yet, in your proposal as I under-
stand it, market access compensation would all of a sudden become a “most 
favored nation provided for all” kind of situation. Now, if you can quantify 
that compensation, it seems to go above and beyond. I am just curious why 
you would suggest in your proposal that that particular remedy should go 
beyond simply between the parties but to the membership as a whole.  
McRae:  Well, it is partly a theoretical point and partly a practical point. 
Theoretically, what a state has done by not complying with its obligations is 
a wrong to all WTO Members; if it is a denial of market access, then it is a 
denial to all WTO Members. It may be that most Members do not have that 
trade and therefore, they are not going to bring a complaint. However, in 
Bananas, the United States’ partial justifi cation was that it had a potential 
or future trade interest in bananas.63  Essentially, by imposing a limitation on 
market access, you are denying something to all WTO Members. Therefore, 
if you are going to do something to replace the market access you have de-
nied, you should consider all WTO Members.  
The practical problem is, of course, fi nding market access that does not 
just open markets for a whole lot of Members who were not interested in the 
original dispute. But, maybe this is the price to pay for not living up to the 
obligation that you made in the original commitment. You made a commit-
ment in the Uruguay Round and you are not prepared to fulfi ll this obliga-
tion, so you have to make an equivalent commitment to all WTO Members 
to do something else. That is the sense in which I think it is more justifi ed. 
Under the current remedy of removal of the measure, those who bring the 
case are seen to get the benefi t from the case. In fact, everyone benefi ts be-
62 Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round 
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm.
63 Bananas, DS27, supra note 15.
137
cause if the provision is removed, it is removed for all member states. Thus, 
it seems to me that where compensation is provided through market access 
it is appropriate to provide market access for all Members. As I previously 
mentioned, the idea of retaliation is simply based on a simple bilateral model, 
but that is not what we are operating under here.  
Bodansky:  Any other questions or comments?  Don?  
Johnson:  I would like for the panel to address the question of cross-
agreement retaliation that has been brought up in the Brazil Cotton case64 
and others. I can certainly see where retaliation might not work for Brazil 
and for other countries like Ecuador, mentioned earlier today in the Bananas 
case. However, I thought that was a fairly unique approach. I do not know 
that it is, but it was unique in my mind in any case. I just wonder what you 
think the implications might be of that alternative, and whether we could get 
a comment also from our EU and the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) attendees as to what the position might be from the EU and the 
U.S.?
Verrill:  Let me see if I can respond to that question. The Ecuador case 
that I mentioned in my talk was the fi rst time that cross-agreement retaliation 
was considered by any panel or arbitral group. They went to great lengths 
to demonstrate that Ecuador had made a convincing case that cross-agree-
ment retaliation was the only option that would be effective because of the 
disparity in the size of their economies and the fact that any retaliatory duties 
imposed by Ecuador would be a self-infl icted wound because those products 
are generally used by Ecuadorian manufacturers.65   
The problem, of course, in dealing with cross-agreement retaliation, par-
ticularly with TRIPS, is: what are the boundaries of the problem? If Ecuador, or 
Brazil in the case that is now pending, is allowed to suspend TRIPS obliga-
tions relative to the U.S., does that mean that Brazilian product producers 
can, for example, incorporate U.S. intellectual property in their manufac-
turing and then re-export those goods to other countries so that there is a 
spillover effect of the suspension of the liquidation? In the Ecuador panel, 
the suggestion was made that this result would not be a problem because 
every country is obligated under TRIPS to have border measures in place to 
prohibit importation of intellectual property, whether trademarks or patents, 
64 Cotton, DS267, supra note 18. 
65 Bananas, DS27, supra note 15.
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that has been used without the consent of the owner. So, there would be 
potential avoidance of a spillover because of the way the TRIPS obligations 
work.66  I think that this is something that needs to be explored much more 
thoroughly than it has been because, as Pascal Lamy stated in the excerpt I 
quoted earlier,67 there needs to be a way to make it more opportune for small 
countries to obtain redress for WTO violations when the other country is a 
much bigger and more powerful trading entity.  
Wilner:  Do you not think that this may encourage small states who 
now think that the advantages they might gain are too ephemeral or perhaps 
counterproductive? Would this type of cross-agreement system in terms of 
remedies help? Is a compensation scheme needed as well? Is there need for 
further compensations and further schemes for effective relief for smaller 
countries to consider – to render the expense worthwhile? 
Verrill:  I think obviously it would. Ecuador felt the only way they could 
really protect their banana industry and its exports was by doing something 
other than simple same-sector, same-agreement retaliation. I think a country 
like Ecuador, or a country of similar size, would be encouraged to be more 
assertive of its WTO rights.  
Zaimis:  Cross-sectoral retaliation, e.g., to suspend TRIPS rights, could 
be a powerful tool for smaller developing countries. But in one way, it is 
easier said than actually done. In practice, what does this mean if you want 
to suspend, for example, trademark rights? A company will have the right 
to produce, for example, fake Gucci bags? For how long? Somebody will 
be doing that job for the period of the suspension, or, in terms of a patent, 
somebody will be using a patent and not paying royalties – who would that 
user be and how would you evaluate or quantify the amount of retaliation? In 
terms of copyright, this would mean allowing the unauthorized copying of 
DVDs, books, and CDs. The number of intellectual property rights involved 
in a book or DVD could be quite diversifi ed in terms of nationalities so 
even if, say, you target a movie made in the EU, you might discover you are 
violating intellectual property rights linked to the U.S., Japan, Switzerland, 
or Norway. Cross-retaliation is not very easy to do in practice. Moreover, it 
might be limited by the size of the market of the retaliator. For WTO Mem-
bers with big domestic markets, suspension of IPR rights might make sense 
(it might be profi table). For WTO Members with small domestic matkets 
66 TRIPS, supra note 16.
67 Lamy Transcript, supra note 3.
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(who rely on export markets), this might not be an interesting option. So, 
appealing as it might seem, there are practical problems linked to it.  
Echols:  In the Ecuador case, I believe one of the options given to Ecua-
dor was to infringe geographical indications, of which I am in favor, which is 
something that is more manageable. Consider a potato or a cheese. Suppose 
they could make a cheese and call it Parmesan or a ham called Parma. Are 
these goods just for the Ecuadorian market or could they export it to the 
communities? What does all of this mean? I think it might be possible to fi nd 
little sections of this broad authorization given to Ecuador that they might 
be able to manage. Then again, as you said, is it for the internal market, the 
domestic market, or would this authorization also affect the European mar-
ket, which would make a big difference?
Kho:  My personal views actually are very similar to Professor Echols. I 
think there are a lot of practical problems, even in a situation of geographi-
cal indications. Professor Echols’ point is well taken, which is if Ecuador 
makes Parma ham and starts to export it to other countries – let us say, to 
the United States – the United States does have obligations under the TRIPS 
agreement to enforce geographical indication rights.68  For example, if the 
EC then comes to the U.S. and seeks redress in that way, the U.S. will have 
no choice but to follow its own laws and its international obligations; at this 
point, the Parma ham that Ecuador is exporting may not be able to fi nd 
markets in the world. There are a lot of diffi culties with cross-retaliation, and 
it is something that looks good on paper and people have to think about it. 
There might be situations in which it would be useful. However, with respect 
to intellectual property, specifi cally, and how to quantify it and then ensure 
that you are not over retaliating, these are all diffi cult questions and part of 
the reason why I think Ecuador ultimately did not do anything. It did not 
utilize the cross-retaliation authority at the end of the day.  
Verrill:  I agree that there are very real complexities. In fact, even the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil has acknowledged that there are what he 
called “hurdles to cross” before it could implement any kind of intellectual 
property suspension as a means of retaliating against the United States. My 
point is that rather than leaving this issue to be resolved by panels who have 
to work through these issues and resolve the diffi culties, I would rather see 
this be placed squarely on the table. It is probably too late to do it in the 
68 See TRIPS, supra note 16.
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Doha Round, but it seems that this is an area where there should be and 
could be solutions found much more readily in the negotiation context than 
in the litigation context.  
Bodansky:  We have time for one fi nal comment if anybody would like 
to take the fl oor.  
Unidentifi ed Speaker:  In terms of trespassing the TRIPS agreement as 
an alternative remedy, I have not heard big pharmaceutical companies come 
up. The pharmaceutical industry comes to mind when I think of remedies 
that would really make a strong statement and would perhaps run the risk of 
overcompensating but at the time would be effective sanctions or remedies 
for lack of a better term. Would that not fall under TRIPS? Is that not on the 
table because these are transnational corporations? How does that fi gure into 
the picture as you see it? Drug patents when we are talking about intellectual 
property, would that not be a very powerful card?  
Verrill:  It is certainly my position that it would be a very powerful card, and 
it would put pressure on the U.S., if it is the country retaliated against, to 
comply because there would be domestic interests presenting a very strong 
case for the U.S. to come into compliance because its economic interests are 
being jeopardized.  
Unidentifi ed Speaker:  Would that fall under TRIPS?  Would it be an au-
tomatic?
Davey:  Brazil is surely thinking of the pharmaceutical patents.
Verrill:  Yes, I am sure they are.  
Bodansky:  Unfortunately, our time is up, but I wanted to thank the panel-
ists again for a very excellent presentation. I wanted to thank the audience for 
coming on a beautiful Friday morning. Also, in particular, I wanted to thank 
the Rusk Center and Ambassador Johnson for organizing what has been a 
really interesting two days. Thank you all. 
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